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 The present study was conducted to investigate some of the practical implications 
of conceptual integration theory for educators. This research was a mixed-methods study 
exploring how improvements in understanding—learning—(as measured by a selected-
response assessment) are reflected in changes in learner language (described in terms of 
conceptual integration patterns). After a pretest with open-response and selected-response 
prompts, two groups of young adult participants viewed different videos of a slightly 
different review lesson in genes, genetics, and heredity, the difference lying in two 
different metaphor conditions: the experimental group was shown a  more “metaphor-
rich” version of the lesson using two classic metaphors about the topic. Both groups then 
took somewhat elaborated posttests to provide data as to what kinds of conceptual 
integration processes may have been in use by the participants as they processed, learned, 
and communicated their understanding of the instructional content.   
 Results were compared to determine if the instructional metaphors bore on 
patterns of learning and understanding as described by the conceptual integration model.  
The different metaphor conditions were not shown to have been significantly different in 
their respective effects on participant learning; however, the broad gains across all pre-
post quantitative results suggested real learning among the participants. This learning—or 
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at least the participants’ communication about the content domain—was indeed reflected 
in changes identified by a conceptual integration analysis of the qualitative data.   
 The researcher concluded not only that the conceptual integration model could be 
used as a guide to improve teaching practices; if the conceptual integration model could 
account more robustly or subtly for cognitive elements of teaching and learning, it also 
could be used to refine the language used in the creation and interpretation of 
assessments, leading to improved validity and reliability at any level of assessment, from 
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Theoretical Context and Background 
 
In pursuit of my doctoral program in educational psychology at UNC, I have tried 
to keep in mind the three topics of foremost interest to me throughout my 30-year 
teaching career: language, learning, and psychology.  A deceptively simple core issue in 
educational psychology has proven to be frustratingly difficult for generations of 
researchers, i.e., just what happens psychologically when students learn something new 
from classroom instruction? In this research, I addressed that question about the 
psychology of learning through the perspective of language. 
Though there have been many advancements in the assessment of student learning 
since the foundations of educational psychology were being established about 100 years 
ago, theoretical solutions to that question—What happens psychologically when students 
learn something new from classroom instruction?—remain elusive. Studies of the 
phenomena of consciousness, memory, neurology, linguistics, social psychology, 
communication, and pedagogy have enriched the ongoing discussion with increasing 
subtlety and explanatory power. However, until recently, there was little common 
intellectual ground among these various fields. Although each separate field yielded 
valuable understanding, educators seeking wide-ranging practical applications have been 
stymied by the piecemeal nature of the different disciplines’ findings.  
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Previous “transmission” models (Mayer, 1999) of learning have been woefully 
inadequate in explanatory power, especially in light of recent advances in cognitive 
psychology and cognitive linguistics. In the present study, I addressed the psychology of 
teaching and learning through the application of principles from the newly emerging 
cognitive model of conceptual integration (Coulson & Van Petten, 2002; Evans & Green, 
2006; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Turner & Fauconnier, 1995; Underhill, 2002), also 
known in the literature as conceptual blending. Because of its unified and holistic, rather 
than fragmented, nature, the conceptual integration model has the potential to offer a 
number of useful insights and tools to the field of educational psychology. The research 
reported here uses a conceptual integration approach in a mixed-method analysis of the 
relative effects of two instructional metaphor conditions by quantitative and qualitative 
measures of change in student understanding. 
In brief, conceptual integration theory offers a model of how people think 
(Coulson & Van Petten, 2002; Evans & Green, 2006; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Turner 
& Fauconnier, 1995; Underhill, 2002). To the extent it is valid, the model could account 
for much of what happens psychologically when people teach and learn. Likewise, the 
model could account for many occasions of informal, ad hoc teaching and learning as 
well; however, the educational focus of the present study is designed to provide an 
application of the conceptual integration model to the analysis of formal instruction and 
assessment. Although other types of thought are included in the conceptual integration 
model, language is the most common medium of human interaction. As such, it is 
recognized as a prime example of at least certain kinds of thought. Because of this, most 
of the examples provided in this research are language-based. The more specific focus of 
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this research is that very powerful feature of language and instruction--the intentional use 
of metaphor as a teaching strategy. Unless otherwise cited, the examples are mine.  
In this chapter, I examine and develop the general theoretical and historical bases 
of the areas of research for this study. To facilitate the reader’s understanding of the areas 
of psychology and linguistics to be addressed, I include a set of terms and definitions 
specific to cognitive linguistics (and an even more specific set of terms and definitions in 
the field of conceptual integration in the second chapter). Having by then established a 
general framework of inquiry, I close this section with an overview of some of the 
potential applications of these concepts to educational psychology and an overview of the 
present research involving an analysis of the use of metaphor in both instruction and 
learning.  
Proponents of the conceptual integration model (e.g., Coulson & Van Petten, 
2002; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002) argue that it implies a vast range of educational 
applications; this research was just such an application. The purpose of this mixed–
methods research was to apply the conceptual integration model to the analysis of 
metaphors used by both teachers and students in a realistic teaching and learning 
situation. Although this research was limited to a small sample size, a single pair of 
experimental conditions, and a single suite of assessments, the relatively natural setting 
and highly focused prompts and responses provided enough quantitative and qualitative 
data to begin to address the idea that the conceptual integration model could be used to 
measure or otherwise analyze learning.  
I have long been fascinated by the ideas that there are underlying genetic and 
linguistic universals shared by all humans and it seems the evidence keeps pointing in 
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that direction (Pinker, 2002; Wells, 2006). Piecing together evidence from different 
disciplines has yielded a high level of plausibility for scenarios that account for much of 
what we see in the fields of linguistics, sociology, psychology, and genetics today in 
terms of our most widely distributed and universally held human characteristics. But 
regardless of the exact sequence of events then, we are now faced with the fact that as a 
species, we are surely the only species capable of intentional choices and activities which 
affect the entire human population and indeed the entire world. Wells’ (1922) famous 
maxim that history, and we may presume also the future, “is a race between education 
and catastrophe,” seems increasingly true as the years go by. In spite of truly marvelous 
abilities and potential, humans also continue to face dire consequences of overpopulation, 
poverty, war, disease, permanent loss of habitats and other resources, etc. For those of us 
who think education is better strategy than for solving such widespread and deeply rooted 
problems than complacency or ignorance, the urgency of discovering more effective 
classroom practices is self-evident. My work as an educator is informed and driven by 
this very sense of the value and urgency of what we do.  
After establishing a general background, theoretical context, and relevant 
terminology in this introductory chapter, I will move to a level of much greater 
specificity in Chapter II--Review of Literature. This review provides a framework of 
inquiry as well as a more detailed terminology based in research and theory, primarily 
from the fields of cognitive linguistics and conceptual integration. At the end of Chapter 
II, having established the validity of investigating and testing the conceptual integration 
approach to learning theory, I posed the primary research questions for this study. From 
these questions, I formulated hypotheses regarding evidence of learning measured by 
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changes in patterns of conceptual integration as evidenced by changes in students’ use of 
metaphors. In Chapter III, I describe the design, materials, methods, and procedures used 
in conducting this research.      
Evolutionary Psychology and 
Conceptual Integration 
 In making a case for how the conceptual integration model could be supported by 
what scientists are continuing to learn about the workings of the brain, I now turn to the 
evidence related to our understanding of how humans could have evolved such a useful, 
dynamic, and creative capacity, that is, the capacity to support conceptual integration.  
If, as Pinker (1997) suggests, “the mind is what the brain does” (p. 21), we must 
take into account the structure, internal processes, external influences on, and the 
products of the brain. The primary focus of this research is specifically related to 
language and learning, though the conceptual integration model goes much beyond these 
in scope. In order to establish an understanding of the possible mental networks of 
conceptual integration, I explore some of the current theory about the evolution of neural 
systems and work toward an understanding of how these systems could support the kind 
of brain activities implied by a conceptual integration perspective. As will be shown, the 
amazingly complex, fast, and recursive nature of brain activity seems to fit well with the 
tenets of conceptual integration. Although the specific physical details of all possible 
mental networks are not accessible in a practical way, what we are learning about the 
brain continues to support, rather than refute, the theories of the conceptual integration 
model. 
First, then, I consider some of the theories for the biological evolution of the 
human brain. Because of the scant physical evidence of human life before about 100,000 
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years ago, much of the conjecture regarding specific factors in the emergence, and even 
the definition of “modern humans,” remains moot. But there is at least some level of 
consensus (Blackmore, 1999; Calvin, 2004; Wells, 2006) that somewhere around that 
time, give or take about 50,000 years, what we today would recognize as cognitively 
modern humans appeared. Our deeply shared DNA suggests a common family group as 
does our “Universal Grammar” (Marcus, 2004; Pinker, 1994; Wilson & Keil, 1999). Also 
sometimes called “Generative Grammar” (Pinker; Wilson & Keil), this is considered by 
its proponents to be a genetically determined mental proclivity in humans to work in 
certain ways with language. Those ways are called “grammars,” or rule sets, and they are 
considered a more or less “given” part of our psychological genetic endowment as 
humans. I go into more detail about this concept in the following terminology section of 
this paper. Just as the superficial differences in human physiology have now recently 
been explicated by a much more complete picture of our underlying genetic unity 
(Wells), the “Tower of Babel” illusion of huge differences in human languages has been 
dispelled by a new and deeper understanding of commonality in language structures and 
processes shared by all people (Deutscher, 2005; Pinker). 
Some evolutionary scientists regard the turning point between pre-modern and 
modern humans as the emergence of specifically human physical skills and abilities. For 
example, Calvin (2004) asserts that the development of the ability to throw objects, such 
as rocks, then spears, allowed early humans to survive what would otherwise have been 
fatal encounters, thereby giving them the opportunity to establish human colonies with 
specific, transferable, and evolving survival skills. The roots of early homo-habilus (the 
“tool-maker”) go back to the earliest evidence of simple tool-making (roughly on a par 
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with simple tools we see in other species, particularly some primates and birds, for 
example), some two or three million years (Calvin). But the surge in the variety and 
sophistication of tools of the much more recent homo-sapiens (the “wise”) is qualitatively 
quite different from any previous tool-making.  
Calvin also brings up a more current example he calls the “curb-cut” phenomenon 
(2004, p. 97). Today’s urban dwellers have seen many different uses of curb cuts beyond 
the original function of allowing greater access for wheelchair-bound people; cyclists, 
skateboarders, pedestrians, cart-pushers, carriage pushers, etc., to use the same structure, 
though such use was not the original intent. Indeed, most of the traffic through a curb cut 
is not the kind of traffic for which it was intended. The point here is that language may 
well have been a happy by-product of other structures and functions of the evolving 
human brain, most of which seem to play multiple roles (Marcus, 2004; Ridley, 2003). 
Taken in combination with the inevitable interaction of these various neural structures 
and functions, we may move toward a plausible explanation of the evolution of our 
complex (specifically, our “computational” and “combinatorial”—each explained in 
detail below) language capacities. Briefly put, this view explains the evolution of 
language as a more or less inevitable by-product of having all or most of the modern 
brain’s structures and functions already in place. Calvin (2004) cites Chomsky, Hauser, 
and Fitch: 
The human faculty of language appears to be organized like the genetic 
code—hierarchical, generative, recursive, and virtually limitless with 
respect to its scope of expression…Most current commentators agree that, 
although bees dance, birds sing, and chimpanzees grunt, these systems of 
communication differ qualitatively from human language. In particular, 
animal communication systems lack the rich expressive and open-ended 




Artifacts from early—so far, dating back to about 75,000 years ago (World’s 
oldest jewelry found in cave, 2005) — homo-sapiens include something entirely new as 
well: art, and lots of it. Bead-making, stone- and bone- carving, basket-making, and cave 
paintings attest to utility and ritual at a completely unprecedented level (Ahuja, 1998; 
Mayell, 2004). Clearly, the latter part of the middle Stone Age represents a reasonable 
time frame (roughly 200,000-100,000 years ago) for the advent of at least anatomically 
modern humans. Though the rise of agriculture is a much more recent phenomenon, from 
probably near the end of the last ice age--some 10,000-12,000 years ago, tribal cultures 
based on traditional hunter-gatherer roles must have flourished for tens of thousands of 
years before, developing language, art, rituals, and world views. Thus, we may be fairly 
sure of the arrival (with homo-sapiens) of a new, thoroughly modern mental capacity: 
complex, symbolic thought (Ahuja; Calvin, 2004; Mayell). 
In contrast to emphasizing a set of particular physical skills or individual mental 
characteristics, other evolutionary scientists point to the development of culture, 
language, and art as the hallmarks of the new species (Heminway, 2001; Pinker, 1994). 
Though some of these thinkers (Blackmore, 1999; Forceville, 2001) posit that primitive 
cultural advances paved the way for increased cognitive capacities, others (Ahuja, 1998; 
Donald, 1991; Gardner, 1997; Winerman, 2005) argue that increased mental or emotional  
capacities were necessary preconditions for societies to emerge. For example, Blackmore 
uses the concept of memes—as in “mimetic: imitative” (Dawkins, 1976, p. 206; Oxford 
Encyclopedic English Dictionary, 1991, p. 922) —to argue that it may have been the rise 
of culture and, specifically, the cognitive ability to copy and adapt behavior that impelled 
our brains to evolve further. Marcus (2004) also suggests that part of what we are “born 
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to learn” is culture, including language, specifically by imitation. “The very ability to 
acquire culture is, I would suggest, one of the mind’s most powerful built-in learning 
mechanisms” (p. 27). Likewise, Azar (2005) advances the case that the evolutionary 
emergence of mirror neurons—a recently discovered type of neuron which activates a 
sense of experiencing a physical activity merely by watching others participate in the 
activity— allowed culture to form. These are fascinating “chicken-or-egg” debates; 
though definitive answers continue to be elusive, the pieces of the intellectual puzzles of 
how evolution shaped our human capacities are beginning to fall into place. Ornstein 
(1991) sums it up thusly: 
So, although blind evolution may well have originally selected for 
adaptability, resistance to heat and the like, it all comes together in the 
complex of factors that lead to us: bipedal, capable of graceful 
movements, needing a large brain to control them as well as speech. 
And…this can well be grasped… by the processes Darwin described. His 
contribution to the evolution of our understanding of ourselves is much 
greater than we’d realized. (p. 78) 
 
 In other words, although Darwin was focused on the grand picture of how all 
different species could have developed, one of those species was homo-sapiens. And in 
focusing on how our own species could have evolved not only physically but also 
mentally and culturally, evolutionary psychologists are continuing to add to our 
understanding of who we are, and how we may come to grips with our dilemmas and our 
promise.  
 Greenspan and Shanker (2004) hold that response to sensory input is the 
wellspring of emotions and memory, and is thus the deepest “ancestor” and most 
essential formative element of our modern social and cognitive abilities. The authors 
especially note the ongoing reciprocity of responses in interactive parent-child behaviors 
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as evidence. Like the other researchers and theorists cited above, their claims are 
plausible and provide valuable insights about the nature of human cognition. But taken 
separately, the various explanations fall short of providing a complete picture of how we 
think and learn. The story of the blind men and the elephant (Kuo & Kuo, 1976) seems to 
be in force here with a need for some kind of unifying perspective. With this in mind, I 
turn now from the past to the present.  
Neuroscience and Conceptual Integration 
Whatever the original impetus, the human brain’s amazingly complex 
connectivity and specialized functions which have evolved are continuing to be 
understood more completely, occasionally yielding to ever more subtle means of 
scientific research. With estimates of neuron counts ranging from 20 billion (Marcus, 
2004) to 100 billion (Pinker, 1997), and total connections at up to 100 trillion (Pinker), 
the brain is the most subtle and complex system known to exist. Among those billions of 
cells, there are an estimated 100,000 different types of neurons with specialized functions 
(Marcus). Yet having evolved to address certain kinds of needs in our ancestors’ lives, 
our brains are not necessarily equipped to address the needs of our modern lives, an issue 
evolutionary psychologists continue to explore (Pinker, 2002). The exploration of the 
present research, however, requires our path to diverge away from evolutionary 
psychology and on toward what neuroscience has to offer in describing the brain and its 
functions. 
Marcus (2004) suggests that there are at least hundreds or even thousands of areas 
of specialized brain functions that appear to have basic “locales.” However, between 
different individuals, the exact shape, location, and connectivity patterns of these 
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“modules,” as they are called (Gardner, 1997), may vary widely. Issues of localized 
function have only recently become amenable to empirical evidence; early 
psychologists were taught that the brain operated as a whole during cognition (Posner 
& DiGirolamo, 2000). But recent advances in neuroscience (particularly neuroimaging 
techniques such as Positron Emission Tomography [PET] scans and functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging [MRI] scans for localization of activity) ostensibly allow 
researchers to study brain activity “in progress” and therefore much more directly.  
Moreover, the computational metaphor used to describe brain functions has also 
been evolving from earlier “serial processing” models to “distributed parallel 
processing” models (Levitin, 2002). The serial processing model traces evidence of 
brain activity as a single chain of related neural events; however, parallel processing 
implies many events at once, reflecting many complex neural pathways and many 
concurrent activities in the brain. 
The neural architecture and functions required for the conceptual integration 
model depend crucially on the orchestration and recursion provided by parallel 
activation processes, “recruiting” information from several sources at once (Evans & 
Green, 2006; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Turner & Fauconnier, 1995; Underhill, 2002) 
such as external/verbal cues in addition to internal memory cues, and in-progress 
meaning construction. “During diverse cognitive tasks, neural areas work in concert to 
form a neural circuit with particular areas active at particular times to perform the 
necessary cognitive computations in the appropriate order of the task demands” (Posner 
& DiGirolamo, 2000, p. 880). In addition to “modules” of specific functions, some 
hemispheric-specific capabilities may be in service when understanding language as 
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well; for example, right hemisphere activation of possibilities may dovetail with left 
hemisphere activation of logical probabilities, allowing for the in-progress 
understanding (meaning construction) of novel discourse and information as it becomes 
available (Shuren & Grafman, 2002).   
Basic pathways, sites, systems, and structures have been mapped out (Carter, 
1999) such as the visual system, the limbic system, and the language areas (Marcus, 
2004; Pinker, 1994; Wilson & Keil, 1999). There also seem to be astonishing levels and 
ranges of plasticity and redundancy in neural development, giving rise to the idea that 
experiential and/or social factors—in addition to genetic factors—may literally help 
shape many of the brain’s specific structures and functions (Pinker, 2002). The long 
period of human infants’ post-natal dependence on caregivers attests to the idea that the 
well-documented development of the nervous system before birth is in itself incomplete, 
impressive though it may be. The high levels of neural development achieved in 
childhood are part of what shapes and structures our distinctly human cognitive capacities 
(Ridley, 2003).    
Additionally, many of the brain’s activities have been timed. Studies of Event-
Related Potentials (ERPs) –specifically, the N400 component, so-called because this 
negative brain wave occurs very predictably at 400 millisecond intervals after words are 
heard or read— are commonly used to determine recognition and processing speeds in 
language use. The N400 component is impacted (as evidenced by different amplitudes or 
height of the wave/signal) by various linguistic factors such as predictability, incongruity, 
and lexicality (Andrews, 1991).   
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ERP studies (Weber-Fox, Davis, & Cuadrado, 2003) have been used in both 
impaired and normal populations to determine some elements of locale, direction, and 
speed of mental processing activities during language comprehension. Weber-Fox et al. 
demonstrated differences in ERP results which suggested not only different processing 
speeds for adults with different levels of language proficiency but also a reduced 
dependence on context in individuals with more advanced language proficiency, both of 
which may bear on patterns of conceptual integration.  
In particularly relevant work, Coulson and Van Petten (2002) have used ERP 
studies to explore conceptual integration in relation to metaphor; for example, 
“Consistent with conceptual blending theory, the results suggest that the demands of 
conceptual integration affect the difficulty of both literal and metaphorical language” (p. 
958). The Coulson and Van Petten study is subtle and powerful, but its focus on 
comprehension speeds does not specifically address nor produce evidence regarding 
change in subjects’ understanding as a result of prompts. Comprehension of metaphors is 
not the same as production of metaphors. Would evidence of learning be as likely to be 
found in changes of metaphor production as it is in metaphor comprehension? Beyond 
metaphor production per se, are other usages or patterns of language likely to change as a 
result of learning? The present study employs and applies conceptual integration theory 
to investigate evidence of such change. 
Change, in the form of natural expressive language reflecting emergent meaning, 
is taken in this study to be indicative of learning. I developed assessment questions 
eliciting participants’ written responses before and after instruction. I then used 
conceptual integration concepts to analyze and measure changes in language patterns in 
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general and specifically, the comprehension and production of metaphors. For example, 
to the extent that responses reflect any internalized instructional metaphor, we may 
suspect that Vygotskyan scaffolding has taken place, perhaps via interactive and/or 
mimetic processing at the very least (Azar, 2005; Dingfelder, 2005; Greenspan & 
Shanker, 2004; Marcus, 2004; Vygotsky, 1934/1987; Winerman, 2005). 
LeDoux (2002) provides a current example of how neurologists continue to 
explore, discover, and understand quite complex brain processes—including certain types 
of positive (“amplifying”) and negative (“regulating”) feedback  loops—operating at 
incredibly minute scales, even within individual neurons. The location, direction, 
intensity, and timing of the flow of neural activity are being mapped “on-line” in recent 
MRI work. The global patterns of brain activity neuroscientists are able to observe with 
this technique take place in an amazing exchange of lightning-fast electro-chemical 
signals across millions of microscopic synapses. Additionally, other, non-neuronal 
activities are becoming more well understood, not only as local and directional processes, 
but also as global (that is, mentally global) phenomena. For example, glia, which are 10 
times more numerous than neurons, are now seen to modulate neural activity in ways 
unimagined just a few years ago and may be instrumental in allowing groups of neurons 
to function collectively (Fields, 2006).  
Limitations of Reductionist 
Approaches to Cognition 
 Still, no matter how finely tuned our observational abilities may be, it has now 
become apparent that descriptions of atomic level processes do not explain well what we 
call understanding or learning. Understanding how ionic charges and neurotransmitters 
work are wonderful extensions of the reductionist (Wilson & Keil, 1999) view that we 
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can explain more of any phenomenon if we can analyze the components finely enough. 
But the mechanics of synaptic levels of brain functions do not explain human meanings, 
motives, or emotions. An individual’s bio-electro-chemical brain functions with a 
personal history and in a socio-cultural context; the psychology of any person cannot be 
fully described by a list of the person’s physical brain parts and processes. For example, a 
brain researcher could examine the parts of a person’s brain in the most fine-grained 
detail without finding evidence in the cells about whether the person who contributed the 
brain spoke Hindi, liked lilacs, or cared for her dog.  The whole mind is indeed more than 
the sum of its brain’s parts, all 100 billion of them.  
To paraphrase an example made famous by Vygotsky (1934/1987), it would be 
impossible to understand the properties and qualities of water merely by analyzing 
hydrogen and oxygen, even though they are the constituent elements of the liquid. There 
is nothing inherent in hydrogen and oxygen when considered separately—even at the 
atomic or subatomic level—which would hint at what their combination in a two-to-one 
ratio could produce or do, e.g., become the essential medium of life on earth, or float its 
solid form on top of its liquid form, or expand its solid volume by 10% over the same 
amount of liquid, etc.          
In sum, instructive though it may be, an atomistic dissection of a physical brain 
could at best lead to only a partial understanding of psychology. Likewise, a similarly 
reductionistic approach to language leads to formal linguistics, a vast and highly 
sophisticated field in its own right. But psychology is more than neurology alone, or 
language alone, or culture alone. Recognition of the need for an integrative, holistic 
approach to psychology has led to the so-called cognitive revolution of the last 30 years 
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(Wilson & Keil, 1999). And there has been no richer sub-field of cognitive psychology 
than cognitive linguistics (Evans & Green, 2006), the theoretical background of the 
present study. And, as will soon become evident, conceptual integration may be 
considered one of the most robust current theoretical models in cognitive psychology and 
cognitive linguistics.  
Thus, in cognitive psychology, the work of Vygotsky is being regarded with a 
new respect in light of recent advances in neurology--the computational and 
combinatorial nature of language and thought are now seen to have a viable neurological 
basis (Frawley, 1997). To Frawley, language is the exact nexus of the “social and 
computational mind” as indicated by the subtitle of his work. The new perspective of the 
“computational mind” (Gladwell, 2005; Narayan, 1997; Pinker, 1994, 1997; Wilson & 
Keil, 1999) does not refute Vygotsky’s contentions about socio-cultural shaping of 
mental processes; on the contrary, it provides a mechanism for understanding these 
processes more fully.  
Likewise, Piaget’s emphasis on the internal, “natural” instincts for acquiring 
knowledge, including language acquisition, is not contradicted by an increased 
understanding of cultural and environmental forces at work in an individual’s 
psychology; these instincts are understood to be most amenable to social influence 
(Ridley, 2003). The “wild child” phenomena which have been documented over the years 
attest to the essential role of a nurturing environment for even the slightest hope of 
successful, “normal” development (LaPointe, 2005). The “debate” between nature and 
nurture is past. Both innate readiness and experiential aptness are sine qua non for 
humans to learn and grow psychologically (Pinker, 2002). 
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Theories of Chaos, Complexity, and 
Dynamic Systems in Relation to 
Conceptual Integration 
 Theories in the fields of chaos, complexity, and dynamic systems (Briggs & Peat, 
1989; Gleick, 1987; Waldrop, 1992) support the types of understanding we are beginning 
to have about neural systems, modularity, and probabilistic decision-making (Gladwell, 
2000, 2005). As these fields have developed, it has become more and more evident that 
they can provide valuable insights into scientific understanding, not only in physics, but 
in biological and neurological processes as well. Next, I briefly review some of the 
relevant specifics from these theorists and their fields. 
In Chaos, an early classic in the field, Gleick (1987) describes the evolution of 
thought among biologists as they found case after case of fractal branching to be the rule, 
rather than the exception, in how biological structures of all scales are formed--mighty 
oaks to lungs, arteries, and, yes, neural networks. Although  
DNA surely cannot specify the vast number of bronchi, bronchioles, and 
alveoli or the particular spatial structure of the resulting tree… it can specify 
a repeating process of bifurcation and development. Such processes suit 
nature’s purposes…And theoretical biologists began to speculate that fractal 
scaling was not just common but universal in morphogenesis. (p.110)  
 
Where each part (or cell) encodes the entirety of an organism, we see the function 
of DNA applied in the form of a fractal: iteration/repetition of a basic structure on many 
scales, exhibiting apparently diverse manifestations, but which ultimately derive from a 
common self-organizing form (DuPlantier, 2003). Crucially, this applies not only to the 
genetic “code” but also to neurological structures as well. Moving between different 
scales is a defining feature of true systems and a very real part of human consciousness/ 
cognition. Surely it is plausible that the awesome connective structure of the brain is 
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capable of allowing cascades of information to move through any number of neuronal/ 
synaptic thresholds, effortlessly flowing from one level of activation to another. As will 
become evident, conceptual integration would require this kind of connectivity; nowhere 
is such connectivity possible except in the human brain. Furthermore, moving between 
different scales is specifically one of the most important and universal features of 
conceptual integration (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), lending still more weight to the 
argument that human neurological infrastructure supports the kind of mental activities 
described by conceptual integration theory.    
Briggs and Peat (1989) explain positive and negative feedback loops as naturally 
occurring phenomena “everywhere: at all levels of living systems, in the evolution of the 
ecology, in the moment by moment psychology of our social interaction…” (p. 26). 
Recall from LeDoux (2002) that the systems at work in our brains have the physical 
capacity and particular function of regulating (i.e., via negative feedback loops) or 
amplifying (i.e., via positive feedback loops) electro-chemical signals both within and 
among individual neurons and neural clusters. Indeed, Bak, cited in DuPlantier (2003), 
calls for a new metaphor for the mind, beyond the information-processing metaphor, 
which has a rich history of valuable use but which, as is necessarily true of any metaphor, 
cannot entirely illustrate—even if it could remain “novel” forever, an impossibility in 
itself—what we are continuing to learn about the workings of the brain/mind.  
Specifically, Bak (cited in DuPlantier, 2003) proposes a fractal model--a “brain as 
rhizome” metaphor. A rhizome is by definition “rootlike” (Oxford Encyclopedic English 
Dictionary, 1991), meaning here a network with many branches and levels. The 
organic/self-organizing, dynamic, complex, chaotic nature of the brain’s structure and the 
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mind’s inductive and deductive workings are surely more accurately described in these 
terms than in those of a mechanistic, linear model. This goes even beyond the 
parallel/distributed processing model currently in use. The rhizomic metaphor is much 
more in keeping with the multiple-level, three-dimensional, fractal nature of the 
processing activities of the brain than the “brain as computer” metaphor.  
Here is a warning, then: the reader must be aware that the term “computational” is 
not the same as the “brain as computer.” Yes, the idea of “processing information” is still 
important and viable in understanding brain function but this will allow us to use the term 
“computational” in a much more valid, mathematically understood way. At this point, it 
is appropriate to elaborate the idea of brain functions, especially in the use of language, 
as both computational and combinatorial. Understanding these terms in a more technical 
way will allow the reader to conceptualize the precepts of conceptual integration more 
readily. 
Combinatorial/Computational Approaches 
to Language and Psychology 
 One of the most fascinating and sometimes contentious issues in psychology is 
the idea that our limited vocabularies—in Chomsky’s terms, “the poverty of stimulus”— 
(Pinker, 1997, p. 30) can produce a practically infinite variety of sentences and meanings 
(Deutscher, 2005; Pinker, 1994). Just how do we take prior knowledge and experience 
and create novel ideas, sentences, solutions, images, etc? There are many manifestations 
of this ability to “go beyond what is given” (Bruner, 1997, p. 129) from the constituent 
elements of mental inputs. Something must be happening to the input information as it is 
being processed in the brain. Purely deductive approaches allow for “correct” conclusions 
from well-defined, “correct” premises, but this formal, truth-conditional perspective 
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cannot account for the inductive and inferential qualities of emergent meaning and 
creativity (Evans & Green, 2006).  
Pinker (1994, 1997, 2000) makes a forceful case that this combinatorial capacity 
is a result of any language’s two ingredients--a lexicon and a grammar or words and 
rules. When a person uses the tens of thousands of words in a typical basic vocabulary, 
multiplied by the number of combinations allowed by the grammar of her particular 
language, multiplied yet again by the thousands of thoughts, situations, and experiences 
she will need to describe the events and people and relationships in her life, the 
combinatorial power of language becomes obvious. Pinker (2000) does the math for an S-
V-O (Subject-Verb-Object) language, in this case, English:  
The rules are combinatorial... the rule for a noun phrase allows four 
choices for the determiner, followed by ten thousand choices for the head 
noun, yielding 4 X 10, 000=40,000 ways to utter a noun phrase. The rule 
for a sentence allows these forty thousand subjects to be followed by any 
of four thousand verbs, providing 40,000 X 4,000= 160,000,000 ways to 
utter the first three words of a sentence. Then there are four choices for the 
determiner of the object (640 million four-word beginnings) followed by 
ten thousand choices for the head word of the object, or 640,000,000 X 
10,000= 640,000,000,000 (6.4 trillion) five–word sentences. (p. 7) 
 
Even if we discount the ungrammatical or otherwise nonsensical sentences, it is 
estimated that at every word-position in a given English sentence there are an average of 
about 10 choices which could produce about a million grammatically correct six word 
sentences from an English speaker with an average vocabulary (Pinker, 2000). 
Grammatical 20 word sentences such as this exact sample could have a feasible number 
of some 100 million trillion (Pinker). Other languages have similar potentials, though of 
course in different ways.    
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Deutscher (2005) gives a fine example from Turkish where a single word--with a 
number of grammatically allowed morphemes used as suffixes, prefixes, and internal 
signals--can carry not only a very subtle and specific meaning but where its “on-line” 
construction represents a series of choices from an equally astronomical number of 
possibilities: sehirlilestiremediklerimizdensiniz, meaning, roughly, “You are one of those 
whom we can’t turn into a town dweller.” This carries something like our rhetorical 
phrase, “You’re not from around here, are you?” Such “sentences in a word” are the 
norm in some languages. Each part of the word involves lexemic choice and also 
meaning via particular order: sehir = town, li = someone from, les = become, tir = cause 
to, eme = can’t, dik = whom, ler = those, imiz = we, den = one of, siniz = you are. Note 
also the apparent “strangeness” of the phoneme/“word” order; though it is completely 
normal to a native speaker of Turkish, the order seems almost exactly “backwards” to an 
English speaker, thus demonstrating another combinatorial aspect of any language, its 
syntax.  
The combinatorial aspect of language—any language—should be obvious. But it 
is not simply a matter of memorizing all these combinations, even if it were possible, that 
is at the heart of our ability to communicate. Language is more than vocabulary; it “is 
much more than the sum of its words” (Deutscher, 2005, p. 21). This is where the 
computational aspects of our psycholinguistic prowess come to bear. The very structure 
of the words and sentences we use prompts understanding in listeners. As discussed 
above, Gladwell (2005), Frawley (1997), Pinker (1994, 1997, 2000) and Fauconnier and 
Turner (2002) note that part of our ability to understand each other in normal discourse 
lies in our ability to use a very small amount of information to construct an “in-progress” 
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analysis of intent and meaning. Gladwell (2005) calls it “thin-slicing,” where we take a 
minimal amount of information and compute the probable intent/meaning with amazing 
accuracy and speed, and most of the time, we are right.  
Like the combinatorial aspect of language, the computational aspects make a lot 
of sense. For most of our “conscious” life, we must make best guesses, based on 
incomplete information. We simply do not have the time to access and sort through all of 
our sensory input and social or personal history in making every decision. Nor do we 
have the time to analyze every possible meaning of every phrase we hear or see. This is 
where computational abilities, based on probabilities of intent, come to the fore. 
I hope by now to have established that a cognitive linguistic approach to 
psychology has much to offer because such an approach takes these awesome 
psychological capacities into account. Thus my focus here has converged from the 
broadest foundations of psychology to the somewhat more limited field of cognitive 
linguistics. In the following section, I will develop an overview of cognitive linguistics 
and conceptual integration. I will also develop a conceptual framework for the 
application of the conceptual integration model to issues in educational psychology 
through analyses of student language.  
Overview of Cognitive Linguistics 
and Conceptual Integration 
 
Because complex, symbolic language use is a uniquely human experience which 
both reflects and generates a practically infinite realm of thought, psychologists have 
long been deeply interested in understanding language in its many forms and 
applications. As cognitive psychology was being developed over the last generation, 
cognitive linguistics has also seen a concurrent growth (Evans & Green, 2006). But 
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cognitive linguistics is often referred to as a movement or enterprise, rather than a field or 
theory, because of its highly diverse range of research and theoretical approaches, 
assumptions, guiding principles, and perspectives. The enterprise is often seen as an 
alternative to the “form” approaches which dominate modern, purely linguistic studies. In 
common with other linguists, cognitive linguists study the functions, structure, and 
systematicity of language, but their driving purpose, however, stems from the critical 
assumption that language reflects patterns of thought (Evans & Green, 2006). 
Cognitive linguists, then, study what it means to know a language, the various 
functions of language, the symbolic and social uses of language, systems and universals 
in language use, language acquisition, semantics, grammar, conceptualization, metaphor 
and metonymy, categorization, and, of course, cognition. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 
(1991) made important theoretical advances which strengthened the case for approaching 
psychology as a distinctly human and subjective experience, departing significantly from 
earlier psychology’s assumptions about a purely “objective” reality. Cognitive linguists 
do not generally deny the existence of a reality “out there,” but hold the following: 
The fact that our experience is embodied—that is structured in part by the 
nature of the bodies we have and by our neurological organization—has 
consequences for cognition. In other words, the concepts we have access 
to and the nature of the reality we think and talk about are a function of 
our embodiment: we can only talk about what we can perceive and 
conceive, and the things that we can perceive and conceive derive from 
embodied experience. From this point of view, the human mind must bear 
the imprint of embodied experience. (Evans & Green, 2006, p. 46) 
 
Two of the more prominent and recent areas of interest within the cognitive 
linguistics enterprise are the fields of mental spaces theory and meaning construction 
theory (Evans & Green, 2006). These in turn owe much of their existence to theories in 
conceptual metaphor, first postulated in the 1980s by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). 
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Conceptual integration has emerged as a recent field of study based on the intellectual 
blending of ideas from mental spaces theory and meaning construction theory (Figure 1), 
articulated by Fauconnier and Mark, respectively (Evans & Green).  
 The conceptual integration model of the way we think has been a burgeoning 
perspective in recent years (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). The potential explanatory 
power of this model includes many of the neurological, social, psychological, and 
linguistic aspects of human thought; thus it deserves to be considered in research in the 
field of educational psychology. In the current research, I seek to answer several 
questions about teaching, learning, understanding, and assessment afforded by a 
conceptual integration approach. 
 Put very briefly, conceptual integration theory includes two central premises: 
thought is both dynamic and creative. In trying to describe and explain the rapid, “on-
line,” constantly flowing nature of “meaning construction,” generations of earlier 
psychologists and linguists were stymied by the sense of static, linear understanding 
provided by less fluid, less robust models, such as the transmission  or container model of 
teaching and learning (Mayer, 1999). This model assumes that students are merely empty 
vessels to be filled with instructors’ knowledge. Was that knowledge a thing to be passed 
from one person to another? Where did this thing reside before and after transmission? 
How could the instructor give this thing to someone else and yet still have it? Among 
other things, this transmission/container model of teaching and learning implied that the 
meaning was somehow in the words themselves rather than being constructed by the 
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Figure 1. A theory is born. The cognitive implications of Conceptual Metaphor (Lakoff 
& Johnson, 1980) lead away from a “meaning is in the words” approach in understanding 
human communication. Turner explores the constructivist and linguistic dimensions of 
communication while Fauconnier explores issues related to thinking as dynamic, often 
temporary, mental responses to inputs from memory, speech, and context. By the mid-




Another major problem earlier researchers encountered was the fact that inputs to 
thought, either from social context or memory, could not by themselves entirely account 
for emergent meaning. In short, how do humans come up with new understanding and 
original utterances from previous constituent elements? This is precisely the issue in a 
number of studies and articles about the comprehension of metaphor (Deutscher, 2005; 
Evans & Green, 2006; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Gibbs, 2002; Hamblin & Gibbs, 
1999; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). By trying to model the creative and dynamic nature of 
thought, the conceptual integration model purports to describe these and many other 
processes more accurately and usefully than previous models of thought. 
 Because conceptual integration theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Turner & 
Fauconnier, 1995) evolved from earlier theories in the fields of conceptual metaphor 
theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) and mental spaces theory (Evans & Green, 2006), any 
explanation and description of it will require some references to these precursors. 
Fauconnier and Turner aver that the capacity for conceptual integration is one of the 
hallmarks of distinctly human thought, allowing us to perform the practically infinite 
array of complex mental and social activities which characterize the human experience. 
Fauconnier was a leading researcher and proponent of mental spaces theory and Turner 
was deeply involved in the study of metaphor in literature when their work converged in 
the 1990s on the problems of meaning construction in normal language interactions 
(Evans & Green). Their work, individually and collaboratively, provides much of the 





Terminology from Cognitive Psychology 
and Cognitive Linguistics 
In order to focus the following discussions, I provide a set of key terms in 
conceptual integration theory that have their origins in definitions from their use in 
cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics.   
Categorization. Our ability to categorize is taken as one of the hallmarks of 
intelligence (and is not limited to humans, by the way). This ability is deeply connected 
to conceptual domains, embodied cognition, and conceptual metaphor (Evans & Green, 
2006; Lakoff, 1987; Varela et al., 1991). 
 Combinatorial thought/language. A practically infinite set of possible statements 
may be derived from combining a finite set of words and rules (Pinker, 2000; Deutscher, 
2005). Distinct from computational thought, combinatorial thought allows us to 
imagine—and choose from— possibilities.  
 Computational thought/language. Information processed in the brain with a flow 
of neural activity corresponding to “If-Then-Else” type statements in computer programs 
(Pinker, 1994, 1997, 2000). Computational thought allows decisions to be made based on 
probabilities and incomplete information (Gladwell, 2005). In part, this idea was 
contributed to the field of cognitive psychology from artificial intelligence (Frawley, 
1997; Wilson & Keil, 1999) but is not to be conflated with the vapid cliché of “The brain 
is a computer”; this trite metaphor is generally considered as having outlived its 
usefulness. It is interesting to note that the people who did calculations professionally 
were once called “computers.”     
 Conceptual domain. “A body of knowledge which contains and organizes related 
ideas and experiences” (Evans & Green, 2006, p. 14). Essential to much of cognitive 
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psychology, conceptual domains are to be understood as an individual’s systems of 
interconnected knowledge which may be activated or accessed by experience, language, 
or memory.  In short, a conceptual domain may be understood as a person’s knowledge 
about something (e.g., genes/genetics/ heredity in the case of the present research). 
 Conceptual integration model. A recent offshoot of several major theories in 
cognitive linguistics (Evans & Green, 2006). Conceptual integration (Coulson & Van 
Petten, 2002; Evans & Green; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Turner & Fauconnier, 1995) is 
explained and defined in much more detail below. As the central model guiding the 
present research, conceptual integration is claimed to account for a good deal of mental 
activity in much human interaction and thought, and is therefore critical to teaching and 
learning, which are the bases of educational psychology. The terms “conceptual 
integration” and “conceptual blending” are used interchangeably. The term “blend” refers 
to the blended mental space where the elements and relationships of the various input 
spaces have achieved final, though often temporary, content and structure based on 
information from the inputs. 
 Conceptual metaphor theory. Stemming from work on metaphor (see below), 
where one conceptual domain is described and structured in terms of another, Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) proposed that entire groups of related metaphors represented conceptual 
domains. For example, phrases such as “He got a raise,” “Hopes were high,” “Climbing 
the ladder of success,” etc., represent an overarching conceptual metaphor such as UP IS 
GOOD. (Per convention, mental concepts are indicated by small capitalized letters to 
distinguish them from the words used to describe them.)  From conceptual metaphor 
theory arose both mental spaces theory and meaning construction theory (Evans & Green, 
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2006). In turn, work in these two fields led to the formation of the conceptual integration 
model (Evans & Green).  
 Dynamic systems. This term is applied to any hierarchical and actively changing 
network of networks. It is derived from work in physics and biology where scale, order, 
complexity, change, feedback, and recursion are used to explain the dynamic nature of 
the universe and its living creatures. Citing the brain’s complex structure as an example 
par excellence of dynamic systems, psychologists have adopted this term as well (Briggs 
& Peat, 1989; Carter, 1999; DuPlantier, 2003; Evans & Green, 2006; Fauconnier & 
Turner, 2002; Wilson & Keil, 1999). 
 Embodied cognition. “This thesis holds that the human mind and conceptual 
organization are functions of the ways in which our species-specific bodies interact with 
the environment we inhabit” (Evans & Green, 2006, p. 50). Categorization and metaphor, 
as well as a host of other cognitive and linguistic activities, reflect this basic orientation 
to the physical world. 
 Inputs/input spaces. Any contributors to the architecture/ content of a mental 
space (Coulson & Van Petten, 2002; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Turner & Fauconnier, 
1995; Wilson & Keil, 1999). A person’s memory may provide input material, but so too 
do conversation, context, and experience. Here is an open-ended notion that enables us to 
consider all thought, not just language, as amenable to explication in terms of conceptual 
integration.  
 Lexical items. Words or phrases considered as single mental units of information 
which can be retrieved from memory (hence, a person’s “lexicon”), the “storage” and 
retrieval of which terms is said to involve the process of lexicality (Evans & Green, 
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2006). When metaphors lose their novelty through repeated use, they slowly take on an 
aspect of “obvious” literality, and become lexicalized as single units of meaning. Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980) use the term “frozen” to describe metaphors which have become 
lexicalized. (See also the explication of “metaphor” below.) 
 Meaning construction. This is the mental work we do when we understand 
another person’s language or make mental sense of an event (Evans & Green, 2006, p. 
162). Another person’s statements, signs, or writings are taken as prompts for building a 
conceptualization of what that person means.   
 Mental spaces theory. Mental spaces are considered complex, but temporary 
conceptual domains constructed in the process of thought or discourse (Evans & Green, 
2006). They are very context-specific and allow people to communicate effectively on 
the basis of very sparse information. In combination with conceptual metaphor and 
meaning construction, mental spaces are used to describe the processes of conceptual 
integration, where much information is “compressed” into meaningful statements and 
comprehension (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Turner & Fauconnier, 1995). 
 Metaphor. This term comes from the Greek, “carry across,” where meaning from 
one domain is carried across to describe another. The Latin equivalent of the term is 
“transfer,” that is, from one domain to another. It should be noted here that the use of the 
term “metaphor” is somewhat different in psychology or cognitive linguistics than in 
literature. Though the two fields overlap considerably with regard to this topic, the 
central thrust of psychological understanding of metaphor is about any use of figurative 
language, not the more narrowly defined use in the study of literature as a direct 
comparison of two things without the use of “like” or “as” (McKechnie, 1983).  
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 Thus, as part of the following review of literature, the reader will note a variety of 
studies involving production or comprehension, that is the “use,” of  idioms (Abrahamsen 
& Smith, 2000: Hamblin & Gibbs, 1999; Horn, 2003; Norbury, 2004), proverbs, irony 
(Dennis, Purvis, Barnes, Wilkinson, & Winner, 2001; Power, Taylor, & Nippold, 2001), 
similes (Chiappe & Kennedy, 2000), metaphors (Carroll & Mack, 1999; Corts & Meyers, 
2002; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Linzey, 1997; Newsome & Glucksberg, 2002; 
Ozcaliskan, 2005; Schmidt, 2000; Sopory & Dillard, 2002), or any other kind of 
figurative—that is to say, non-literal—language to which I will apply the generic term 
“metaphor.” Further, it should be noted here that the present research does not attempt to 
address the surprisingly thorny cognitive linguistics issue of what can be understood as 
“literal.” 
 Technically, metaphor is often represented by the form “X is Y,” where the 
target/topic conceptual domain “X” is described by the relevant properties of the 
source/base/tenor conceptual domain “Y.” In the statement “War is Hell,” the source 
domain, Hell, provides the descriptive properties and structure for the target domain, 
War. Though the nomenclature in the literature varies, hereafter I will use the terms 
“target” and “source” to refer to the two types of contributing domains. The XY format 
demonstrated here is in keeping with a later version in a somewhat different context. The 
letters are used here to describe content domains. These domains are mental “places.” 
Nouns, as the words which grammatically name places, are what are being labeled with X 
and Y, not “domains” or “source” or “target.” Nouns can become elements in mental 
spaces and carry the XY nomenclature with them. Such an analysis, described more fully 
in Chapter IV, is performed on various open-ended participant responses in this study.  
32 
 
 As noted above, a metaphor may be called “frozen” (or “dead”) when its use has 
become lexicalized and so conventionalized as to carry little potential for new 
understanding. Further, a metaphor is called “opaque” when the constituent parts cannot 
be used to calculate its meaning. A “transparent” figure of speech is one where the 
meaning can be derived from its constituent parts. As the current work progresses, we 
will see a number of such terms from the studies of figurative language come into play in 
developing a conceptual integration approach to the analysis of subject responses. (See 
also Linzey [1997] and Deutscher [2005] for more complete “lifespan/natural history” 
approaches to metaphor.) 
 Polysemy. Literally, this word means “many meanings” (Evans & Green, 2006). 
Not only do many individual words have multiple meanings, even entire phrases can 
prompt for different meanings in different contexts. In the first case, “Sick” may mean 
something twisted and evil to one generation of English speakers, but many of today’s 
American teenagers use the term as a very positive adjective. The phrase “Round the 
corner” can describe a restaurant chain (noun), an action of autos or horses (action verb), 
a person in relation to a physical street corner (preposition), or a psychological milepost--
“She rounded those corners long ago.” A person working a lathe or throwing a clay pot 
on a wheel might round corners as well. With so many possibilities of understanding, the 
conceptual integration theory tries to account for how a given meaning can be 
constructed for virtually any phrase. In conceptual integration, most meaningful phrases 
can be “reverse engineered” to derive the original inputs.  
 Radial meaning. This term relates to polysemy (Evans & Green, 2006). When a 
term has many possible meanings (or “senses,” technically), those meanings are modeled 
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as being more or less distant (that is, radiating from) from a central, standard, 
prototypical meaning. 
 Scaffolding. The metaphor used by Vygotsky to describe the processes of 
instructional interaction where the idealized intellectual “distance” between the 
teacher/expert and the student/novice represents areas of potential growth, the now-
famous Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD), and the instruction provides a purposeful 
and specific framework for the student’s conceptual attainment in a given domain 
(Bruner, 1996).  
 Situated learning. Almost all learning—language acquisition, values, habits, 
formal and informal teaching and learning, etc.—takes place in some kind of social 
context (Lave & Wegner, 1991). Derived from Vygotsky’s work (1934/1987), this view 
has slowly been replacing the “transmission/container” model of teaching and learning, 
where knowledge is a “thing,” given from one person to another. Notice how “context” is 
a basic element of mental spaces theory as well as a primary element of meaning 
construction (Evans & Green, 2006). Much of what is understood as accurate 
comprehension is directly dependent upon context—especially social context—for 
appropriate meaning construction. 
 Theory of mind. A developmental stage in which people come to the 
understanding that other people have different thoughts (Wilson & Keil, 1999). Though 
this usually occurs in childhood, the consequences of not developing this notion can be 
devastating. Some symptoms of autism--such as taking statements only literally, or 
fixating on things rather than social implications, or incessant or obsessive self-talk/role-
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playing, or completely ignoring social cues--may be described as forms of cognition that 
do not display a “theory of mind.” 
 Universal grammar. As linguists--most notably Noam Chomsky— began to 
discern commonalities underlying even the most “different” of languages, it became 
apparent that those “differences” were largely superficial. The impact of these findings in 
linguistics has revolutionized cognitive science by implying similar—that is, 
“Universal”—neurological and mental structures in all humans, especially in the use of 
language. This is not to be conflated with the standard language-specific type of 
“grammar” taught in formal language instruction. Rather, it refers to the 
common/universal human cognitive capacity to acquire and use language (Deutscher, 
2005; Evans & Green, 2006; Pinker, 1994, 1997, 2000).  
Applications to Educational Psychology 
Having developed a general context within cognitive linguistics for the current 
research, I now turn to an overview of the central thrust of this research--the application 
of conceptual integration theory to issues in educational psychology. The reader will 
recall that conceptual integration theory is a specific hybrid of two models within 
cognitive linguistics: mental spaces theory and meaning construction. Briefly put and 
explained with more detailed research findings in Chapter II, this research uses a 
conceptual integration approach to the analysis of two experimental teaching conditions.  
In this research, I measure and describe, in both quantitative and qualitative ways, 
relative change in the participants’ understanding due to exposure to the two different 
instructional metaphor conditions.   
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The focal point of this proposed research in educational psychology is at the 
nexus of cognitive psychology, language, and learning. An individual’s psychology is 
physically “embodied” (Evans & Green, 2006; Varela et al., 1991), neurologically 
impelled (Marcus, 2004; Pinker, 1994; Thomas, 1990), and socially “situated” (Lave & 
Wegner, 1991; Vygotsky, 1934/1987). These psychological maxims must be also true of 
a crucial aspect of psychology--learning. At the most basic level, it is clear that most 
direct, institutional instruction and thought is in the form of language. Researchers from 
two entirely different generations reinforce this. First, consider Vygotsky (with a telling 
reference to Piaget): 
A basic, indisputable, and decisive fact emerges here: thinking depends on 
speech, on the means of thinking, and on the child’s socio-cultural experience. 
The development of inner speech is defined from the outside. As Piaget’s research 
has shown, the development of the child’s logic is a direct function of his 
socialized speech. This position can be formulated in the following way: the 
development of the child’s thinking depends on his mastery of the social means of 
thinking, that is, on his mastery of speech. (p. 120, emphasis in the original)  
 
Some 70 years after Vygotsky’s death, Frawley (1997) asserts that “to understand the 
compatibility of Vygotskian theory with cognitive science, we need a framework that 
gives language a role in both the social and computational mind” (p. 34). Because the 
conceptual integration model purports to account for these crucial aspects of human 
psychology, it may provide just such a framework; the current research is an attempt to 
test this potential.  
Next, I begin to develop concepts of how the conceptual integration model may 
be fittingly applied to some of the perennial issues in educational psychology--the science 
of teaching and learning. Although one could argue that most of the learning a person 
does in a lifetime is outside of the classroom, formal and institutionalized learning 
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situations are undeniable facts of life in our modern times. The focus and resources 
(Current Expenditures for Public Elementary and Secondary Education, 2006; Largest 
Military Expenditures, 2006) provided by societies for their children’s schools (nearly as 
much as for the military in this country) attest to the attempt to go beyond what was 
expected of children and cultures not so long ago. Where once a child would be well 
served by the natural teaching and learning in a family or, at most, the tribal unit, those 
days are gone in the modern world.  
With such a huge investment of money and time in education, people everywhere 
have a keen interest in the quality and content of how their schools are serving their 
children. Effective schools, then, are the concern of all constituents and effective teaching 
and learning practices are the academic focus of educational psychology. In order to 
serve our children most effectively, we educators need to use all the tools at our disposal 
to provide the best possible educational experiences for our students. These tools are 
much more than the superficial trappings of fine facilities, higher-level classes for “top” 
students, and special education programs. We must use what we are learning about the 
brain and mind from all branches of psychology to serve our students and communities as 
effectively as possible--the purpose driving this research.  
Overview and Summary of Purpose, Scope, 
and Methods of Present Research 
 
 The present research is designed to apply theories from the field of conceptual 
integration to a realistic teaching and learning situation. I used different metaphoric 
components in teaching an otherwise identical lesson about the same topic to two groups 
of participants. The control group received the instruction without any overt metaphors. 
In contrast, the second experimental group received instruction with brief, scripted 
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references to two different metaphoric descriptions of the topic, Genes, Genetics, and 
Heredity: Genes are Blueprints and Genes are Recipes. I then analyzed both qualitative 
and quantitative results of the pre- and-post-instruction assessments using both traditional 
techniques and techniques developed specifically to apply several of the principles of 
conceptual integration to some of the qualitative response sets.  
 This research is designed to show how the conceptual integration model may be 
employed in explaining how some of the instructional interactions between teachers and 
students actually affect the thinking processes—and thus, the learning—of the students. 
By applying principles of conceptual integration theory to learning situations, I hope to 
provide insight into both individual and social elements of learning through the analysis 
of changes in students’ language about specific instructional content. I offer several ways 
of identifying and describing processes of thought at work in learners as they develop 
new understanding as evidenced by changes in the pre- and post-instruction 
performances. Using a conceptual integration approach could eventually lead researchers 
to find new ways to improve both teacher effectiveness and student learning.  
Through this research and the application of new techniques developed 
specifically for this work, I illustrate several key points. First, there are a number of 
associations between quantitative and qualitative results in pre-and posttest performances. 
This research deals with the idea that learning will be reflected in changes in patterns of 
language use described by the conceptual integration model. Correlation analyses of the 
different quantitative results provide intriguing findings, described more fully elsewhere 
in this paper. Second, I also describe different levels of mimicry of the two core 
instructional metaphors between the two groups of participants. This provides a direct 
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link to Vygotskyan theory (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Vygotsky 1934/1987) where 
individual meaning is at least partially derived from specific context and learning is at 
least partially (if temporarily) described as social copying (mimetic learning; Blackmore, 
1999). Third, I tested the idea that there would be significant differences in the 
effectiveness of either of the two instructional conditions. For example, differences which 
emerge based on academic major, perhaps, or levels of prior knowledge or disposition 
toward a target or source, may make one or the other metaphor a better teaching tool for a 
given audience. Such differences are in people, not words, a core tenet from the 
constructivist view of cognitive linguistics. Finally, I elicited metaphoric elaboration and 
creativity from the participants as part of the post-instruction data collection process to 
ascertain whether or not there could be a measurable connection between high 
metaphoric skill and the ability to learn (at least from this kind of instruction). 
Furthermore, there is the strong possibility that any teachers—not just science teachers—
could benefit in general from the findings of this research.   
Each of the above points required different types of questions, data, and analyses, 
resulting in a mixed methods research approach. First, I analyzed quantifiable data from 
traditional pre- and-post-instructional selected-response assessment scores. Then, I 
compared selected-response and open-response performances of the different 
instructional groups for two reasons: (a) to determine the relative efficacy of the 
respective metaphoric lesson components/ conditions; and (b) to address the central issue 
of this research, which is to describe how changes in learning are reflected in changes in 
language. Additionally, I analyzed two types of qualitative data from participant-
constructed responses. One data set included two main types of responses: (a) the 
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participants’ elaboration of their own novel metaphors ;and( b) the participants’ opinions 
about the relative merits of the standard, “received” metaphors used in the past. Another 
data set was a third-party accuracy rating of participants’ open-response statements. 
Finally, I analyzed and recorded the frequency and type of conceptual integration 
networks employed by the participants before and after instruction (see Chapters III and 
IV). 
Thus, to summarize the purposes for which I conducted this research, I offer the 
following: (a) testing recent theories in cognitive linguistics, especially conceptual 
integration; (b) applying those theories to realistic teaching and learning situations 
appropriate to research in educational psychology; and (c) making a timely, unique, and 
genuine contribution to the field. 
One constraint was the fact that I obviously could not try to account for all 
learning in all people in all situations. Further, the focus was necessarily limited to a 
narrow focus on a brief instructional interaction and a small set of linguistic variables, 
those being several metaphors about the same topic. To progress beyond the transmission 
model of teaching and learning, researchers need to demonstrate not only that emergent 
meaning, as evidenced by changes in metaphor production or other language patterns, is a 
natural product of conceptual integration. To the extent that research supports the validity 
of a conceptual integration approach to educational and psychological issues, researchers 
also need to assist other educators in learning to use the concepts provided by conceptual 
integration theory to enhance teacher practice and student learning.          
In Chapter II, I review classic views of and more recent research in the use of 
metaphor, especially in both metaphor comprehension and production. This sets the stage 
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for discussing how the production of metaphor may reflect new understanding. That is, I 
begin to make the case that students’ use of metaphor is likely to reveal a reflection of 
teachers’ use of metaphor. Additionally, I provide several classic examples of metaphors 
used in teaching. At last, given the above, I connect all of this to educational psychology 
and the questions this research is intended to answer.  
Then in Chapter III--Design, Methods, Materials, Participants, and Procedures,  
I demonstrate how the conceptual integration model may be applied to specific research 
questions and hypotheses involving several types of measurable evidence of student 










REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
Traditional Perspectives and  
Theories in Metaphor 
Although the focus of the first part of this chapter is on metaphor per se, I will 
also be alluding to various aspects of metaphor in light of the conceptual integration 
model, of which metaphor is a distinct subset. In a later section of the chapter, I will 
overtly address the terms and techniques of the conceptual integration model in much 
greater detail.  
The power of metaphoric, non-literal language to describe and explain the world 
has long been recognized (Evans & Green, 2006; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Wilson & 
Keil, 1999). As discussed elsewhere in this work, the history of the study of metaphor has 
developed over many centuries. From Aristotle’s ancient musings about metaphor as a 
poetic gift, figurative language has at last come to be recognized as a standard feature of 
daily discourse. Traditional research views of metaphor comprehension and production 
continue to be represented in the literature (Abrahamsen & Smith, 2000; Hamblin & 
Gibbs, 1999; Horn, 2003; Nakamoto, 2003; Newsome & Glucksberg, 2002; Norbury, 
2004; Temple & Honeck, 1999). Most of this work uses speed and accuracy of 
participants’ comprehension as measures of metaphor use and generalized 
linguistic/cognitive ability.     
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For example, Nakamoto (2003) measured response time (RT) for comprehension 
among groups of Japanese students to make a point about the necessity of asymmetry in 
metaphor. Comprehension speed in Nakamoto’s study was significantly better when 
subjects read paired samples of clearly asymmetrical target and source domains. In using 
metaphor, listeners/readers are said to understand a given target by way of thinking about 
a different concept--the source. Thus, when Romeo says of Juliet, “She is the sun,” the 
qualities of the source—“sun”—such as brightness, warmth, giver of life, etc., are carried 
over to the target, Juliet. Though earlier thought about metaphor stressed similarity—
called a comparison model, the roots of which view go all the way back to Aristotle— 
between target and source, it is clear that similarity alone is not the source of power of 
metaphor (Nakamoto). Without asymmetry as well, metaphors can be weak or ungainly 
or provide no emergent understanding about a topic. Therefore, crucially, both similarity 
and dissimilarity appear to be essential, though not sufficient in themselves as individual 
factors, in fully comprehending metaphor. Similarity is one of the 15 vital relations 
aspects of the conceptual integration model (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002) described in 
detail later in this chapter as is its conceptual opposite, dissimilarity, under the heading 
“Disanalogy.” For now, vital relations may be thought of as various cognitive 
mechanisms which are always “on call” to perform various cognitive tasks, as in this 
case, inferring Similarity and Dissimilarity from a metaphoric prompt. Thus also, in the 
inclusion of asymmetry—that is, Disanalogy—the conceptual integration model accounts 
for more of the cognitive salience of metaphors, providing a clearer, more 
multidimensional understanding of a target domain.  
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Other research (Temple & Honeck, 1999) in the traditional literature deals with 
the primacy (in time and comprehension) of literal meaning. Temple and Honeck (1999) 
compared the respective comprehension times for different types of phrases: literal, non-
literal, and neutral. The results suggested that literal meanings were first in line to be 
processed; if no sense could be made at that stage, the reader/listener was thought to 
move into a mental search for possible non-literal meaning. However, their work has not 
fully resolved the issue of literal primacy in figurative language comprehension because 
the implication of stages in comprehension falls far short of describing the dynamic 
processes and outcomes involved in figurative language comprehension. Though the 
definition of what may be understood as literal remains problematic, primarily because 
this relies on a meaning is in the words approach, Temple and Honeck’s work reinforced 
at least the idea that the ease and speed of lexical access may rely at least somewhat on 
internal, experiential familiarity as well as external contexts of event, place, time, and 
social environment. But their work clearly bears upon issues of polysemy and conceptual 
bases and suggests a multistage figurative language process, thus lending support to a 
linear/serial/sequential processing model rather than a parallel/distributed (open/direct 
multiple-points) access model. In cognitive linguistics, this would be taken to confirm the 
radial meaning model of lexicality--comprehension speeds would be based not on an 
“either-or” choice, as implied by the yes/no, right/wrong, go-directly-to-the-right-answer 
direct access model described above.  
The radial meaning model is probabilistic, but sequential, implying that mental 
processing and meaning construction might take a bit longer to process, starting from the 
hearer’s initial sense of a metaphoric phrase and moving to an acceptable approximation 
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of the speaker’s actual intent by testing possible intent at further and further conceptual 
distances from the originally held sense. This very constructivist model of natural 
conversational metaphor use holds the elements of conceptual integration: with a 
meaningful phrase, a speaker prompts a listener to construct a mental network, the 
construction of which involves the use of various cognitive mechanisms in discernable 
linguistic and conceptual patterns.  
Pinker (1994) puts it nicely: “Though most common words have many meanings, 
few meanings have more than one word. That is, homonyms are plentiful, synonyms are 
rare” (p. 151). That we can make “probably correct” guesses about polysemy and other 
types of figurative language much more often than not is yet another aspect of the 
universality and automaticity of metaphor use among humans (Fauconnier & Turner, 
2002; Gladwell, 2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Pinker, 2002). The conceptual 
integration approach purports to account for polysemy and any other types of figurative 
language, providing a model for the interactions, intentions, implications, inferences, 
inputs, and outputs/emergent understandings which characterize our everyday speech 
interactions. 
Researchers in human communication (e.g., Abrahamsen & Smith, 2000) also 
take interest in figurative language. Abrahamsen and Smith worked with children with 
communication disorders on understanding idioms. The researchers used both face-to-
face classroom instruction and a computer based teaching model, and found that the 
success of both models hinged on explaining idioms that were presented in context. 
Interestingly, gains for specifically trained idioms did not generalize to untrained idioms; 
this suggests that for some speech-disordered children, direct instruction of specific 
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idioms should be practiced. These results and inferences underscore three ideas relating 
to conceptual integration. 
The first of these ideas is that figurative language is a deeply natural 
phenomenon; those who struggle with it are at a serious disadvantage psychologically 
and socially (Abrahamsen & Smith, 2000). Second, the fact that specific idioms can be 
taught might indicate that people who learn them in this overt fashion have “lexicalized” 
the terms. That is, their ability to use these particular terms after training, but not to use 
new terms without training, could indicate that these children had learned to use the items 
as literally true, static, stored memories, similar to other basic “vocabulary.” This could 
indicate a rather interesting difference between this type of strategic cognitive 
accommodation and the fluid, “on-line” meaning construction and comprehension we 
usually attribute to natural dialog. Third, the critical element of context allowed these 
students to successfully integrate specific terms into their language comprehension 
abilities. There seems to be further evidence to reinforce both the precepts of Vygotskyan 
socially situated learning (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Vygotsky, 1934/1987) and the tenets of 
conceptual integration.  
Vygotsky (1934/1987) and his modern successors in social views of learning such 
as Lave and Wenger (1991) asserted that most learning, especially learning from direct 
instruction, is highly dependent on the social context, the partial result of which is that 
successful learning is often socially defined. Likewise, the conceptual integration model 
allows for—indeed, requires—both internal and external prompts for understanding. That 
the social contexts help define the linguistic and psychological frames of reference for the 
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speakers and listeners in that situation may seem obvious, but the mental processes at 
work are both quite subtle and powerful as well.        
Other communication research (Norbury, 2004) on idiom comprehension grapples 
with issues of memory, language skills, and general mental capacity. In this case, 
Norbury compared comprehension accuracy and memory of idioms between a control 
group and several subgroups of children with communication disorders. The Norbury 
study demonstrated that normal comprehension of figurative language involves elements 
of both top-down—contextual processing— and bottom-up—that is, semantic analysis. 
The study suggested that differences in the types of disorders represented in the children 
were contributors to the different types of strategies and different levels of ease and 
accuracy the children displayed in interpreting idioms. Both theory of mind (explained 
below and elsewhere) and automaticity of using contextual clues were addressed in the 
study. The participants who struggled with these factors performed significantly worse 
than those whose impairments were not related to theory of mind or automaticity of using 
context to infer meaning.     
As seen with metaphor per se, questions revolve around whether the idiom is 
stored as a lexical unit, whether its meaning can be derived from understanding its 
constituent parts, how and if the idiom is comprehended via context, what correlation 
there may be between general language skills or general mental capacities and idiom 
comprehension, whether literal understanding helps or hinders comprehension, etc. As 
seen across the spectrum of works to be described in this chapter, context—often social 
context, to be exact—is indeed a major factor in understanding almost anything, 
including figurative language.  
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Additionally, as a subset of the general social context, we see from developmental 
psychology that much meaning is constructed specifically as a result of inferences made 
from a theory of mind (Wilson & Keil, 1999). By definition, a theory of mind is inferred 
when a listener understands that a speaker is expressing a point of view that comes from a 
different individual. This is yet a further example of the social context mentioned above, 
continuing to lend credence to Vygotsky’s work. Though adults tend to take a theory of 
mind for granted, it is nevertheless a developmental milestone in communication. 
Children who have not attained this sense that other people have other thoughts have 
difficulty comprehending the social context and hence the meaning of utterances made by 
other people.  
In another research example specific to the study of metaphor—but from a 
perspective of grammatical analysis— Hamblin and Gibbs (1999) arrived at the threshold 
of a need for the dynamic explanatory power of conceptual integration. They analyzed 
the non-decomposable elements of the idiom, “kick the bucket.” That is, no constituent 
element lends to the understood meanings of dying and dying quickly. The whole phrase 
is understood by fluent, idiomatic speakers and listeners as a lexical unit meaning to die 
(quickly). This is precisely the example used by Norbury (2004) where this idiom is 
labeled “opaque.” But this points once again to the limitations of a reductionist approach, 
which in this case presupposes a storehouse of discrete and unexplained lexical items 
(including such “frozen” metaphors/idioms described above), which are somehow both 




Whereas Hamblin and Gibbs’ (1999) work stopped at the point of suggesting that 
figurative meaning—even in frozen metaphors such as the one used in their study— is 
shaped by particular metaphoric verbs, a conceptual integration approach would suggest 
specific dynamic mechanisms and conceptual frameworks—in short, an integration 
network—which could explain the meaning of the phrase being analyzed. As explained 
below and elsewhere, the different levels of lexicalization of these conceptual metaphors, 
as they are called, became a critical factor in coding and analysis. 
Here, in addition to the terms frozen, transparent, and opaque, I distinguish 
between what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) call conventionalized or “dead/frozen” versus 
“novel” metaphors. Conventionalized metaphors began as novel metaphors but repeated 
use has absorbed them into everyday language—that is, they have become “lexicalized” 
as a unit of meaning. This idea has been discussed and expanded at some length by 
Linzey (1997) as the lifespan of a metaphor. On the other hand, novel metaphors “create 
new information about the target” (Sopory & Dillard, 2002, p. 390). In terms of 
conceptual integration theory, this would be paraphrased by saying that comprehension of 
a metaphor results in a blend which displays emergent meaning and the conventionalized 
figures of speech may provide one or more frameworks for input spaces.  
Lending further credence to the conceptual integration idea that we structure our 
phrases to prompt for understanding in our listeners, Horn (2003) tackles issues of 
opaque vs. transparent idioms. Although the distinctions he draws have more to do with 
linguistics than the main thrust of the current work, it is worth noting that the idea of 
entire phrases being used as lexical units (opaque, i.e., not understandable by knowing its 
parts; or frozen, i.e., stiffly unchanging in use or syntax) versus using phrases which may 
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be understood by virtue of their contexts and semantic composition (transparent) is 
precisely in line with a conceptual integration perspective. Like the other kinds of 
figurative language studied by the researchers cited here, listeners/readers are given clues 
(technically, prompts) to meaning by speakers/writers; it is up to the listeners/readers to 
construct meanings appropriate to the intent of their discourse partners. This is an 
example of how meaning construction theory has been recruited for use in a conceptual 
integration model of metaphor comprehension.   
Another aspect of metaphor use which suggests the viability of conceptual 
integration theory is the concept of filtering. Newsome and Glucksberg (2002) compared 
older and younger adults’ metaphor comprehension and found that people in both groups 
both enhanced metaphor-relevant properties and filtered out metaphor-irrelevant 
properties. The study was conducted to determine if age-related mental decline would 
emerge in tests of metaphor comprehension. To their pleasant surprise, the researchers 
found no evidence of decay in this critical mental ability among the elderly participants. 
This is a typical example of research showing life-long patterns of metaphor use. In 
conceptual integration terms, enhancing would mean using the selective projection and 
highlighting of certain properties of the target and source domains. Filtering out is a 
concept common in conceptual integration, basically to account for the fact that we 
cannot think of everything all the time; our consciousness needs an effective filtering 
system to function normally. Note that these terms carry much of the same notion of 
amplifying or regulating specific meaning, quite similar to the neural feedback or 
inhibitory processes described previously in this paper.  
50 
 
An older article by Carroll and Mack (1999) was both prescient and provocative, 
although it was originally written in 1984. It made the case for what they called active 
learning via metaphor. They wrote that in the field of the psychology of learning, prior 
knowledge was the equivalent of the elephant in the room, the thing that everyone knew 
was there but refused to talk about; for cognitive scientists, prior knowledge was “a 
complication that theorists…could not well accommodate. [They] focused empirical 
work on simple and artificial concepts and skills, precisely to avoid the complication of 
prior knowledge” (p. 385). But in conceptual integration, prior knowledge is accounted 
for as a source of any number of relevant input spaces and as a provider of frames of 
reference and inputs into emergent understanding.  
Their work in artificial intelligence led Carroll and Mack (1999) to believe that 
metaphoric application is the way learners process new knowledge (and produce 
emergent meaning) in the light of prior knowledge. They saw the value of metaphoric 
thinking as lying in its open-endedness, which invited construction of mental models: 
“metaphors are kernel comparison statements whose primary function in learning is to 
stimulate active learner-initiated thought processes” (p. 386). In discussing then-current 
approaches to metaphor, Carroll and Mack reviewed problems with both mental-
operational and linguistic-structural approaches, and called for an explanatory model 
which would include both accurate attributes of and relationships among the various 
elements of successful metaphors. Once again, the conceptual integration model takes 




Further, and equally important, Carroll and Mack (1999) note that a more viable 
approach to metaphor would also explain the dynamic process through which metaphors 
are not only understood but produced. 
[A] theory of real learning will need to directly confront the processing problems 
of how corresponding nodes and relations are recognized as such…Such an 
account of the mechanisms [of metaphorical understanding] would tell us why one 
or more metaphors are useful and how  they are generated and then used to 
support learning. (p. 391, emphasis in original) 
 
In speculating about how such mechanisms might ultimately be described, Carroll 
and Mack (1999) used a set of terms that would be used again later in the specific 
parlance of conceptual integration theory (and its two primary precursors, mental spaces 
theory and conceptual metaphor theory): retrieve, integration, compress, framework, 
structural mapping, inferential processes, construct, and interact. The writers also insisted 
on the importance of viewing learning as an active process, not the learner-as-passive-
container paradigm. “Metaphors can facilitate active learning…by providing clues 
for…inferences through which learners construct…knowledge…” (p. 393). The present 
research makes use both of specific metaphors in teaching scientific concepts and also a 
conceptual integration analysis as a measure of how participants’ language changed as a 
result of learning. Further, in this research, I measure the educational impact of the 
instructional metaphors, and describe and explain the results from a conceptual 
integration perspective. 
Current Perspectives and  
Theories in Metaphor 
The seminal work for this generation’s researchers in the psychology of metaphor 
was Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By (1980). In developing the theory of 
conceptual metaphors, they started to bridge the gap between linguistics and psychology. 
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By defining metaphors not as lexical units, but as clusters of related concepts, they 
allowed for a more dynamic, in-progress process of metaphor use and meaning 
construction. Earlier similarity/comparison models of metaphor were predicated on 
analyses of the linguistic devices of figurative language use, where virtually all of the 
meaning of an utterance is inherent in the words themselves (Evans & Green, 2006). 
Lakoff (1987) and Johnson’s (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) work signaled a major shift of 
focus away from such linguistic “form” approaches to metaphor toward the logical 
analysis of meaning construction in the context of natural discourse, thus engendering the 
first phase of the more modern approach to the psychology of figurative language. 
Soon after Lakoff and Johnson (1980) began to advance the case for what would 
become known as conceptual metaphor theory, Lakoff (1987), Rosch (2002), and Varela 
et al. (1991) established that human use of categorization was both a result of and an 
impetus for human psychological capacities including the prime example of complex, 
symbolic language (see also Greenspan & Shanker, 2004). One tenet of conceptual 
metaphor theory holds that the human ability to categorize experiences or objects is a 
crucial part of our ability to remember, learn, and communicate (Lakoff; Lakoff & 
Johnson; Rosch). The very act of mentally grouping concepts allows us to establish a 
number of domains of thought from which we can compare and contrast new 
experiences. These domains allow us to draw conclusions about language and other 
social, mental, and physical experiences by allowing us to bring to mind different mental 
frames of reference. These mental frames (explained in detail in Chapter IV) inhabit and 
inform many of the mental spaces which are created during thought. An example of how 
categorization may be considered in light of conceptual integration is found in Heit 
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(2002) where he makes the case that the “integration process refers to how prior 
knowledge serves as an initial representation, which is subsequently revised as new 
observations are made” (p. 828, emphasis added).  
The robustness of conceptual metaphor theory is due partially to its application to 
any language. Recent research by Ozcaliskan (2005) demonstrates that the prototypical 
metaphoric source/target domains of “motion in space” is evident in Turkish speaking 
children as would be predicted by the embodied mind concept (Varela et al., 1991). But it 
is accepted (Lakoff, 1987) that categorization and metaphor (Deutscher, 2005) are bound 
together in the psychology and language of all people. It is essential to understand the 
contribution of these psycholinguistic elements to the understanding and application of 
conceptual integration theory.  
Schmitt (2000) uses Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) work in making a case for 
understanding subtle similarities and differences within and across cultures, as well as in 
individuals. Part of the beauty of the conceptual metaphor approach is in its applicability 
to any culture or language. For example, Schmitt makes a distinction between the 
American concept of “war” against AIDS and a local African concept of the AIDS virus 
as an “eater” (p. 3). Also, he uses his native German to confirm a physically experienced 
“path of life” (p. 2) metaphor which Lakoff and Johnson cite as a nearly universal 
concept.     
The next phase of the more modern approach to metaphor began about 10 years 
ago as the study of the psychology of figurative language was taking on some distinct 
characteristics along two main lines of thought: (a) the traditional view of metaphor as a 
comparison grounded in a lexical/form approach using models of semantic memory and 
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(b) a newer view, which was focused on issues of production and emergent meaning, 
where figurative language was viewed as on-line and context-bound (Katz, 1996). This 
was about the time Turner and Fauconnier (1995) were making their first inroads into 
conceptual integration theory in an article claiming—contrary to the prevailing wisdom 
of communication theorists of the time— that “there is no encoding of concepts into 
words or decoding of words into concepts” (p. 14). Going beyond the standard two-
domain model of describing metaphor, they proposed a many spaces model, including not 
only mental spaces for two inputs, but mental spaces for multiple contributions in 
addition to spaces for blends with emergent meaning, inherited from the inputs, and with 
new structure of their own. Linguistic expressions in natural discourse, they averred, are 
structural prompts by a speaker for retrieval of structure and construction of meaning by a 
hearer. Thus, many of the first threads of what would become conceptual integration 
theory were developed specifically in work on metaphor.  
Equally important is the fact that the conceptual integration model accounts for 
the interactive and contextual aspects of learning. Though today socially situated learning 
is seen as obvious (Lave & Wegner, 1991), some of Vygotsky’s intellectual heirs were 
considered fairly radical in developing social approaches to psychology and learning not 
so long ago. In the foreword to Situated Learning (Lave & Wenger), William Hanks 
describes the newer perspective as that  
which treats verbal meaning as the product of speakers’ interpretive activities and 
not merely as the “content” of linguistic forms…[with the] premise that meaning, 
understanding, and learning are all defined relative to … contexts, not to self-
contained structures. (p. 15) 
  
Further work on metaphor production, as distinct from comprehension, can be 
found in Corts and Meyers’ (2002) study of the organized and purposeful production of 
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metaphors in several sermons delivered by Baptist clergymen. The participants’ speech 
patterns were found to display bursts or clusters of figurative language involving a central 
root metaphor representing the topic at hand. This suggests that rather than an even 
dispersal of figurative language throughout a prepared speech, one might expect several 
extended references to a metaphoric core image to occur in relatively close proximity to 
each other. By contrast, in the present work, participants were young college students 
writing extemporaneously about a recent lesson, rather than professional speakers (i.e., 
preachers) who have written and rehearsed a specific text. If the burst effect does not turn 
out to be the case in extemporaneous utterances, it may indicate that metaphor production 
is affected or even focused by the act of writing, as distinct from speech acts, rehearsed or 
not.  
A recent call for papers for the 5th International Conference on Researching and 
Applying Metaphor (Gineste, 2002) attests to the continuing academic viability of the 
topics being discussed in the current work. The conference theme was Metaphor, 
Categorization and Abstraction: A Multidisciplinary Approach and had the following as a 
list of sub-topics: Metaphor and similarity; …categorization; …language acquisition; 
…translation; …modeling lexical networks; …emergence of meaning; …metonymy 
identification; …analogy; Metaphors, idioms, proverbs and second language learning; 
and Metaphor (production and comprehension) and pathology. 
Modern metaphor analysis continues to play a major role in traditional 
psychoanalytic venues as well. Moser (2000) makes the case that metaphor analysis 
provides a “multifaceted research perspective” (p. 3) with the following points:  
1) Metaphors influence information processing [because the metaphors we use] 
influence our cognition of the self and the world. 2) Metaphors are a reliable and 
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accessible operationalization of tacit knowledge … because metaphors are a 
linguistic manifestation of tacit knowledge. 3) Metaphors are holistic 
representations of understanding and knowledge. 4) Conventional metaphors are 
examples of automated action [because they are employed automatically and, like 
so many features of language, rather unconsciously]. 5) Metaphors reflect social 
and cultural processes of understanding [in addition to being part of an inner 
psychology of an individual, metaphors are context-sensitive, reflecting social and 
cultural meanings as well]. 5) [Psychologists can profitably use metaphor by] 
combining quantitative and qualitative approaches to metaphor use. (p. 4) 
 
Moser suggests frequency and correspondence analyses of categorical data, which will 
indeed be part of the current study. But he also makes the case that “the full potential of 
metaphor analysis can only be reached when combining it with a qualitative approach” 
(p. 5). 
In Moser’s (2000) essay, we find a case of a psychoanalyst espousing linguistics 
in general (and metaphor, in particular) as essential tools for the professional 
psychologist. Though Wachtel (2003) makes a compelling argument against an uncritical 
reliance on metaphor analysis for psychoanalysts, he also writes, “it is difficult to 
imagine how psychological inquiry can be pursued in any meaningful manner without 
extensive use of metaphor” (p. 6, emphasis in the original). 
But psychoanalytic therapy is not the only use of metaphor studies. A number of 
researchers (Dennis et al., 2001; Johnson, 1991; Kazmerski, Blasko, & Dessalegn, 2003; 
Power et al., 2001) have used metaphor comprehension to determine various cognitive 
capacities. For example, Kazmerski et al. found evidence suggesting that metaphors are 
processed automatically as opposed to the more traditional view that metaphor is a 
special gift accessed by artistic talent or extra mental effort. This too fits with another 
tenet of conceptual integration theory, which specifies metaphoric language as automatic 
and natural (see also Wilson & Keil, 1999.) 
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Further, Kazmerski et al. (2003) combined IQ tests with measures of metaphor 
comprehension and found that lower IQ subjects exhibited lower quality metaphor 
interpretations, and that higher IQ was correlated with more interference in metaphor 
comprehension, suggesting that more frames of reference might slow comprehension 
among higher IQ subjects. Again, from a conceptual integration perspective, these results 
were quite plausible, suggesting that there was some period of testing possible frames of 
reference for a likely meaning, given the context. This also fits nicely with the 
probabilistic processing described above regarding the Temple and Honeck (1999) study.  
Kazmerski et al. (2003) contended that their results were most consistent with a 
constraint satisfaction approach to metaphor comprehension. That is, as people construct 
their understanding about the meaning of verbal prompts, they calculate and select 
probable intentions from a possible variety of meanings until one seems to fit the 
circumstances. Higher IQ participants may have a larger repertoire of possibilities to 
consider. Constraint satisfaction implies that we employ a function of our understanding 
based on whether certain logical conditions of comprehending figurative language are 
satisfied. This interpretation is not at odds with either conceptual integration or with the 
probabilistic decision-making implied by a computational view of the mind (Fauconnier 
& Turner, 2002; Frawley, 1997; Gladwell, 2005; Pinker, 1994, 1997, 2000). Marcus 
(2004) specifically addresses the “if-then”—i.e., computational—logic used by both 
genes and neurons at key activation junctures as well, suggesting at least the likelihood of 
enabling neural structures and functions in force for this type of mental operation. 
Some research into issues of comprehension of literal vs. non-literal language 
deals with risk factors among children with head injuries. Dennis et al. (2001) showed 
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that closed-head injuries (CHI) in children could lead to significant difficulties in 
comprehension of irony and deception. The in-progress, dynamic meaning construction 
we take for granted in normal conversation may become difficult or impossible for CHI 
victims. Here, the inability to think metaphorically is symptomatic of a disorder. Again, 
this is consistent with the conceptual integration perspective where it is a given that 
metaphoric thinking is the norm. 
Other research in figurative language continues to go beyond the more traditional 
view that figurative language is an anomaly; rather, that it is automatic and essential. The 
more current view centralizes, rather than marginalizes, the role of metaphor in everyday 
communication. Power et al. (2001) studied the ability of children and adolescents to 
discern between literally true and literally false proverbs; it found the results to be 
consistent with the idea that figurative language comprehension was early-emerging and 
that its use was a “direct, automatic, and natural reflection of the way people think, 
reason and imagine” (p. 1). Evidence of this capacity for figurative language use suggests 
that it emerges developmentally earlier than the traditional perspectives recognized and 
that it also continues to develop in subtle ways into adulthood.  
The issue of developmental differences in metaphor interpretation was also 
addressed by Johnson (1991) in a study that also examined the roles of general language 
proficiency as well as general mental capacities in interpreting metaphors. Participants’ 
responses in Johnson’s study were coded on a five-point scale reflecting no or inaccurate 
responses through basic, then advanced/elaborated paraphrases of a set of specific 
metaphors. Johnson’s subtle and meticulous work confirms the idea that there are indeed 
developmental aspects to metaphor interpretation; she introduces the concept of cognitive 
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complexity in scoring subject responses, a concept which will be used as part of this 
work’s application of conceptual integration to the analysis of formal instruction and 
learning. Later in this study, I analyze elaboration and complexity as part of a larger 
examination of student production of metaphors. I explain Johnson’s analysis technique 
in more detail in the fourth chapter--Analysis and Coding Procedures.                
Metaphor in Psychology and Education 
An excellent meta-analysis by Sopory and Dillard (2002) explored a comparison 
between different explanations of why metaphor can be so effective in making a point in 
contrast to literal language. Sopory and Dillard tested six explanations of why metaphor 
seems to have an advantage over literal language in persuasive impact: pleasure/relief, 
communicator credibility, reduced counter arguments, resource-matching, stimulated 
elaboration, and superior organization. The last explanation, superior organization, was 
most supported by the results of their study. “Metaphor is credited with the capacity to 
structure, transform, and create new knowledge, as well as evoke emotions, and influence 
evaluations” (p. 382). Note how closely this fits with the perspective advanced by Carroll 
and Mack (1999) as well as the later information in this work regarding conceptual 
integration. According to Sopory and Dillard, three theories of the understanding of 
metaphor are considered as being most representative of the diverse schools of thought 
on the subject.  
First is the literal-primacy view which we have seen above in work dealing with 
comprehension of a metaphoric phrase or after a literal understanding has been tried and 
rejected as false (which we may take as the most traditional view of metaphor, holding 
that it is an anomaly in otherwise truth-conditional discourse). Second is the salience-
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imbalance view in which the attributes of the source and target domains are weighed as 
being more or less appropriate, giving the metaphor relative strength. Third is the 
structure-mapping theory which holds that metaphors convey a system of connected 
knowledge people use to seek a relational mapping between attributes (Sopory & Dillard, 
2002, p. 385). The mappings for a given metaphor produce a unique psycholinguistic 
topology of content, context, implications, inferences, and relationships. This last theory  
--which includes not just attributes, but relationships among attributes--derives from 
associative network models of memory and is thus most closely related to the theoretical 
bases of conceptual integration, namely conceptual metaphor theory and mental spaces 
theory (Evans & Green, 2006; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). Note that an associative 
network of memory is quite close to what has already been described as a conceptual 
domain, a body of related knowledge. Readers will recall that the entire mental space 
structure engendered by a given moment of discourse may be called a conceptual 
integration network. This fits well with the previously cited work in dynamic systems 
theory (Wilson & Keil, 1999) where systems are networks of networks with capacities for 
recursion, hierarchies, and different levels or scales. 
The current study compares the effectiveness of two specific instructional 
metaphors/conditions. I used several suggestions from the Sopory and Dillard (2002) 
meta-analysis in designing the lessons. Sopory and Dillard state, “When a metaphor is 
non-extended, single, placed early in a suasory message, novel, and with a familiar target, 
its impact can be substantial” (p. 407). Therefore, for the experimental group, I overtly 
explained only two metaphors, not several and not in depth, to teach the lesson; 
placement of the overt metaphors was near the beginning of the lesson’s script.       
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Pre-instruction data collected in this study were used to determine the participants’ base-
level prior knowledge of the target domain. Other data, in the form of a power-ranked 
survey, demonstrated how participants rated the relative effectiveness of the various 
classic metaphors used to explain the given topics. More details of the design rationale 
are explicated in Chapter III.  
The modern era of metaphor studies may be said to have begun with Lakoff and 
Johnson’s (1980). By casting figurative language in terms of conceptual thinking, the 
writers pushed the topic away from being understood as mere literary décor; at that point, 
metaphor studies became recognized as a powerful tool in cognitive psychology. So far in 
this paper, I have described research and theory attesting to the study of language in 
general and figurative language—metaphor in particular--as important to understanding 
psychology and learning. Rather than the more traditional view that the use of metaphor 
is out of the ordinary, it is now being regarded as an essential part of everyday language.  
The more modern view is reflected by Deutscher (2005) who argues that 
metaphor is a chief contributor to both the vocabulary and structure of all languages; it is 
also a primary agent of change in language which keeps a language alive.  
[We] began with a view of metaphor as an ornamental figure of poetic art, but as 
we probed more deeply, the picture changed beyond recognition. Metaphors 
turned up everywhere, dead or alive, hiding behind even the plainest words of 
ordinary language. It transpired that metaphor is an essential tool of thought, an 
indispensable conceptual mechanism which allows us to think of abstract notions 
in terms of simpler concrete things. (p. 142) 
 
Further, aside from its many practical applications in human communication and 
social interaction, metaphor’s value as a reflection of individual psychology and learning 
is continuing to be discovered. The current research is part of that discovery process. 
While more purely linguistic approaches held that the meaning of words was somehow in 
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the words themselves, these views became limited in their explanatory power because 
these concepts required a kind of store and sort approach, unexplainable in terms of what 
was being learned about the brain. Technical and theoretical advances in the subtlety and 
power of understanding brains and minds have forced and allowed cognitive linguists to 
gain a more complete view of the workings of language within and between brains/minds 
(Evans & Green, 2006). The combinatorial and computational nature of thought and 
language are reflected in the very structure and functions of the brain (Deutscher, 2005; 
Marcus, 2004; Pinker, 1994, 1997, 2000). 
It becomes more and more evident that metaphoric language is central to our 
linguistic and psychological capacities. I have tried to make the case that metaphor 
deserves to be examined in light of its potential to shape and reflect the very specific 
human capacity to learn through linguistic interaction. Readers will recall some of the 
linguistic research topics/issues cited above: idioms, irony, communication, proverbs, 
primacy, similarity, polysemy, and metaphor. Readers will further recall psychological 
research topics related to metaphor: conceptualization, categorization, development, 
social context, therapy, injury, brain studies, evolution, artificial intelligence, creativity, 
learning, etc. Consistently, I have tried to draw attention to connections between 
comprehension and production of metaphor and learning. Likewise, I have tried to build a 
case for considering how metaphors can be understood in light of a conceptual 
integration approach, which I will explain in much more detail in the next section.   
Thus, I have used a traditional background in theory and research as a starting 
point. I have also explored the more modern theories of conceptual metaphor, meaning 
construction, and mental spaces in arriving at a more complete and up-to-date theory of 
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metaphor use that is included under the aegis of conceptual integration theory. Though 
Fauconnier and Turner (2002; Turner & Fauconnier, 1995) and Evans and Green (2006) 
made a number of statements about the obvious connections to education and learning 
implied by this theory, to my knowledge there has been no independent research to 
explore these claims in specific educational applications. If conceptual integration theory 
is indeed a viable theory of the way we think, it would have to include learning as part of 
what it explains.  
In the current research, I apply the conceptual integration model to the analysis of 
metaphor use in a realistic teaching and learning situation in a project specifically 
designed to elicit a new type of measurement of learning using tools derived from 
conceptual integration theory. Thus, the research makes an original contribution to the 
field of educational psychology through the practical application of current theory in 
cognitive linguistics and, more specifically, conceptual integration theory. In the next 
sections, I discuss details of conceptual integration processes and how they may be 
applied to the analysis of student learning. In brief preview, the purpose of the current 
research is to develop a conceptual integration analysis of learning and the use of 
instructional metaphors.  
Definitions, Principles, and Examples 
of Conceptual Integration Theory 
 
Types of Conceptual Integration Networks  
 To adequately explain the methodology used in this research, I must now explain 
the key terms and concepts I used and explored in applying the conceptual integration 
model to teacher-learner interactions. In brief, the first part of this section reflects 
Fauconnier and Turner’s work (2002). Conceptual integration networks are to be 
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understood as models of dynamic neurological activation patterns emerging from both 
external stimuli: speech prompts, other contextual input, and internal frames of mental 
references such as memories or imaginative concepts. Four major categories of networks 
are considered: simplex, mirror, single scope, and double scope. 
A generic diagram of a conceptual integration network includes at least four 
mental spaces, each of which may be understood as culturally, linguistically, 
historically/experientially, contextually, or even creatively generated in a person’s mind 
(Figure 2). Though from the above we may be confident that neural activation 
accompanies these processes, it should be noted here that the accompanying figures are 
not to be taken as literal mappings of neural patterns but as models of psychological 
processes. Any given mental space may be formed by activation of any number of neural 
signals, clusters, or pathways. Marcus (2004) explains, “Just as there is no simple one-to-
one mapping between genes and brain areas, there is no simple one-to-one mapping 
between brain areas and complex cognitive functions” (p. 129). That said, I now move on 
to the central thrust of this work--a practical application of conceptual integration theory 
to the field of educational psychology, especially in the use of and relative effectiveness 
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Figure 2. Generic elements of a conceptual integration network. Differences in relations 
within and among these mental spaces provide the keys to understanding different types 





A conceptual integration network starts with a mental space for a generic concept. 
Thinking then enlists concepts from at least two other mental spaces--input spaces. 
Certain elements from and between these three mental spaces are then blended into an 
emergent concept called, simply, a blend. The four network types are named according to 
the types of blending resulting from different types of elements in the input spaces, the 
relations among these elements, the unique and also shared contributions of these 
elements, and the structure of the final blends. The various structures in all blends may be 
said to have certain topologies as a result of the single and combined elements from the 
input spaces and the blends. Connecting these topologies is a mapping of elements within 
and among the mental input spaces. “The blend is an integrated platform organizing 
frames of the mental space inputs for organizing and developing those other spaces” 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 133). 
For example, a Simplex Network (Figure 3) is so called because it is particularly 
simple and ubiquitous. Culture and biology often provide the elements of the different 
input spaces such as our understanding of the roles and values involved in saying “Claire 
is the daughter of James.” A generic space for males and females starts the network and 
an input space for family roles explicates the parent-child roles, while another input space 
provides specific values” (i.e., specific people with certain names). The various elements 
of the inputs are entirely compatible, and we take it as self-evident, though as is usually 
the case, there is much going on “inside the black box” of our brains of which we are not 
aware. This compatibility between the organizing frames of inputs is part of the reason 
for using the term simplex to describe this kind of thought. As we shall see, this is not 
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Figure 3. A simplex conceptual integration network. A combination of specific people in 
specific roles has emerged as a blend which began with generic concepts. X is the Y of Z 
(D(c,j)) is a common construction with nested elements; a simple task for most people, 





frames, elements, inputs, and relationships. Nevertheless, the grammatical construction 
“X is the Y of Z” is a kind of general prompt for constructing any type of integration 
network. Thus, in texts and tests, when students find this construction, they are being 
asked to construct a specific—that is, often, but not always, a simplex— conceptual 
integration network. Fauconnier and Turner (2002) add: 
[X is the Y of Z] is taken to be the prototype of semantic composition, easily 
expressible in … logic as [D(a,b),] where [D is daughter, a is Claire, and b is 
James]… What we have just discovered is that … logical forms correspond to the 
cross-space mappings in simplex networks. The blended space in such networks is 
compositional in the sense that the entirety of the relevant information from both 
inputs is brought into the blend. This composition is truth-conditional in the 
following sense: the sentence counts as “true” in a world if the blend fits the 
current state of that “world.”…the simplex network is nothing but our old friend 
“framing” as studied in artificial intelligence and as captured formally in predicate 
calculus notation! …it is wonderful to discover that first-order logic and blending 
are not antagonistic; one is a simple case of the other…This brings parsimony to 
our description; but, more important, it captures a deep generalization about the 
phenomena being studied. There is a great variety of conceptual integration 
networks, and this variety accounts for the variety and creativity in the way we 
think. (pp. 120-121, emphasis added)  
 
The Mirror Network (Figure 4) contains elements in which all spaces--generic, inputs, 
and the blend—share an organizing frame. An organizing frame specifies the relevant 
activity, a ski competition, which is carried throughout the network. This example is from 
the 2006 Winter Olympics when television camera technology was used to show different 
skiers on the same track at the same time, showing their relative positions, though each 
racer skied alone, and at different times in the real world and real time. Technology here 
was used to do what we do easily in our mental worlds when we compare any kinds of 
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Figure 4. A mirror conceptual integration network. Here, elements from the inputs are 
closely matched (mirrored). The organizing structure in all frames is essentially the same, 
though the blend usually goes beyond the original in some meaningful way.  




The situations are mirrored in that they share the same organizing frames: the 
generic frame of competition, in this case, is combined with inputs providing information 
about different contestants in that contest, even though in reality they may never have 
met in a face-to-face, real time competition. The other inputs provide information about 
the competitors: the fact that they are competitors, though seemingly obvious, is 
nevertheless essential to this blend; the competitors now have roles to play as 
competitors. They also have what are called values, specifying one competitor as 
uniquely different from the other. Roles and values are explained in more detail below. 
The final blended space not only contains the same organizing frame as the other 
spaces, but that frame often inheres in a yet richer frame that only the blend has 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), in this case an imaginary concurrent race between Racer 1 
and Racer 2. The organizing frame provides a shared topology between the spaces that 
allows them to mirror or correspond to each other, but the blended space also includes 
differing details for both racers at the same time such as color, shape, angle, line of 
attack, relative locations, etc. This would seem to be the basis of the popular Fantasy 
Football Leagues where players from different eras compete against one another. The 
shared organizing frames about football are reflected in the final blends; however, the 
details about each contest, while maintaining the original organizing frames, differ. 
Next, a Single Scope Network (Figure 5) is so called because there is a one-sided 
contribution to the blend from one of the input space’s organizing frames but not the 
other. The overt, relative contributions to the final blend from the input spaces is highly 
asymmetrical with the main contributor providing a reference topology that is emergent 
in the blend. This type of network is evident in metaphor comprehension and use, and  
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Figure 5. A single scope conceptual integration network. Here, an asymmetrical 
contribution of one input (hence, single scope) compared to the other is implied. This is 
the prototypical situation in metaphor--where one input provides a way to understand 
another; meaning or salience comes from the blend, which draws from the source domain 





holds for much of this present work’s focus. In the accepted psycholinguistic tradition, 
metaphor provides a shared but asymmetric comparison between two conceptual 
domains: (a) the target domain is that part of the metaphor which is being described and 
(b) the source domain carries the most vivid descriptive/explanatory semantic power of a 
given metaphor. Thus, for example, in a phrase such as “He is such a rat,” the person 
being described is the target and the negative qualities of rats is the source of the 
attendant details, power, and relevant meaning (in metaphor studies, often called the 
salience) of the description. Therefore, in single scope blends, we see the exploitation of 
one input (an organizing frame/source) for understanding another, the focus (target) 
input.  
The rather obvious conceptual dissonance of the two inputs is believed to be a 
source of our feelings of insight when we experience the final blend as a psycho-
neurological event because the blend remains actively connected across the network of 
mental spaces and supporting neurological structures. From this perspective, this is the 
“Aha!” moment of relatively sudden global insight; most of the network is still on-line. 
Slower realizations, alas, because they evolve over much longer time periods, cannot 
provide the same feelings.  
 Finally, Double Scope Networks (Figure 6) usually result from blending concepts 
in such a way that not only is each input a major contributor to the blend, but the inputs 
each have quite different internal topologies and the meaning in the blend is structured 
differently than either/any of the inputs. This sense of structure through contrast or 
clashing elements of the different organizing frames gives us the term Double Scope 
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Figure 6. A double scope conceptual integration network. In this example, very different 
input frames clash with each other, and the blend not only takes some of its salience/ 
meaning from each, but also adds new meaning of its own. As in all blends, compression 
has been achieved; in this case, vital relations such as roles, intentionality, identity, 





frames in a Single Scope network, there are contributions to an emergent blend from the 
quite different (i.e., Double Scope) structures of the various contributions and 
combinations of the organizing frame inputs and emergent blend. Since the inputs for a 
double-scope network are by definition quite different from one another, the blend they 
create will necessarily involve the selective projection of quite specific--though 
different—elements from their respective mental spaces.  
To clarify, asymmetrical contribution of inputs is a feature of both Single Scope 
and Double Scope blends, but the latter will display clashing details between and among 
the various specifics implied by different elements and actions provided by the inputs. A 
defining and distinguishing feature of Single Scope or Double Scope blends is whether 
the contributing inputs clash or not; each combination of contributions is reflected in the 
construction of one or the other type of emergent blend. Logically, then, two more points 
should be noted here: (a) some metaphors can go beyond the more straightforward Single 
Scope construction and take on the form of a Double Scope blend; (b) not all metaphors 
are Single Scope blends, nor are all Single Scope blends metaphors.  
A final distinction on this point for now should allow readers to continue more 
confidently; the specific suite of cognitive mechanisms implied by the use of metaphor is 
the same for any Single Scope blend. However, the grammatical approach in the more 
traditional two-space target-source configuration is taken as the canonical starting point 
for the analysis of metaphors. In conceptual integration theory, metaphor is considered a 
somewhat special, though ubiquitous case of single scope networks, not because it is 
rare—which it is not— but because of the way it is achieved (see Chapter IV for more 
complete explanations.)    
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A recent and extreme example of a Double Scope blend (Figure 6) has come from 
American politics –with world-wide repercussions—lurching to life as a mixed metaphor. 
Beyond making English teachers everywhere cringe, the resulting decisions have meant 
life or death—literally—for tens of thousands: “We cannot let the smoking gun come in 
the shape of a mushroom cloud” (Bush, 2003). Notice how the smoking gun metaphor as 
one input is understood to demonstrate irrefutable guilt of recent criminal activity, while 
the other metaphor of the mushroom cloud implies the irrevocable catastrophe of a 
nuclear war. Here are two very different input structures—each one a metaphor in its own 
right, coincidentally— giving us a double scope structure coming together into a blend 
which at the time carried enough new dread to justify war in spite of the convoluted 
grammar. 
The work these conceptual integration networks do performs a function called 
compression. Conceptual integration networks are said to compress the input from 
different mental spaces into a final (though often temporary) blend, wherein lies 
emergent understanding or global insight--that “Aha!” moment. Compression usually 
occurs along one or more dimensions of thought called Vital Relations. 
Definitions and Examples of Vital Relations  
and Compressions  
 These vital relations (italicized in this section’s examples for clarity) with brief 
descriptions, examples, and educational applications are as follows: 
 1. Analogy. Blends here allow us to compress different input information, such as 
George Washington and George Bush, into a single role—U.S. President. Political 
cartoons that refer to stereotypes use this kind of compression often. The cigar-
chomping big shot/business tycoon, the redneck country boy, the tree-hugging 
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environmentalist, and many other stereotypes are readily recognizable. A current use of 
the word “beater” uses part-whole and analogy compressions to give new meaning to an 
old word. What used to be a term for a type of kitchen tool (an egg beater), a percussion 
mallet (a drum beater), a type of hunter’s helper who literally beats the bushes to flush 
game into the open, or more recently an old--i.e., “beat-up” and abusable car or pick-up 
truck—now has been enlisted for use as a modern slang term for a type of sleeveless t-
shirt after the stereotypical image of a beer-swilling lout who beats his wife and wears 
just such a tank-top-like t-shirt. 
 2. Category. Categorization, as one of the hallmarks of human thought, very likely 
has its beginnings in animal brains; however, the human level and use of this ability may 
be a prime source of language and human cognition (Lakoff, 1987; Varela et al., 1991). 
Categorization is also an implicit aspect of metaphorical thinking in particular; as such, 
it deserves close attention in our later analysis of student responses. This mental function 
allows us to use both property and similarity to produce a blend.  
 A modern yet already classic case here is a term such as computer virus. Enough 
of the properties and similarities of biological viruses were easy to interpret in the 
context of work with computers as to make this blend an instant success among millions 
of people. Notice also how the frames of reference have changed along with the 
metaphors. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, computers were hailed as “super brains” 
(Wilson & Keil, 1999). Soon thereafter, psychology employed the information 
processing metaphor to describe mental activities where brains were being described as 
computers. As discussed elsewhere, the time is ripe for a new metaphor and metaphoric 
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thinking requires categorization as part of its ability to evoke powerful insight (Lakoff, 
1987; Varela et al., 1991). 
 3. Cause-effect. We continually make mental assumptions about cause and effect, 
e.g., knowing the dog must have wanted out, though we don’t see the dog. The stain (or 
worse) on the carpet is the effect and we surmise the cause (Fauconnier & Turner, 
2002). We are not always necessarily accurate in making these assumptions. Much of 
folk psychology and folk science are built on what is both obvious and yet not 
necessarily true (Wilson & Keil, 1999). It is obvious that the sun goes around the earth.  
Likewise, it is obvious that “those people” aren’t like us. Indeed, the English word we 
got from the Greeks regarding outsiders—barbarians—seems to be derived from 
disdainful mimicry of their “foreign” languages as “babble,” according to my 
undergraduate classics professor.    
Cultural chauvinism, such as practiced by European sociologists at the height of 
the colonial period, took it for granted that non-European cultures and peoples were 
inferior. The effect--world domination—was seen as a natural consequence of the cause: 
namely, the inherent superiority of the Europeans. As students of World War II know, 
schoolmasters in Nazi Germany routinely argued that Jews and other “undesirables” 
would be in favor of their own extermination if they only had the mental capacity for 
understanding how inferior they were (Johnson, 1983). Feelings of moral superiority 
often derive from misguided cause-effect thinking. Of course, Europeans are by no 
means the only peoples burdened with convictions of their own cultural superiority.  
In science education, misunderstandings are often quite difficult to supplant 
(Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994). Classic, yet unfortunately still current, examples 
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include cause-effect fallacies about the changing seasons or the phases of the moon as 
demonstrated regularly in earth science classrooms around the country. The films Minds 
of Our Own (1987) and A Private Universe (1987) demonstrate this with unnerving 
candor. In the films, misunderstandings about science concepts still hold in even bright, 
well-educated students’ views of the world.    
 4. Change. A very general job of the mind is to recognize various types of 
change--change over time, change from experience, or change as a result of an event. 
Blends can reflect many types of change. Another recent television phenomenon again 
uses its technology to produce a blend of this type. A recent Mercedes advertisement 
uses a mere 30 seconds of images to show a race that represents over 110 years. How? 
In every scene/cut, the car has evolved into a newer version. It starts with a model from 
1894 that seamlessly morphs to the newest, sleekest design. This is but the most recent 
example of a long-standing use of image technology by advertisers to compress the 
effect of years into mere seconds. These are now iconic changes in television 
advertising, e.g., the change from Granny’s kitchen to today’s, or the change from child 
to adult. As with many vital relations, change is often used in a suite of cascading vital 
relations as we use several at once or in sequence to process our thoughts.  
The concept of change is essential in education as evidence of academic, 
personal, or social growth or development. Sometimes we are aware of growth in others 
more readily than we are of growth in ourselves. But in education, change is an absolute 
essential; it is a primary objective. Evidence of purposeful change is a hallmark of 
educational success. Thus, when educators want to measure learning, we look for 
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different types of change, represented and measured both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. 
 5. Disanalogy. Built from a sense of analogy, this allows an important type of 
mental comparison where things which may be closely related in some way can be 
distinguished from one another. It is difficult to specify fully what is different about two 
things that are already quite different, e.g., a rabbit and General Motors; it is much more 
evocative to consider how General Motors and Toyota, or George Washington and 
George Bush, are different. Notice in this example a grouping of similar vital relations 
where roles, properties, analogies, disanalogies, and similarities help us compress our 
conceptual frames of reference into some kind of usable categories. 
We often use such thinking for counterfactual statements: “You’re comparing 
apples and oranges,” or “I knew Jack Kennedy… [and] Senator, you’re no Jack 
Kennedy” (Bentsen, 1988), or “I’m not your mother, so you had better learn to clean up 
after yourself around here.” In thinking in general, and in learning in particular, 
disanalogies are an important part of understanding.    
 6. Identity. Identity is possibly the most basic vital relation. We understand that 
one person is still “that person,” whether an infant or an elder. Notice that identity can 
actually help us establish change in one person. On the other hand, statements such as 
“He’s just not his usual happy self today” or “I feel like a new man” are forms of identity 
statements built into counterfactual—that is, disanalogous— references. In education, 
identity, change and disanalogy are woven together in statements such as “I can’t believe 
I used to think geometry was so hard.” 
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 7. Intentionality. This covers a host of expressions involving desire, hope, fears, 
etc. This concept is very basic to our understanding of the world and each other. Titles 
such as Death Becomes Her or The Importance of Being Earnest play on our sense of 
intentionality. Phrases such as, “I’d like to see you try that,” or, “I hope you’ll change 
your ways, young man,” or, “I’m afraid it’s going to snow tomorrow” all use 
intentionality in some way. By ascribing intention to others’ actions, we are using a very 
basic psychological tool, a “theory of mind,” which implies a sense of psycho-social 
maturity on the part of the person making such inferences. Readers will recall the 
definition of a “theory of mind” provided in the previous section. This is precisely where 
implicit intentionality comes in.   
 8. Part-Whole or Whole-Part. Synecdoche is the technical term; however, this 
linguistic activity is often reasonably understood as metonymy, the use of one name to 
name another, associated thing, a very common mental/linguistic activity. Many slang 
terms, such as “Brass” to refer to military officers, use a part-to-whole compression. 
Street slang is often at the forefront of linguistic part-whole compression. References to 
pop/street-culture have little social cache if they are considered out of date. The chain of 
referents leading to a 1990s phrase such as “Chillin’ wit muh homies in the crib” may be 
obvious, but one would betray a pitiful lack of “street cred” if one used such a phrase 
today, only a few years later. More recently, “bling” has been used to describe 
ostentatious jewelry, using just a “sound effect” about the shiny gleam (part) to refer to 
an entire (whole) range of expensive, flashy clothing accessories. Using abbreviations, as 
exemplified in much of the recent text- and instant-messaging phenomena such as LOL 
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(usually for Laughing Out Loud) or LYLAS (Love Ya’ Like A Sister), are also clear 
cases of part-whole mental compressions.   
Advertising not only uses this element of psychology as part of its on-going 
attempts to influence shopping habits but often becomes a catalyst for even more 
linguistic change. In the 1980s, “Where’s the beef” came from a Wendy’s fast food 
commercial and played on the cliché of “having a beef”—conflict/problem—with 
someone, and became a compression for any reasonable complaint. Likewise, 
“Awesome,” from a Nissan auto commercial from that same time period, came into 
parlance as descriptive of any good thing. The former has faded while the latter is still 
with us, probably because its meaning already had practical use in the language, IMHO 
(i.e., In My Humble Opinion).  
The Michael Jordan basketball empire inspired movies, ads, and many linguistic 
frames of reference. In the movie Space Jam, Bugs Bunny calls Jordan “Your Airness,” 
and it makes perfect sense. Here also is a case where sheer imagery alone has come into 
being as a cultural referent; both the flying basketball player and the Nike “Swoosh” are 
proprietary trademarks, embodying this part-whole compression without a word.      
 9. Property. Blending allows us to compress a property into an inherent 
descriptive quality. A person who is a shining example of athleticism may warrant being 
called a “star.” Many of the adjective/descriptive noun phrases that are constantly 
evolving (Deutscher, 2005) follow this pattern. Over time, noun phrases and verb phrases 
evolve into shortcut phrases, taking on--through compression—new meanings and uses 
as other parts of speech or grammatical tools.   
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 10. Representation. When we see a play, we know the actors represent characters; 
likewise, if we see a photograph and say, “That’s my boy,” we are using representation. 
We are not under the illusion that the piece of paper is also at the same time a human 
being. Representation helps us compress a lot of information into small usable 
statements. Notice how a phrase such as “The White House said today…” uses a 
combination of part-whole, representation, and identity compressions. 
 11. Role. Many of our most common descriptive statements, such as “She is the 
boss” or the metaphor “He is a just a big fish in a small pond,” are blends where roles 
have been compressed. Notice here that such statements also elicit the sense of identity. 
Educators could look closely at their students’ remarks about roles to understand how 
much the students know about a subject. There is already a tradition in educational 
psychology of attribution theory (Ormrod, 2006) where remarks about success or failure 
are used to understand a student’s locus of control. That is, statements are interpreted as 
to what roles are played by different people and events in bringing about a given state of 
affairs (Wilson & Keil, 1999). 
Roles are often balanced by, associated with, and expressed in terms of values in 
cognitive linguistics and conceptual integration; values are the specific players of the 
various generic roles in statements. Thus, in “James is the father of Claire,” “James” and 
Claire” are the values and fatherhood (and by implication, daughterhood) are the 
respective roles played by James and Claire.    
 12. Similarity. We seem to be neurologically equipped and disposed to perceive 
similarity (Levitin, 2002). This is reflected in relations between inner mental spaces. Face 
recognition modules are an example of this neurological proclivity. This deep-seated and 
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early-manifesting ability has implications for both biological and social survival. We not 
only recognize relatives or strangers and friends or foes but also emotions and other types 
of non-linguistic messages. This vital relation paves the way for a closely related 
capacity, categorization. In specific regard to the issue of similarity, traditional studies of 
metaphor have used similarity theory or comparison theory as a defining aspect of 
metaphor, the roots of which go back to Aristotle. See Chiappe and Kennedy (2000) for 
recent work along these more traditional lines of inquiry where the researchers test the 
relative strength of metaphors and similes.   
 13. Space. Like time, space can be mentally blended. We can be in one place 
physically but mentally visit another quite easily. Imagination often prompts for concepts 
of being somewhere else. A soldier in battle may wish to be in a safer place, a lover may 
wish to be in the presence of the significant other, or a student may wish to be outside 
instead of in the classroom taking some dumb test. Einstein was said to have extra matter 
in the sections of the brain where spatial thinking occurs--with parietal lobes about 15 
percent wider than average and a missing Sylvan fissure, leading to speculation about an 
abnormal ability to make mathematical connections and spatial speculations (Ackerman, 
2004). Much of what counts as imagination and creativity derives from our ability to 
make blends involving compressions across time and space. Interestingly, since Einstein, 
Space-Time is often used as a hyphenated compound word/concept, indicating the new 
concept that what were formerly considered two is now considered as one. Worth noting 
here is Deutscher’s contention that all languages, through common intuition, have long 
since related space and time through metaphor; “there is no known language where 
spatial terms are not also used to describe temporal relations” (2005, p. 134).  
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 14. Time. We compress time into blends in many ways. We have memory, a sense 
of continuity, a sense of causation, and notions of simultaneity, for example. In a 
statement where one says something like “I’m not the person I used to be,” that person is 
implying at least three vital relations: change, identity, and time. 
 15. Uniqueness. Blends often have uniqueness as a prime factor for having been 
made in the first place. Further, it is often the uniqueness of the separate elements going 
into the blend that allow the uniqueness to emerge in the blend itself. Jokes or witty 
sayings often have meaning because of a unique blend of mental inputs: whether “a man 
bites a dog” or “the fault lies not in our stars, but in our selves,” each part of the blend 
derives from unique mental input spaces. The blend itself carries into new, unique, 
emergent meaning, distinct from the previous ones. 
Examples of Vital Relations, Compressions, 
and Conceptual Integration Networks 
 For some representative examples of how these vital relations do their work in 
creating conceptual integration networks, we may look at a few applications to some of 
the examples of the different types of networks discussed above. When we say “Claire is 
the daughter of James,” this simplex network compresses vital relations of role, identity, 
category, and uniqueness. A listener is given this much information in a mere six words, 
half of which are nouns. If we say Olivier’s Hamlet is more convincing than Burton’s, we 
have set up a mirror network where the inputs of the same dramatic role structure the 
listener’s understanding along the vital relations of analogy, role, identity, property, 
disanalogy, and representation. Most of our uses of metaphoric language are examples of 
single scope networks: whether we think of genes as blueprints or recipes, we are taking 
what we know about blueprints or recipes to describe genetic processes; what we know 
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about the source domains (of blueprints or recipes) is compressed by vital relations such 
as analogy, category, cause-effect, change, part-to-whole, property, representation, and 
similarity into our understanding of genes, the target domain.  
For an example of compression across a number of vital relations in a double 
scope network, where the input spaces have little in common, consider a long-running 
joke among a group of my friends (Figure 7). As teenagers, we fancied our wit to be 
extraordinary and were pleased with ourselves when we realized various words in 
English used the suffix “-taneous.” Collectively calling ourselves the “Taneous 
Brothers,” that is, Instant Taneous, Simul Taneous, Spon Taneous, and Subcu Taneous, 
we laughed at our fine word play many times over the years. Years later, while 
explaining this to another friend, we challenged him to come up with another name for a 
new Taneous brother, hoping to challenge the friend and also perhaps to learn of a new 
word with the –taneous suffix. For whatever reason, the new friend said, apparently out 
of the blue and just to be silly, “Ike.” The surprise was complete because Ike didn’t fit at 
all with the expectation, and again, they roared with laughter, especially when one of 
them summed it up this way: “Ma and Pa Taneous lost the thread.” For this simple 
sentence to encapsulate the whole story, an impressive amount of compression has taken 
place.  
 First, a generic space, such as baby names, was enlisted years ago. Then an input 
space for the fictional Taneous brothers was developed, at least in part through a mental 
space of puns from a specific group of non-naming words in English. Here is a clash 
between an input with naming words and one with non-naming words. Over time, the 
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Figure 7. Reverse-engineered joke. Very different, clashing, inputs make for a double-
scope network. The blend takes information from all inputs to create emergent meaning 
via compressions of uniqueness, intentionality, category, disanalogy, representation, 






and common use among the jokesters as an input space for a legitimate family name, at 
least for the purposes of the on-going joke. Once again, the new name, Ike, came from an 
input space which was totally at odds with the Taneous punch line because unlike Instant, 
Simul, Spon, and Subcu, Ike really is a name (and there is no immediate dictionary 
connection to “iketaneous”)! How could all of these inputs, which share so little, be 
compressed into an expression which allows for all the input spaces to be accounted for, 
yet which prompts for a new, logical, yet also accurate understanding? The Subject-Verb-
Object sentence, “Ma and Pa Taneous lost the thread,” will do quite nicely in recruiting a 
number of very different mental spaces toward a unified blend which shares some 
structure with the inputs, yet also has structure beyond the constituent elements of the 
inputs. 
The use of “Ma and Pa” implies both parenthood and perhaps a not-so-sharp or 
not-so-educated mentality as well. The metaphoric phrase of “losing the thread” implies 
that they may not have had much to hold onto in the first place, intellectually speaking, 
and even that was now gone. So the pattern to which the Taneous parents had clung, 
naming the first four boys to create the dictionary words instantaneous, simultaneous, 
spontaneous, and subcutaneous, was now broken; Ike’s brief appellation was the 
surprising result. This demonstrates that many inputs may be at work in a given 
integration network, and that the inputs may be elaborate and long-standing or quite 
temporary ad hoc statements. The various inputs have very little structure in common, yet 
the seven word blend has its own unique structure, nevertheless derived from its 
precursors. This little bit of autobiography is a real world example of how vital relations 
such as uniqueness, intentionality, category, disanalogy, representation, similarity, 
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change, time, and cause-effect are used to compress information in remarkably fluid and 
potent ways.  
It must be emphasized that the fluid and rapid rate of blending and compression 
into other blends may involve any number of these vital relations in dynamic interplay; 
many variations and combinations are possible. 
There are canonical patterns of compressions over these vital relations that 
we will encounter time and time again. Compression can scale Time, 
Space, Cause-Effect, and Intentionality. Analogy can be compressed into 
Identity or Uniqueness. Cause-Effect can be compressed into Part-Whole. 
Identity itself is routinely compressed into Uniqueness. It is also a 
fundamental power of the way we think to compress Representation, Part-
Whole, Cause-Effect, Category, and Role into Uniqueness… 
 
There are also canonical patterns of proliferation of Vital 
Relations. Cause-Effect can be added to Analogy. Intentionality can be 
added to Cause-Effect. Change usually comes with Uniqueness or 
Identity. 
 
Vital Relations are what we live by, but they are much less static 
and unitary that we imagine. Conceptual integration is continually 
compressing and decompressing them, developing emergent meaning as it 
goes. Certain basic elements of cognitive architecture make blending and 
compression possible. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 101) 
 
It must also be reiterated that these mental functions are not limited to language. 
However, because the present work is primarily focused on language and because such 
huge amounts of our mental processes deal with language, most of the examples here are 
couched in the context of language use. It is these types of patterns which the current 
research is designed to elicit and analyze. If any patterns can be found to be prevalent in 
natural, emergent (but topical and prompted) discourse from students on the basis of prior 
knowledge or instructional metaphor condition, we may tentatively interpret such results 
as indicative either depth of understanding and/or the relative persuasiveness of 
metaphor, respectively, both of which could have significant impact on how teachers may 
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evaluate the effectiveness of their instruction and the validity and reliability of their 
assessments of student learning.    
The primary goal for all compressions is to achieve human scale (Fauconnier & 
Turner, 2002). Any of the vital relations described above will eventually, through 
whatever necessary combinations and sequences, bring about a blend which will reflect 
human scale for the purpose of understanding. The sub-goals of compression serve the 
primary goal. Sub-goals include the following: (a) compress what is diffuse, (b) obtain 
global insight, (c) strengthen vital relations, (d) create a story, and (e) go from many to 
one. From both a neurological viewpoint (Wilson & Keil, 1999) and a systems 
perspective (Gleick, 1987; Waldrop, 1992), the idea of scaling is a feature of hierarchical 
systems of networks. As elements of various inputs are recruited into the blend, they are 
connected through compression which allows for both this human scale and global 
insight as well.  
Governing Principles of  
Conceptual Integration 
 
 A final set of principles must now be developed to understand conceptual 
integration theory. Fauconnier and Turner (2002) describe these as governing or 
optimality principles. Briefly put, with all other things being equal, we will find blending 
requires principles of (a) topology, where the useful topology of the inputs is reflected in 
the blend; (b) pattern completion, where existing patterns in the inputs can be used to 
correctly understand patterns in the blend; (c) integration, the essence of a blend; (d) 
maximization of vital relations, where vital relations have the most obvious presence and 
salience; (e) mental maintenance of the web of appropriate connections without 
additional surveillance or effort; (f) unpacking, where a blend can be unpacked or 
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reverse-engineered to reconstruct the entire network; and (g) relevance, where any 
element in the final blend is somehow directly related or linked to elements from the 
various inputs from which the blend was formed. These principles help differentiate 
between statements which are blends and those which are not blends, because it is worth 
noting here that although blends permeate our discourse, not every statement is a blend.       
Examples and Conceptual Integration Analyses 
of Metaphors as Instructional Models/Tools 
 
The history of using metaphors to teach lessons is long and well-documented even 
without including religious storytelling or innumerable instances of “at-momma’s-knee” 
types of life lessons. The following is a brief sampling of well-known instructional 
metaphors with representative, selected analyses using a conceptual integration approach. 
1. The allegory of the cave. In Book VII of The Republic (Plato, trans. 1961), 
Plato wrote of human consciousness as a kind of fleeting, removed, ephemeral 
experience, much like watching one’s shadow dance on a cave wall in the flickering 
firelight. He was not the only philosopher to address the issue of human consciousness, of 
course, but the image created by this metaphor has had staying power for over 2000 
years. The image is something of a cultural icon and would be easily accessed as a 
framework for an input space for almost anyone with a basic knowledge of the history of 
Western philosophy. Thus, the image may be accessed through memory or by a cultural 
cue if, for example, one saw a cartoon about this in The New Yorker. The conceptual 
integration model would include the potential for a person to employ this image as an 
initial input space which could be derived either from prior knowledge or contextual 
clues such as language. 
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 2. A folk tale (points of view). The parable of the blind men and the elephant 
(Kazlev, 2004) is common to many cultures. It can be used with adults to discuss bias or 
with children or literature classes to discuss theory of mind/point of view. Because the 
listener knows what the characters don’t know—that is, that the one thing all the blind 
men are touching is an elephant, the listener has made a compression of many to one, that 
is, part-to-whole. Each of the blind men’s conjectures creates an input space in the 
complex integration network the story elicits in the listener. The listener also recruits 
enough information about other inputs derived from experience or basic knowledge to 
make sense of the men’s comments. An input about trees helps when one man describes 
the legs, an input about snakes helps when another man describes the trunk, etc. 
 3. A sail and a wing (physics of flight). Flight instructors often use a metaphor 
with sailing to explain the phenomenon of Bernoulli’s principle--the similar shapes and 
function of sails and wings. Because this metaphor is based on similarity of multiple 
aspects of shape and function, we might label the frameworks of both inputs as being 
nearly equal contributors to the blend, yielding a mirror blend. Sailing instructors use the 
idea of a sail as a vertical wing to explain propulsion for their boats, lending further 
credibility to the balance of the inputs, mirroring one another. 
 3. Earth scale (biology/ecology). A typical science class activity for middle school 
children might involve drawing large (10 feet or more in diameter) circles with chalk. 
The width of the chalk represents the depth of the biosphere, the home of all known 
living things, including the oceans and atmosphere (perhaps 10 or 12 miles thick, at 
most); the diameter of the entire circle represents the diameter of the earth (roughly eight 
thousand miles). By bringing the size of the earth and the very small relative size of the 
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biosphere into human scale, teachers are using the metaphor of the drawn circle to 
compress several ideas about the environment and human impact into one brief lesson 
with symbolic representation.  
 4. Sun scale (space science). In earth and space science, it is typical to use a 
football field to teach students some of the elements of relative size and distance. With 
the sun represented by a basketball on one goal line and the erstwhile planet Pluto on the 
other (smaller than a BB), teachers use this exercise in compression to human scale to 
give students insights into planetary distances. It is no accident that Einstein used a 
metaphor to describe the speed of light. He famously imagined riding a beam of light 
from the sun on an outward journey from the sun through the solar system. Physically, 
this seems to be impossible. However, the image is easy to visualize because we have the 
capacity to create mental spaces/inputs at will, regardless of the actual feasibility of an 
act or scenario. 
 5. Body as machine or temple? Professional sports trainers may talk about high 
performance, fuel, stress, pounding out work, work-loads, RPMs (“reps”), or the like, and 
be perfectly comfortable using a whole system of metaphors of the body as a machine. 
People who have a different body metaphor will likely employ a different set of 
statements. If the body is a temple, there will likely be sacrifice, cleansing, spirituality, or 
perhaps protection. Our metaphors for life provide many of the mental space inputs we 
recruit for everyday conversation and understanding. That our psychology is both 
physically embodied and culturally embedded are issues the conceptual integration model 
tries to address (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Greenspan & Shanker, 2004; Lakoff, 1987; 
Pinker, 1997, 2002; Varela et al., 1991). 
93 
 
 6. Math symbols. Because they use information about one domain to create 
information about another domain, symbols of any kind have metaphoric qualities. The 
open (or big) end of arrows eventually gets to be learned as greater-than. There really is a 
lot of balance involved in balancing an equation. Exponents mean a lot and don’t take up 
too much space. Social conventions of all kinds, including language and math, are richly 
coded and can become prompts for input spaces at any time because our brains are 
dynamically and subtly responsive to both internal and external inputs. 
 7. “Life is…” statements are often metaphoric, compressing so much information 
into seemingly simple statements that we sometimes fail to appreciate how we can 
construct so much meaning from so few words. Consider the evocative power of the 
following various statements. Life is a journey. Life is a vale of tears. Life is full of 
surprises. Life is not for the weak of heart. Life is a test. Life is a contest. Life is a trial, a 
struggle, a climb…a trip! 
Whether we are children or adults, whether we are in classrooms, homes, or 
places of work, metaphors are in constant use around us, not only as clever, special 
language, but as teaching and communication tools of the highest degree. The 
mechanisms with which we understand and produce metaphor are so natural and 
automatic that we should continue to explore this area of human interaction in order to 
discover what more we can learn about language, learning, and psychology.  
Instructional Metaphors in the  
Teaching of Genetics 
Having by now established the viability of the study of metaphor as a topic which 
continues to demonstrate a richness of potential for both psychology and education, I will 
now discuss the particular pair of metaphors examined in the current research. Of course, 
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metaphor has long been acknowledged as a teaching tool par excellence (Deutscher, 
2005; Marcus, 2004). Science teaching in particular has maintained a lively debate and 
even started a cottage industry in developing metaphors to help explain certain concepts 
to students at all grade levels (Aubosson, Harrison, & Ritchie, 2006). Science teachers—
and all effective teachers, really—are keenly aware that good metaphors help their 
students learn concepts; likewise, an ill-chosen metaphor can serve to merely confuse 
students rather than to illuminate subject matter. One problem, of course, is that no one 
metaphor can be as completely accurate as a teacher or student—or any set of speakers 
and listeners— might want it to be. It is accepted that metaphoric descriptions are and, to 
some extent, must be incomplete and partial (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980). Often, an element in a metaphor that highlights one aspect of a concept 
well may carry with it elements which limit or distort a student’s ability to understand 
other aspects of the concept accurately.  
A now-classic case in point--and one which a recent study by Condit et al. (2002) 
has made devilishly more complex--is the use of either the blueprint or the recipe 
metaphor for teaching and learning about genes, genetics, and heredity. In their study, 
Condit et al. analyzed explanations by their participants in choosing one or the other of 
the metaphors as more effective and found a wide range of opinion regarding the 
instructional usefulness and accuracy of each metaphor. These mixed results seem to 
have been based on factors the participants had internalized about recipes and blueprints 
long before their participation in the study. Some subjects described each metaphor as 
being superior or inferior for the same reasons, e.g., helping the subjects think about the 
organizational aspects of genetic information or being too deterministic. In other words, 
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the participants’ prior experiences of, and dispositions toward, the source domains of 
recipes or blueprints were far too varied to predict the effectiveness of transfer of any 
given salient qualities of either metaphor to the target domain: genes, genetics, and 
heredity. 
For one thing, the science of molecular genetics in the last 50 years was 
advancing so rapidly that it was regularly outstripping the metaphors used to describe its 
wondrous processes (Condit et al., 2002; Marcus, 2004). The blueprint metaphor held 
sway as an important contributor to student learning until criticism mounted in the mid-
1990s, declaring that the mental model emerging from this metaphor was too 
deterministic. If there was a gene for everything, and genes controlled everything through 
perfectly replicated patterns, humans—and all organisms—were mere pawns of genetic 
destiny. Of course, as previously mentioned, no metaphor is complete or completely 
accurate. As we have seen already and as will continue to come up in later discussions, 
part of the power of metaphors lies exactly in their incomplete or partial nature 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).  
Critics of the blueprint metaphor advocated for a recipe metaphor instead 
(Marcus, 2004), claiming it better represented the processes of molecular genetics, 
allowing for natural variation and the effects of the environment. Further, it was a 
superior metaphor because it did not imply a specific, one-to-one mapping from a 
particular gene sequence to a particular trait or attribute of the organism. As cited in 
Marcus, geneticist Richard Dawkins wrote the following: 
The genetic code is not a blueprint for assembling a body from a set of 
bits; it is more like a recipe for baking one from a set of ingredients. If we 
follow a particular recipe, word for word, in a cookery book, what finally 
emerges from the oven is a cake. We cannot now break the cake into its 
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component crumbs and say: this crumb corresponds to the first word in the 
recipe; this crumb corresponds to the second word, etc. (p. 1) 
 
Marcus further cites British zoologist Patrick Bateson:  
The idea that genes might be likened to the blueprint of a building… is 
hopelessly misleading because the correspondences between plan and 
product are not to be found. In a blueprint, the mapping works both ways. 
Staring from a finished house, the room can be found on the blueprint, just 
as the room’s position is determined by the blueprint. This straightforward 
mapping is not true for genes and behaviour, in either direction. (p. 6) 
 
The proposed shift to the recipe metaphor was embraced by specialists in 
genetics, the media, and some science writers. However, as Condit et al. (2002) write,  
use of the recipe metaphor has not fulfilled the critics’ aspirations for it… 
[and this] can be attributed to a faulty theory of how metaphors function… 
This approach assumes that metaphors have innate, monosemic meanings 
that determine the mindsets of those who use them. (p. 303) 
 
 What the geneticists expected in espousing a different metaphor as a more 
effective teaching tool came from a meaning is in the words approach. But it has become 
clear that in different contexts, metaphors, like other language devices, can have different 
meanings/functions. This study addresses a resulting issue in Chapter VI: if meaning is 
not in words, can there be meaning in metaphors made of words? 
Condit et al. (2002) approached the gap between the geneticists’ expectations and 
the less-than-hoped-for outcome of their efforts by taking into account the difference 
between larger sets of potential metaphoric meanings and smaller, filtered sets of 
contextually activated metaphoric meanings. Condit et al. contend that the geneticists 
could have done a more effective job by approaching the newer metaphor not as a 
replaceable part, or as something merely to be inserted into the heads of learners (using 
the old “container” model/metaphor of learning), but as something that already had 
meaning in the population of learners and, moreover, as something that would prompt 
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learners to continue to process and construct their own meanings from a living, active 
metaphor.  
The practical difference of the two models is this. If the meanings were in the 
words and also in the metaphors made of words, the container model would be supported 
by significantly increased scores for the experimental group with the enriched metaphor 
condition relative to the scores of the control group. If, on the other hand, the container 
model was not supported by increased post-instruction scores among the experimental 
group, one logically remaining possibility is that no learning at all has taken effect. This 
possibility may be rejected because there are positive, significant differences in virtually 
all pre- and post- instruction measures for all participants reported in Chapter V. Another 
logically possible choice would be that the given metaphors were inappropriate for the 
tasks. Because the two primary metaphors and the other classic metaphors were 
developed and used by instructors since the beginning of instruction in the content 
domain of genes, genetics, and heredity, this possibility, too, may be discounted.  
Another logical choice is that because the instruction relies merely on telling information 
about the topic—even with more metaphors—rather than engaging participants in more 
cognitively constructive activities than unguided, passive listening, teaching and learning 
opportunities may have been squandered.      
In the present study, by assessing the learning/meaning construction process via 
analysis from a conceptual integration perspective, I test some of the dynamic meaning-
via-context approaches advocated and explored by Condit et al. and I also elicit data 
about the use of metaphors in the relative instructional effect of the two given 
instructional conditions. Design decisions are described in more detail in Chapter III. 
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Conceptual Integration, Metaphor,  
and the Present Study 
The reader will recall from Carroll and Mack (1999) the list of terms (presented 
here in verb form) they used in calling for an approach to active learning: retrieve, 
integrate, compress, frame, map, infer, construct, and interact. It is worth restating that 
these same verbs are used throughout discussions of conceptual integration theory as 
well. The use of instructional metaphors also requires students and teachers to retrieve, 
integrate, compress, frame, map, infer, construct, and interact. When we consider the way 
we think, communicate, and learn, these and similar, related ideas must come into play.  
Until conceptual integration theory had been formulated (Evans & Green, 2006; 
Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Turner & Fauconnier, 1995), many elements of psychology 
and learning seemed impossible to connect. Where was knowledge stored? How do 
people understand each other? How does learning take place? Are we merely passive 
containers of information? How can we understand one another when words and phrases 
can have so many meanings? How does language—and metaphor, in particular— work 
as both an interactive yet also internal psychological process? In brief, simply recall the 
question posed on the first page of this paper: Just what happens psychologically when 
students learn something new from classroom instruction? 
By using the conceptual integration model, these types of questions seem to have 
some hope of being satisfactorily answered. The field is new and no doubt many 
obstacles remain. But the unifying effect of one theory which accounts for biology, social 
interaction, language use, situational context, and much of what we call psychology has 
tremendous potential. Academic interest in conceptual integration is just beginning. But 
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the possibilities are immense since the combinatorial and computational aspects of 
human thought and language are so succinctly addressed by this theory.  
In this research, I examine the use of conceptual integration as an analytical tool 
in a classroom learning situation where I test some of its claims, refine our understanding, 
and apply its precepts in the pursuit of helping teachers and students improve their 
abilities. 
Sample Conceptual Integration Analyses of  
Two Core Instructional Metaphors 
With the foregoing definitions, examples, and guidelines now in place, I now turn 
to the specific elements of the practical applications and implications of these concepts in 
the present research. As previously discussed, any metaphor carries the potential to hide 
and highlight certain elements of a concept (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980). Teachers know that it is a real art to find and express metaphors well 
enough to truly help their students learn. I turn to a debate in the field of science teaching 
regarding two such useful and yet incomplete metaphors. 
In this research, using the specific metaphors “genes are blueprints” and “genes 
are recipes” as studied in research by Condit et al. (2002), I test not only if an enriched 
instructional metaphor condition is more effective than a less-overtly metaphoric 
condition but also, from an analysis of participant responses after instruction, if there are 
any patterns of conceptual integration networks that indicate different levels of 
understanding or different mental strategies used to process instruction and 
communication.  
I also discuss and describe different aspects of mimetic processing as part of the 
conceptual integration processes among the participants. That is, I investigate what gets 
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copied by the participants from each of the given metaphors and what changes appear in 
the participants’ written patterns of conceptual integration. Such mimetic behavior may 
be taken as a specific instance of Vygotsky’s (1934/1987) contention about scaffolding as 
an instructional framework which is developed, initiated, and supported by the teacher, 
and which eventually develops—often through overtly copied behaviors—into the 
learner’s conceptual, internalized command of given material.  
When an instructor uses a given metaphor, the student is prompted to construct a 
set of mental spaces which accurately represent—if only temporarily at first—at least 
some of the elements of the instructional input, the given metaphor. Such mental 
representations become some of the inputs in the student’s conceptual integration 
network. A student in a class about genes, genetics, and heredity has a topic—that is, a 
target domain—very well defined by the highly structured instructional context. The 
question here becomes this: What will the student learn as a result of the instructional 
prompt to think about the target domain (genes, genetics, and heredity) in terms of a 
specific source domain (e.g., blueprints)? Using the generic framework for a single scope 
conceptual integration network because of its typical association with metaphor, we may 
imagine a number of scenarios. 
A single scope, conceptual integration network for this metaphor might start with 
a generic space for life science/biology class because this represents a student’s initial 
mental framework for what she is experiencing. When the instructor uses the blueprint 
metaphor, the student is prompted to extend the generic life science/biology class input 
space toward a specific target, genes, which becomes an input space of its own. Any 
information already in this space which the student is able to bring to bear may be 
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considered prior knowledge or memory. The source domain, blueprint, has also been 
prompted by the instructor and represents a third input space. 
But here is the critical moment where a blend will or won’t be achieved. The 
success or failure of the blend prompted by the teacher determines the level of meaning 
construction—that is, learning—by the student as the student constructs blends in 
response to the teacher’s prompts. In this study, I examine the changes in the number, 
types, and veracity of statements and constructions (blends and otherwise) before and 
after the teaching/learning exchange, allowing me to discover and discuss what factors 
are most relevant to the successful use of instructional metaphors (see research questions 
below and Chapter VI.) 
From the conceptual integration perspective, the moment in question is when the 
information in the student’s input spaces—generic space: science class, first input: genes, 
genetics, heredity (target domain); second input: blueprint (source domain)—will provide 
enough input to lend structure and content to an emergent blend, a fourth mental space 
which by definition will contain a uniquely structured representation, with qualities and 
relationships among those qualities relevant to specific content provided by both of the 
inputs. The extent to which the emergent blend reflects an accurate understanding of the 
given elements and their relationships is the extent to which the student may be said to 
know about genes, genetics, heredity, at least insofar as they relate to the functions of 
blueprints. Examining students’ statements in light of conceptual integration techniques 
could give rise both to a more subtle understanding of the specific problems given student 
may be having and to more effective teaching and learning solutions to those problems.     
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But here lurks the dilemma: the use of a given metaphor—in this case, genes are 
blueprints—assumes that the student’s knowledge base includes at least something about 
blueprints. What definitions, qualities, process, or products does the student associate 
with blueprints? It is immediately obvious that with a greater knowledge of the source 
domain, blueprints, a student will have a greater likelihood of meaningful application of 
the relevant qualities of blueprints in relation to the target domain, namely genes, 
genetics, and heredity. A student who has no idea of what a blueprint is will clearly be at 
a loss. Levels of age-level appropriate vocabulary acquisition may be one explanation for 
a child’s not knowing what a blueprint is, but there are others. There are considerations of 
gender, socio-economic status, education, ESL status, access to technology, cultural 
perspective, and so on. The teacher who uses any metaphor thinking that it will be 
equally helpful and obvious to all students is in serious danger of making an unwarranted 
instructional assumption.  
To extend these considerations to two hypothetical students representing the 
conceivable extremes of these elements, first consider how valuable meaning 
construction will be for a student whose command of English is limited and whose life 
experience has never included the word or concept of a blueprint. At most, working with 
the constituent parts—that is, Blue and Print, he might conclude that genes/genetics/ 
heredity have something to do with the color blue or with print as a kind of writing done 
by hand or machine. Although genes are found in chromosomes, which by definition 
(from the Greek for colored bodies, which earlier geneticists found in a brief, specific 
stage in cell division) do have something to do with color (McKechnie, 1983), it is not 
really their “blueness” that is important. Likewise, the student may be technically correct 
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about how print might be connected to the target concepts, but only in the most trivial 
and superficial ways. A conceptual integration interpretation of this situation would 
predict little, if any, emergent meaning and therefore, little, if any, advancement in 
learning for this child. The source domain’s poverty of content and structure makes it 
very unlikely that the student will be helped in understanding anything about the target 
domain by this particular instructional metaphor. 
On the other hand, consider a precocious, articulate student from a privileged 
background. Perhaps her father is even an architect who sometimes brings home both 
actual blueprints per se but also has had occasion to explain to his daughter how they are 
used, what they mean, and how computer-assisted design has created whole new fields of 
visual representation for architecture and construction. This hypothetical student may 
readily understand many things taught to her about genes, genetics, and heredity precisely 
because of the depth and accuracy of, and ease of access to, information in her well-
nourished and elaborate source domain. She will draw on the source domain to build an 
emergent blend where genes, genetics, and heredity will be understood to have some of 
the qualities of blueprints such as organization, scheduling, parts working together, 
planning, communication, and so forth. These two hypothetical students are highly 
dissimilar, but teachers know that in most real classrooms, this level of diversity is 
actually quite typical and is reflected not in just two students but in scores of them.  
In this research, I tally and employ components from conceptual integration 
theory including the four different types of integration networks (simplex, mirror, single 
scope, and double scope) and 15 different vital relations (i.e., analogy, category, cause-
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effect, change, disanalogy, identity, intentionality, part-whole, property, representation, 
role/value, similarity, space, time, and uniqueness) compressed into blended statements.  
From exploring the basic question I posed at the beginning of this paper—What 
happens psychologically when students learn something new from classroom 
instruction?—I hope to have established the basis for asking research questions about 
student learning as reflected in a conceptual integration approach. The primary research 
question became this: How is learning reflected in changes of conceptual integration 
patterns? To answer this, I compared how different instructional metaphor conditions 
impact learning as measured by traditional quantitative analyses. I also collected and 
analyzed participants’ open-response production of various metaphors before and after 
instruction. After performing these types of analyses, I was prepared and able to assess 
some of the accompanying tenets of conceptual integration theory as they apply to 
classroom practices (Chapter VI).  
The Present Study: Research Questions and  
Overview of Methods and Data Analysis 
This research is designed to show how the conceptual integration model may be 
employed in clarifying some of the psychological implications when intentional teaching 
and learning have taken place. By applying principles of conceptual integration theory to 
learning situations, I analyze changes in participants’ written language about specific 
instructional content. In determining the pre- and post- instruction changes in conceptual 
integration patterns participants used to articulate their understanding, I explore ways of 
identifying and describing processes of thought that must have been at work—according 
to conceptual integration theory— in the participants as they developed and demonstrated 
new understanding. A conceptual integration approach could eventually lead researchers 
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to discover ways to improve teacher effectiveness and student learning through improved 
diagnosis, content, planning, and activities. 
Research Questions 
 Four primary questions and their corollaries drove this research: 
1. How is learning reflected in changes of verbal (written) conceptual integration 
patterns?  
 
2. Does metaphorically “richer” instructional content lead to significant group 
differences either in selected-response scores or any open-response measures?  
 
3. To what extent, if any, does mimetic learning apply to the use of instructional 
metaphors by participants as measured by either (a) change in metaphor use or 
(b) change in conceptual integration patterns? Corollary 3.1: What is the 
relationship, if any, between mimetic post-instructional metaphor use and 
selected-response scores? 
 
4. Can participants develop effective novel metaphors of their own? Corollary 
4.1: Do participants who demonstrate higher creative metaphor ability also 
score higher on the selected response/ recognition part of the assessment? 
Corollary 4.2: Do participants who demonstrate higher creative metaphor 
ability also score higher on the open-response part of the assessment (in 
relation to accuracy ratings for the open-response data)?  
 
Overview of Methods and Data Analysis  
 In order to apply the theory of conceptual integration to a realistic teaching and 
learning situation, I used different two metaphoric conditions in teaching an otherwise 
identical lesson via a video recording about the same topic to two groups of participants. 
The control group (Group C) simply took the pretest and the posttest without any overt 
references to metaphors in their version of the instruction. By definition, their scores 
provided a baseline. The experimental group (Group E) viewed the identical instructional 
video with the addition of blueprint and recipe metaphors, both embedded in the 
instruction. I analyzed pre- and post-instruction open responses as well as results of pre- 
and post-instruction selected response assessments.  
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Respectively, all of the research questions above required different types of 
assessments, data, and analyses, resulting in a mixed methods research approach. I 
applied both traditional quantitative techniques as well as principles of conceptual 
integration to the analysis of the qualitative response data.  
First, I analyzed quantitative results from the different instructional/experimental 
groups to determine the relative efficacy of the respective instructional metaphor 
conditions. Then, I analyzed qualitative data from the participants’ open responses in 
several ways. I determined if there were unique or typical patterns of conceptual 
integration networks used by individuals or groups of participants before or after 
instruction. I analyzed participant responses across dimensions of instructional group and 
program major according to the frequency and type of conceptual integration networks 
(along with their respective vital relations) employed by the participants before and after 
instruction. Further, pre- and post- instruction differences either in metaphor use or 
specific metaphor elaboration could logically reflect mimetic learning and this work 
developed these issues as well.  
Further, final qualitative analyses were made via the results of (a) a survey of the 
participants’ dispositions regarding the various given metaphors including the two 
primary metaphors, and (b) the creative metaphor exercise. Each shed a good deal of light 
on several of the topics at hand.  
Expected Results  
 Through this work, I expected to illustrate or test three key points. First, there 
should be relationships between quantitative and qualitative changes in performances. 
That is, learning, as measured by pre-and-post-instruction quantitative assessments, will 
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be reflected in changes in patterns of conceptual integration as measured by pre-and-post-
instruction qualitative assessments. 
Second, I tested for significant differences in the effectiveness of the two 
instructional metaphor conditions described above. The pair of metaphors provided to the 
experimental group should help those participants more than the non-metaphoric 
condition helped the control group. This tested the common sense notion that using 
multiple metaphors will help students learn more (from more metaphors). Again, the 
assumptions of success here lay with the traditional “container” model of teaching and 
learning, the most pertinent corollary of which, in this case, was “more is better.”  
Third, I assessed the different levels of mimicry (and presumably internalization 
as well) of the two specific instructional metaphors among the participants. Differences 
could emerge based on levels of prior knowledge of or disposition toward a given 
metaphoric source domain.  
In the next chapter, I explicate the research and data collection procedures 
designed to answer the above research questions, relating specific elements of the design 










DESIGN, ANALYSIS, METHODS, MATERIALS,  
PARTICIPANTS, AND PROCEDURES 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I describe in detail the sources and types of data I collected and 
analyzed in pursuit of answers to the preceding research questions. Further, I discuss 
design decisions, experimental procedures, and the goals, means, and context of this 
research. I also explain how the pilot test played into the decisions for the final drafts of 
the instruments and assessments employed here. Additionally, I describe the details of the 
procedures employed in the preparation, conduct, and completion of the study. I also 
review the assumptions and implications derived from the theoretical framework of the 
conceptual integration model, especially as it pertains to understanding more about the 
nature of teaching and learning.  
Design 
 Because the nature of the research questions is an essential contributor to design 
decisions, the four primary research questions are listed in order of importance here to 
establish the hierarchy of subsequent decision-making. This in no way establishes the 





Research Question 1: How is Learning Reflected  
in Changes of Conceptual Integration Patterns?  
 In order to develop data to address this question, my design had to include the 
following elements: quantitative evidence of learning against which to compare 
qualitative changes, qualitative evidence for change in conceptual integration patterns, 
and dimensions of teaching and learning to create a realistic scenario from which the 
above types of evidence could be elicited (as evidenced by a variety of pre-post- 
measures).   
For this phase of the design, I developed a conceptual integration frequency 
matrix (Appendix C) to determine the types and frequencies of integration networks used 
by the participants in their written responses before and after instruction. I later analyzed 
the matrices of blend types and vital relations for face value evidence of change in the 
types of conceptual integration networks and vital relations employed in the construction 
of those networks by the participants. 
The coding of this most essential data was so specific to conceptual integration 
theory that I dedicated the entire next chapter to the explication of that process. As 
described in Chapter IV, the raw data was rich enough to be categorized for use in a more 
purely descriptive report—provided in Chapters V and VI—of face-value pre-post- 
changes in patterns of blends and vital relations, specifically produced from a teaching 
and learning scenario. The application of conceptual integration theory to a learning 
situation was precisely the purpose for gathering this data.  
But the open-responses provided another more general opportunity for applying 
conceptual integration to analyses of learning. I first tallied and compared the frequencies 
of student responses using Simplex, Mirror, Single Scope, and Double Scope integration 
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networks as a single number of “Blends” in the Production Data. But because of the 
concurrent nature of the qualitative and quantitative aspects of this research, the 
conceptual integration data, which provided the core of evidence relating to the primary 
research question, required me to analyze phrase construction frequencies of many kinds, 
of which conceptual integration data would be a subset. Therefore, in the process of 
analyzing the data for a more specific research goal, I was required to apply a number of 
standard qualitative analyses, eliciting an additional set of frequency data to bring into 
consideration. An additional value of the data lay in the fact that both qualitative and 
quantitative data were in the specific contex of a given content domain, which permitted 
a number of additional comparisons and interpretations across a broader range of 
variables. For example, I later compared the frequencies of specific blend types to 
selected-response data and accuracy data.  
In addition to an observational analysis of changes in conceptual integration 
patterns, I used MANOVAs and paired t-tests to compare construction frequency data 
drawn from the texts the participants produced. This allowed the numeric tallies of the 
pre-instruction open-responses to be compared to post-instruction open-response tallies. 
Next, the data permitted another analysis regarding the relative overall usages of the four 
types of conceptual integration networks the participants produced in the texts of their 
sentences before and after instruction. If the frequency and type of conceptual integration 
networks used by the students in their open responses were shown to change 
significantly, whether or not in accordance with any one of the metaphor conditions, this 
provided strong confirmatory evidence of the construct validity of the conceptual 
integration model in general and, specifically, of the validity of applying the conceptual 
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integration model to educational concerns. Such changes would have significant 
implications for psychologists, test-makers, teachers, and students.  
Research Question 2: Does Metaphorically “Richer” 
Instructional Content Lead to Significant Group  
Differences Either in Selected-Response Scores  
or Any Open-Response Measures?  
 Another phase of analysis focused on how participants responded to metaphor use 
in teacher discourse, described elsewhere throughout. In this phase of the study, the same 
open responses (in addition to the forced-choice section on metaphors) created by the 
participants in the conceptual integration analyses (above) and the mimetic analyses 
(below) were used to examine an aspect of metaphor elaboration, first shown in 
Johnson’s research (1991) on developmental aspects of metaphor use. It was anticipated 
that students with higher test scores on both pre-and-post data would also demonstrate 
more metaphoric elaboration, regardless of their group.  
Research Question 3: To What Extent Does Mimetic 
Learning Apply to the Use of Instructional 
Metaphors by Participants?  
 If students in a given instructional group use that group’s metaphor in articulating 
and improving their understanding, we may infer that the instruction has been effective. 
If students move from being unable to provide any metaphor before instruction to using 
their group’s specific instructional metaphor after instruction, and if those students’ 
quantitative scores improve beyond a reasonable estimation of priming and practice 
effects, the theoretical implication—in the Vygotskyan view, at least— is that the 
scaffolding provided by the metaphor has allowed the students to internalize some 
aspects of the concept in question.  
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Another important analysis may be made here concerning the different 
experimental conditions and the effects of mimetic learning strategies. The overt 
instructional strategy of enriching metaphor conditions might be predicted to have 
significant mimetic effects on student qualitative responses. The group with no overt 
metaphor would be expected to demonstrate either (a) no use of any particular metaphors 
or (b) less overt mimetic copying (of more fossilized, deeply lexicalized terms/metaphors 
such as “code” or “twisted ladder”).  
If so, this could indicate that metaphors in question were somehow more naturally 
used by some students in learning about a target domain. Should this turn out to be the 
case, this would support some of the basic tenets of meaning construction theory, where 
the meaning is not in the words but develops via listeners’ cognitive responses to—and 
perhaps also as a result of their prior knowledge of or dispositions toward— the words 
used by the speaker. If the qualitative responses fell along these lines, this would provide 
confirmatory evidence of the work of Vygotsky (1934/1986) and Blackmore (1999), 
where both social context and its corollary, mimetic learning, are at work in individual 
cognition.           
Research Question 4: Can Participants Develop  
Effective Novel Metaphors of Their Own?  
 To provide participants with a sense of learning and closure, and to take proper 
advantage of the analytical opportunities presented by the content and circumstances of 
this research, participants were prompted to create and elaborate their own novel, yet 
fitting metaphors about genes, genetics, and heredity. The ability to do so was taken as a 
sign of content mastery, linguistic development, and cognitive complexity (Johnson, 
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1991). In Chapters V and VI, I report and discuss the results and implications of this 
exercise.        
Data Analysis 
Quantitative Analyses  
 Traditionally, quantitative data generated by the selected-response questions 
would simply be compared across both groups and between pre- and posttest results. The 
design allowed for correlations, MANOVAs, and t-tests to be performed on pre- and 
post-instruction quantitative test results. Results of the selected response tests were used 
as the dependent (Y) variable for variance and correlation calculations. Here, I did a 
traditional analysis in the context and as the basis of a more extended series of 
assessments and interpretations. Quantitative comparisons of group means allowed me to 
determine the relative effectiveness of the metaphor conditions as measured by selected 
response assessments.  
A serious and classic problem in the more limited traditional approach would 
emerge if we failed to take into account more--and more subtle—ways to measure just 
what and how people learn. Simple pre- and- posttests too often reflect learning in the old 
“container” or transmission model, where the teacher pours the knowledge into the 
students’ heads. Those students who remember words easily or do well on quizzes 
because of the relative ease of selected response formats might appear to have learned 
more than other students but possibly in a very superficial way. It was also likely that 
there would be some students who would perform worse in a selected response format 
than they would with other types of assessment. The point here was that such exams often 
did not do justice to either the students or the subject matter. As but a small part of a 
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larger assessment context, the traditional approach was clearly valuable in its own right, 
but it should be only the beginning of a deeper examination of the interaction of teaching, 
learning, and subject matter.  
In this study, instructional treatment groups defined the levels, and pre- and post-
instruction test results provided dependent variables for quantitative analyses. Test scores 
were compared between the control group (with no metaphoric instruction) and the 
experimental group (with a double dose of overt metaphoric instruction). I also compared 
the sheer amount of change in the test scores and written statements of the two groups.  
However, with the traditional measures of learning as a starting point, I attempted 
to pose and answer more subtle questions. If groups clearly differed in their respective 
performances, what was the source of these differences? If the groups performed equally, 
what did that say about the different instructional metaphors? Whether the groups scored 
differently or not on the selected response posttests, how would that be reflected in or 
related to the frequency and accuracy of conceptual integration patterns in their 
constructed responses? How would narrative accuracy be related to test scores? This led 
to the need for analyses of the language the participants used to describe their 
understanding. Thus, I moved beyond the initial quantitative scores to qualitative 
analyses of participant-constructed responses. 
Qualitative Analyses  
 I collected pre-instruction qualitative data in the form of written responses about 
participants’ familiarity with the treated-as-a-single topic: genes, genetics, and heredity. 
These responses were readily analyzed for face value statements of high or low levels of 
prior knowledge for each respondent. Also, I analyzed the statements for any uses of 
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metaphors. All such evidence was compared to the same participant’s post-instruction 
responses. Thus, for each participant, there were two sets (pre- and post-) of open-
responses to analyze, averaging some 10 to 20 sentences.  
But there was also a third source of data: a section which called for the 
participants to think about and be creative in their own use of metaphors. The 
participants’ responses to metaphor elaboration instructions also provided a venue for 
survey data by asking them to make a forced choice among several options of previously 
used metaphors for genes, genetics, and heredity. A last bit of data about participant use 
of metaphor emerged from a prompt encouraging participants to be creative in 
developing an appropriate metaphor of their own. Most of the use of metaphor has been 
traditionally studied through the lens of comprehension; however, there is relatively scant 
research on metaphor production. But in this research, metaphor production, elaboration, 
and creativity were taken as potential evidence of learning because of their emergent 
qualities.    
Therefore, the qualitative, textual, open-response data served both for 
straightforward analyses of metaphor mimicry, elaboration, and creativity and also, 
primarily, for an analysis of the uses of, and changes in, the conceptual integration 
networks used by the participants, both individually and in experimental groups. Open 
textual responses provided data that were potentially more natural, and quite possibly 
more telling about the levels of understanding a person attained than selected-response 
data.  
Understanding the cognitive mechanics of metaphor production has the potential 
to be a powerful means of conceptual and educational analysis. Will participants 
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internalize a metaphor enough to copy it? Will they extend it into new conceptual 
territory? That is, will participants be able to use metaphors more adeptly in transferring 
concepts to new problems?    
Participants could be expected to perform better on selected response posttests, 
regardless of their exposure to either instructional metaphor because of practice effects. 
But because a further analysis of their constructed responses could provide a more well-
defined profile of their knowledge in any case, pre- or post-, experimental or not, I 
analyzed participants’ responses for elements of observable change in light of the 
conceptual integration model. I discussed correspondence between the two types of 
categorical variables developed from the four types of conceptual integration networks in 
relation to the 15 types of vital relations, both before and after instruction. Changes in 
pre-and –post instruction conceptual integration patterns would presumably reflect 
changes in participants’ understanding of the topic.  
Using the 4 X 15 matrix of the four network types and the 15 vital relations, I 
obtained a profile of conceptual integration use for each student and each group of 
students before and after instruction by performing observational analysis. This included 
the number of conceptual integration networks per paper and the relative proportion of 
the different types of conceptual integration networks. The analysis provided a means of 
testing the implication from conceptual integration theory that the different instructional 
conditions would somehow be reflected in changes in the types of blends produced by the 
learners. Later, I analyzed not only changes in network types but also changes in the uses 
of vital relations.   
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Additionally, by inviting students to use metaphors in their written responses in 
the feedback section, I hoped to collect enough responses to analyze for a confirmatory 
study of metaphor elaboration as developed by Johnson (1991) who created a five point 
scale (0-4) to rate students’ use of metaphors. In her work, Johnson demonstrated a 
developmental link to the elaboration of metaphors. Older students in her research were 
much more likely to add information or extend metaphors as they described their 
understanding. Those who scored a zero rating were unable to even copy the given 
metaphor, clearly indicating a lack of understanding. Students who scored at level one 
were able to repeat the given metaphor but added nothing else. Those who were rated at 
level two added a single minute change. Those who were rated at level three showed a 
clear change beyond the given metaphor, either numerically or creatively. Those who 
scored a four rating were clearly creative in providing more or more unusual responses 
that showed understanding and new dimensions of thought about the given metaphors. 
The present study did not address developmental issues but Johnson’s use of metaphor 
elaboration as evidence of cognitive complexity was completely in keeping with the 
precepts of conceptual integration and provided this research another interpretive 
perspective of the data.  
To summarize the qualitative analyses afforded by the participant-generated open-
responses, I performed the following tasks, all within the context of a conceptual 
integration approach to teaching and learning via instructional metaphors:       
1. When technically acceptable, participant responses were categorized as one of 
four types of conceptual integration networks and were analyzed according to the 
compressions via the given 15 types of vital relations described in Chapter II. Patterns 
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that were discernable within and between groups according to instructional group and the 
implications of such patterns for teaching and assessment purposes will be described in 
detail. 
2. Because conceptual integration was derived from conceptual metaphor and 
both were part of the larger cognitive linguistic enterprise, comparisons were properly 
made between changes in conceptual metaphors and blends. I discuss the particulars of 
this analysis in the next chapter. 
3. Participant responses were analyzed according to elaboration of metaphors 
(Johnson, 1991).  
4. Finally, some of the data reflected simple copying of a given instructional 
metaphor, providing at least some evidence of mimetic effect (Blackmore, 1999). 
The research design, represented in Table 1, was a mixed-methods study based on the 
traditional pre-post assessment procedure. The design allowed for a control group (Group 
C) and another experimental group (Group E). A unique feature of this particular design 
was that it also allowed for both quantitative and qualitative data to be concurrently 
gathered and cross-compared in the same experiment. 
A Pilot Study 
 In order to assist in the design, production, and integration of the final research 
instruments, I conducted a pilot study during the spring term following my Research 
Committee’s approval of my doctoral proposal the previous fall. After obtaining the 
University’s IRB approval, I designed, produced, and administered the 22 item, three 




After analyzing the participants’ performance on the pilot assessment, I discussed 
many content and design related issues with subject-area experts. I made the following 
decisions to improve the accuracy, clarity, probity, and difficulty level of the various 
assessments. The pilot instrument presented 12 selected-response/matching items, three 
selected-response/forced-choice items, five fill-in-the-blank/short answer items, and two 
open-response prompts. The final pretest instrument presented eight selected-
response/matching items, three selected-response/forced choice items, and two open-
response prompts. 
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Note. Where Y=DV (selected-response data); Q1 AND Q2=qualitative open-response data; 
Q3=survey and metaphor data 
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Research Design Components 
 
First, the five item set of fill-in-the-blank questions was jettisoned because of too 
many possibilities for either multiple legitimate answers or blind guesses. More 
importantly, the open-response data were clearly of greatest value to me in terms of being 
able to analyze relatively natural, content-focused student language. Accordingly, more 
writing space was provided in hopes of encouraging a greater number of written 
utterances. Also, both the general open-response instructions and the specific instructions 
for the pre- and post-tests were revised to elicit more elaborate and more focused 
responses. Instructions throughout were improved for clarity. 
The facts that no one scored zero nor did anyone score 12 (of 12) suggested that 
(a) the selected-response/matching item set could be reasonably leveled in terms of 
participant vocabulary and (b) the spread of scores suggested the set could be of some 
discriminatory use. The wide range (1-10), low mode (2), and modest mean scores (41%) 
reinforced this. A real surprise about the qualitative data became evident through a 
quantification exercise: of 116 total sentences written about the topic (genes, genetics, 
and heredity), only two presented overt metaphoric descriptions, slightly less than one 
overtly metaphoric statement per 50 written sentences. However, learning that from the 
pilot study prepared me for a similar performance in the actual research. Because I 
expected there to be few spontaneous uses of overt metaphor from the pilot test results, I 
did not rest my research hopes on a great amount of initial metaphoric productivity by 
participants. This was part of the rationale for developing the metaphor index scores that 
were derived from the forced-choice items and the open-response prompt for a novel 
metaphor. This index allowed me to obtain focused, individual data about all participants’ 
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cognitive abilities in metaphoric thinking, rather than being forced to deal with the very 
few spontaneous metaphors (only 2 in 146 sentences) produced in the pretest phase.       
Instruments 
In response to the results of the pilot test, the final drafts of the assessment 
instruments (Appendix B) were constructed as follows, in order of presentation to the 
research participants. This organizational structure is repeated later in this chapter in the 
description of the procedures. I have chosen this organizational strategy for these two 
sections to allow readers a sense of the participants’ experiences during the research 
sessions. Below is a description of all other necessary materials and equipment. 
The Pretest  
 The first page provided space for students to write as much as they could recall 
about the related target domains--genes, genetics, and heredity. Lines were provided for 
any text the participants might be able to produce in summarizing their knowledge of the 
domain. The second page consisted of eight selected-response items. To minimize 
guessing by process of elimination, 12 possible answers (eight correct answers plus four 
plausible distracters) were provided for the matching section. Scores from this selected 
response section were the basis for many other measurements and interpretations in this 
work.  
The Video Lessons  
 Every vocabulary item on the test was written into the lesson’s script (Appendix 
A) verbatim (with minor concessions dictated by standard grammar and usage). 
Likewise, every vocabulary item was shown onscreen as text during the first mention of 
the item, either as a subtitle or as part of the text on the graphic being shown at the time. 
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The two lessons were on separate DVDs. The videos were brief, about 20+ minutes in 
length, with very few specific images and words to go with the two specific scripts. That 
is, for the brief sections of the videos which differed, the metaphor scene included 
background shots of a set of blueprints dissolving to a building and a recipe book 
dissolving to a cake--there was no such pair of scenes in the control group’s video. The 
videos were professionally produced with everything but the metaphor scene exactly 
duplicated in each.  
Thus, after the videos had been produced, very little in the way of further 
materials, except for the assessment packets, was necessary to produce. Further material 
needs included backup copies of the various videos and a television and DVD player. The 
script and the items were written in accordance with information from a variety of 
sources (Freeland & Hurst, 2004; Gonick & Wheelis, 2005; Jenkins, 2000, 2003). 
The Posttest  
 The two assessment packets (the pretest and posttest) had essentially the same 
selected-response and open-response prompts with some exceptions. The selected-
response posttest (Appendix B) included four additional selected response items to 
answer in order to allow participants some sense of growth in understanding rather than a 
static, exact duplicate of the first assessment, thus mitigating, it is hoped, at least some of 
the expected effects of both practice and fatigue. Also, the order of items was changed for 
the same reason. These quantitative data were used in two primary ways:  for traditional 
comparative analyses and to explore the possible relationships between (a) the 
participants’ performance on the open-response sections of the assessments, especially 
(b) participants’ production of metaphors, and (c) participants’ patterns of conceptual 
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integration. The final two pages of the posttest (Post 4--the forced-choice survey of 
historic metaphors, and Post 5--the creativity exercise) were distributed only after the 
posttest open-response and selected-response sheets had been turned in. 
It should be noted that all of the selected-response items were original to this text 
and research. Whatever the arguments against this might be, one positive aspect of this 
was that I could and did refine all of the instruments (including the qualitative prompts) 
used in this research. The improved content-area vocabulary was both more accurate and 
up-to-date. The definitions of all of the vocabulary items were expanded. The items and 
definitions on the written assessment were practically exact matches for their 
counterparts in the lesson’s script discussed below and elsewhere. 
In the current research, I used four of the pilot test items as a separate cluster of 
novel items for the posttest in addition to the other eight items I used in both the pre-and 
posttests. Compared to the overall item difficulty level of the pretest, the level of this 
four-item mini cluster was at least as or more difficult based on my intent to design a 
question set including items which asked for some greater level of novelty, detail, or 
subtlety.  
Now with the pilot test behind me and the assessment items in late-draft form, it 
was time to work up the script for the video lessons based in part on the exact language of 
these written assessments. Over the next six months, I completed two full drafts (and 
productions) of the video lessons, developed a final research schedule, and, under the 
auspices of IRB approval, conducted the research in the spring semester of 2009. 
Having completely redrafted the assessment instruments and the lesson scripts, I 
also needed to acquire and use various physical folders and types of data files to create in 
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order to accommodate the variety of papers, questions, answers, and information which 
evolved over the course of this study. 
The only other materials participants needed were the assessment packets 
themselves. The first sheet for the participants was an IRB informed consent form 
describing the basics of the research and verifying their participation for class credit 
received in exchange for their participation. The last sheet for the participants was the 
IRB-required debriefing sheet. 
In addition to assessment and IRB materials for the participants, I needed to have 
the completed videos at hand. The small numbers of participants made for simpler 
logistics than were originally planned. Only one proctor and one room at a time were 
necessary. Adding to the simplicity and reliability of the process was the one traveling A-
V cart and one projection system. With the people, instruments, materials, and equipment 
in place, the research proceeded as follows.   
The Research: Participants, Settings,  
and Procedures 
With one “no-show” exception, all other students presented themselves on time 
for every session. Sessions were quite uniform and straightforward in procedure.    
Participants  
 Over a three week period (before and after spring break), 25 psychology students 
participated in the research in groups of one to four. Their demographic data are 
presented elsewhere in this section. Eleven timeslots were provided but one was 
cancelled due to a snow closure of the university and one session had a no-show. All 
research was conducted in one of three classrooms arranged in advance in the campus 
education building. All rooms were well-lighted, reasonably warm, and quiet; no major 
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distractions occurred during the course of any session. Participants were provided with 
pens in the rare cases where they did not bring their own. Participants were seated at their 
discretion in a group in the center of the room with one or more desks between them but 
in adequate proximity to the video screen.  
Although use of locally available participants imbued an element of convenience 
sampling in terms of the demographic profile of the group of participants, I contend that 
the number of participants was enough to provide useful data for the purposes of this 
study. Further, as described above, no particular type of participants were sought or 
excluded from the study, resulting in at least a nominal degree of reflection of the 
generalized demographic profiles of the university’s service area and undergraduate 
student population.   
Participants were students from an introductory psychology course (PSY 120) 
typically offered by the university with the knowledge, approval, and cooperation of the 
university Internal Review Board. Therefore, student demographics reflected the 
university’s rather diverse, “middle-of-the-road,” rural/suburban, socio-economic, and 
educational status, rather than a preponderance of special populations (that is, populations 
reflecting extremes of socio-economic status, ethnicity, or non-English speaking 
linguistic groups). I asked participants to give two hours of their time for this research, 
which matched the required class requirements for this type of activity. The total number 
of participants was 25, affording enough participants to create a control group (Group C) 
with n = 11 and an experimental group (Group E) with n = 14.    
Of the 25 students who became participants, sixteen were females and nine were 
males (ratio 1.78:1). As it happened, the classes available to the participant pool (Psych 
126 
 
120 students) during this term were much more evenly gender-balanced (1.2: 1) than the 
sample group. The female to male gender distribution for the two research groups (C and 
E) was seven to four and nine to five, respectively, providing a corresponding gender 
ratio for each group of 1.75: 1 and 1.8: 1. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 22. Such 
a small total age range predicted the miniscule and presumably insignificant differences 
between the mean ages of Group C (19.8 years) and Group E (18.78). Possibly the most 
problematic information to emerge from analyzing the demographic data of the sample 
group of participants was that the control group had one outright biology major, perhaps 
enough of a curve-breaker to skew their results undeservedly upward. Equally 
problematic was the fact that the experimental group—though there were no biology 
majors, per se—had three people whose majors were in related fields-- medicine and 
nutrition. They, too, might have skewed their group’s results undeservedly upward.  
Settings  
 The locations for all phases (pretest, instruction, and posttest) of all research 
sessions were in medium-to-large classrooms in the College of Education building. Thus, 
at all times, students were in relatively familiar academic settings.  
Procedures 
Consent was obtained from the university, the college, the instructor, and the 
students who agreed to participate in full accordance with all the policies of the UNC 
Institutional Review Board. Copies of all necessary forms in this regard are included in 
Appendix D. The university allowed students to register for participation in the study 




Phase one: Pretest. Using a script to enhance the standardization of the 
procedure, I introduced the entire project to each participating group, and distributed and 
collected the IRB informed consent sheets. As the assessment began, I gave the 
participants the open-response sheet first, followed by the matching quiz pretest. All 
question and answer sheets except the final two were distributed and collected one at a 
time in order to help participants avoid distraction by seeing too much too soon, or by 
over-thinking what they had already written and therefore losing the sense of authentic, 
natural, ad hoc language I tried to preserve at every stage.  
Phase two: Instructional treatments and posttests. The primary instruction and 
assessment exercise occurred at this time when participants were shown identical videos 
(with the exceptions of the metaphors as described above). Group assignments for a given 
day’s film were random and based on the number and gender mix of participants who had 
signed up for that day’s research session. The two groups (Groups C and E) were shown 
instructional videos with two different metaphor conditions (impoverished or enriched, 
respectively). The control group—impoverished—(Group C) simply took the posttest, 
having seen the video without specific metaphoric instruction. Group E—enriched—saw 
the instructional video with both of the metaphors.  
Immediately following either video presentation, the second assessment—the 
posttest, described above— was administered in the same order but with the following 
variations in the instrument. The second page displayed the expanded 12-item matching 
section. No distracters were provided for this section. Upon completion of the posttests, 
participants handed in their answer sheets. Then, they were given the last two sheets, 
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assessing their disposition toward and ability to create novel metaphors, especially in 
relation to the target domain. 
Phase three: Survey and creativity exercises. At this time, all students had the 
opportunity to write brief descriptions of their thoughts about the usefulness of the 
various instructional metaphors with which they had been presented. This was a final 
opportunity to collect some qualitative data (in the forms of a survey and a creative 
exercise) to analyze in light of metaphor production and conceptual integration. After the 
post-instruction assessments were completed and turned in, I gave debriefing sheets to 
each participant and the session was over. 
Summary 
The time for participant involvement entailed about five minutes for the greeting, 
introduction, and informed consent forms. Participants usually took about 20 minutes to 
complete the pretest. No time limits were imposed on completing any of the written 
work. The videos ran at about 23 and 25 minutes, respectively. The posttests took about 
another 20 minutes, and the final written assessments and comments took about another 
20 minutes. The total of time for each session was about 80 minutes.  
Participants provided quantitative data via pre- and post-instruction, selected 
response assessments for a range of traditional quantitative analyses. All participants took 
the pretest as a baseline for later quantitative and qualitative analyses and interpretations.  
All participants had several chances to produce textual responses for qualitative 
analyses as well. All participants wrote pre- (QUAL 1) and post-instruction responses 
(QUAL 2 and QUAL 3). These data were analyzed in a number of ways: ( 
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1. The written responses were analyzed by performing analyses of statements 
generated before and after instruction according to the (a) frequency and type of 
conceptual integration networks used and (b) the sets of vital relations at work in each 
network;  
2. Mimetic responses, copying, or using the metaphors from the respective 
instructional videos were noted by changes in the sheer number of post-instruction 
references to any of the given metaphors.  
Two elements of particular interest emerged here (reported in detail in Chapter 
V). First, and most importantly, I was able to test for some relationships between changes 
in quantitative results and qualitative results. Second, I was able to compare mimetic 
responses across the two groups. 
Group C received no overt or elaborated instructional metaphors and, thus, were 
treated as the control group (Xc). Group E received instruction mentioning both 
metaphors (Xe). In addition to the traditional posttest, final written questions for all 
participants included a list of nine possible other metaphors used over the years to 
describe the target domain (genes, genetics, and heredity): archive/ library, blueprint, 
code, instruction manual, program, recipe, switch, and trigger (Marcus, 2004; Ridley, 
2003). Participants were asked to choose and explain in detail their three top choices 
from the list for the metaphoric comparisons they perceived as being most helpful in 
understanding the domain. All participants were also asked to provide and explain any 
new metaphorical descriptions of the topics, if possible.    
Appendix B presents the pre- and post- instruction assessments. As with the pilot 
test, I obtained full cooperation from the university and participants, who were recruited 
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and treated according to all applicable IRB policies, guaranteeing confidentiality and lack 
of inappropriate exposure to any intrusive or harmful tests, effects, or misinformation. 
Indeed, since both groups were afforded overtly and purposely beneficial instruction, 
there should have been no ill effects for either group. Appendix D presents the consent 
and debriefing forms.  
Integrity and Security of Data and Process 
A number of precautionary steps were taken to avoid unnecessary problems with 
bias, practical quality, and handling of data, etc. First, of course, participants were not 
allowed off-task access to the materials or to each other. I and/or my research advisor 
were present at all times during all sessions.   
1. I used the same brief written introduction, instructions, and transition 
statements for all sessions (see Appendix A). When participants completed each writing 
task, I collected their papers in a manila envelope without looking at or consciously 
reading any texts. I looked only at the spaces on the first page to check that the 
demographic information had been filled out. Back-up photocopies of all response sheets 
were made.  
2. I scored the quantitative quizzes immediately upon returning the materials to a 
locked office after the participants left. This was not only effective use of time; I saw no 
input beyond individual letters in answer spaces. This process allowed me to be as 
unfamiliar as possible to the contributions (and of course the identities) of the individuals 
and to their group membership. Because I also would be performing the qualitative 
analyses, I needed to have typed transcripts of all the participants’ open-ended, textual 
responses for my work in order to keep this faux handicap as intact as possible 
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throughout the rest of the analyses. Specifics of the blind analysis process are detailed in 
the next chapter. 
3. The familiarity of settings, the identical videos, and the scripted 
administration of the exercises should provide for standardization of procedures, thus 
reducing unrelated variability of responses within and between different groups. 
Appendix A includes scripts of the administration instructions and the video 
presentations. 
The detailed specifics of coding texts according to conceptual integration theory 







CHAPTER IV  
 
 
ANALYSIS AND CODING PROCEDURES 
 
 
In this chapter, I initially address issues of quantitative and qualitative data 
analyses as separate, though complementary, components. They are described here in the 
relative order of pertinence to the research questions, a structure and technique I preserve 
through the remaining chapters. To close the chapter, I integrate the various types of 
analyses used, summarizing the theoretical and practical grounds for this research. 
Numeric, graphic, and narrative results are presented in Chapter V. 
Quantitative Procedures 
I began the data analysis by scoring the bedrock of quantitative procedures in this 
study, the traditional selected-response sections of the instruments. I separated the pages 
immediately after each research session and scored the identical eight item Pre 8 and Post 
8 items and the imbedded four item cluster (Post 4) of new items as part of the 12 item 
Post 12. The results of these tests are used as dependent variables (Y1, Y2, Y3, and Y4, 
respectively) in various conventional statistical operations such as correlations, 
MANOVAs, and t-tests.   
Traditionally, the selected-response assessments results would be enough to 
measure the relative effectiveness of the two conditions. Here, however, the traditional 
data are used primarily to provide a background against which other data, both 
quantitative and qualitative, may be compared. In this research, these other data may be 
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of greater interest but they have little or no meaning without accounting first for the 
quantitative dimensions. Those dimensions go beyond quiz scores, as shown below.    
Participants wrote 147 pre-instruction sentences and 200 post-instruction 
sentences. These provided many more data points to consider, far beyond the confines of 
the traditional tests. Much of that data lies in frequency counts of various pre-post 
grammatical constructions: word and sentence counts and words per sentence; overt use 
of metaphor; implied (conceptual) metaphors; key (historic examples of domain-specific) 
metaphors; identity statements; blends; and mega blends. Each item in the foregoing list, 
in fact, became a data variable for pre-post comparisons in this research. This 
productivity data--in my own terminology—is one important way to quantify, measure, 
record, and compare the qualitative data produced by the participants.  
Frequency counts are of value here because of the confirmatory potential of a 
plinth of cognitive linguistics: language reflects cognition. The theoretical extension of 
this premise is that changes in cognition—in this case, learning—will be reflected in 
changes in language. This goes beyond issues of developmental stages in vocabulary, 
grammar, and syntax. Many of the linguistic changes individuals make in their language 
are automatic and unconscious; understanding the patterns in these changes could lead to 
any number of improved teaching practices. Accounting for speech pattern frequencies—
either those generic to language studies or those reflecting a conceptual integration 
approach, as this work does—is a beginning, but there is still more. Taken together, the 
qualitative sections of the instrument, especially in combination with the quantitative 
sections, provide a much richer representation of the cognitive processes at work in the 




The qualitative data presented by the pre- and post open-response statements 
represent the primary source of the information this research had to develop in order to 
answer the central research question: how is learning reflected in changes of conceptual 
integration patterns? In the following section, I explain the handling and coding of this 
primary asset.  
Another source of qualitative data was tapped in the Prompted Metaphor section 
of the assessment by including a survey of preferences (and explanations) for given 
historic metaphors (here called “key” metaphors), opportunity for comments about the 
key metaphors, and an opportunity to demonstrate creativity in metaphor productivity. 
The instrument for this data included a list of key metaphors and instructions to rank and 
explain their choices of the three most effective ones. I combined each respondent’s 
survey ranking of the three most effective metaphors into a power point score: a first 
place vote was credited with three points, a second with two, and third with one. This 
information, reported in Chapter V, provides a sense of individual and also group 
dispositions toward or against any of the given key metaphors. As part of the same 
exercise, participants were prompted to provide three or more aspects of how each of 
their top three choices of key metaphors is (or perhaps isn’t—any specific comment 
beyond the original two-space/target-source metaphor, pro or con, would count as an 
elaboration) applicable.  
The creative metaphor page completed each research session. Participants were 
prompted to create a novel metaphor and to describe how it could highlight or hide 
certain aspects about the topics: genes, genetics, and heredity. Data from this source are 
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in the form of novel elaborated metaphors about the topic, lending the entire body of this 
data to descriptive analyses, presented and discussed in the succeeding chapters.     
My research advisor typed the transcripts of the handwritten open-response data. 
My subject matter expert proofread the transcripts. I used the typewritten pages they 
produced as worksheets for each participant and coded all responses according to the 
detailed processes described below. Because of an internal coding system for the 
response sets used by my colleagues, I was blind to the identities, the pre-post status, and 
the group membership of the participants until after I had analyzed each worksheet. Only 
after all available data had been recorded did I use identifying codes to connect the work 
of individuals across the spectrum of analyses I would be performing and to organize the 
individual data sets appropriately. I then entered all the data I had collected as single 
large sets in Excel, still blind to any other information. In the following sections, I 
describe the procedures I used to analyze the open-responses for patterns of metaphor use 
and blending.   
Coding Procedures 
The logic and coherence of the coding processes described below permit an 
integrated interpretation of the results. This work takes a pragmatic approach to language 
analysis, which means I focus on phrase-level statements. Focusing on phrases-level 
statements opens a way to understand utterances more holistically than a semantic, fine-
grained, look-at-every-word-as-an-independent-data-point level. Cognitively, this is a 
better match to the way most utterances are expressed. That is, a pragmatic approach—
although constructed on a foundation of semantics—allows researchers to investigate 
further aspects of context, grammar/syntax, motive, memory, etc., to account for how we 
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speak/write and what we mean, rather than solely focusing on what meaning (the iconic 
definition of semantic) may have been vested in a particular word. That is, although the 
pragmatic level focus is on conceptual blending, that cannot be achieved without a great 
deal of detailed semantic level work in advance as explained below.  
As described at the end of this chapter, I eventually created a corresponding 
graphic model for each of the 340 blends in the data, the components and 
interrelationships of which allowed me to confirm not only that the statement in question 
was a bona fide blend but also what kind of blend it was. But this final categorization was 
only possible as the result of prior detailed analyses of the texts following conventional 
procedures in the field (Evans & Green, 2006). What follows, using a simple-to-complex 
approach, is how I analyzed the participants’ open-responses, not only for conceptual 
integration networks but all other open-response variables used in this research as well. 
Coding Conventions 
Much of the basic coding performed on the typed transcripts follows the accepted 
conventions; noun phrases, verb phrases, prepositional phrases, etc., are marked with 
capitalized initials or abbreviations. Also per convention, X means a single element, 
probably a subject. A basic identity statement (“Heredity is traits” [sic]) is symbolized as 
“X is Y” or “XY” where the two elements X and Y are linked by the lexicalized verb 
“is.” With just a bit more information, we can prompt for a simplex blend (e.g., Genes are 
sections of chromosomes), symbolized by XYZ, or X is the Y of Z. XYZ statements are 
common in much of our speaking and writing and can prompt for other blend types as 




Most of the other coding is equally straightforward. I will explain the details from 
the simple to the complex. First, I determined what to include or exclude from analysis 
on a word for word basis. The first to go were throw away phrases/verbal ticks such as 
“like,” personal disclaimers such as “I’m sorry,” off-topic statements, some transition 
statements such as “such as,” etc. Such constructions in no way add to the more focused 
and authentic responses; they are very unevenly distributed, fairly rare, and would serve 
only to muddy and skew the more robust data (and less problematic grammar-level 
issues) we have in the large majority of cases. The interest here lies not in improving 
writing skills but in making principled judgments about inclusion or exclusion of data. 
The data of interest lie in participant statements about the content domain.    
Articles (a, an, the), numbers, and conjunctions are usually subsumed as part of 
larger phrases and therefore not considered as separate pieces of evidence. This is in 
keeping with the pragmatic vs. semantic approach as described above. It is technically 
possible that exceptions to this coding decision could be made based on a given use 
which might be specifically or exceptionally germane to understanding a given blend or 
metaphor.  
Then I picked out elements, prepositional phrases, noun phrases, verb phrases, 
identity statements, and blends in successive sweeps through text. Nouns, noun phrases 
(NPs), and pronouns (Pro)—even the most complex—are counted as elements. At the 
simplest level, an element is one distinct part of a mental space. Elements are usually the 
nouns and noun phrases/gerund phrases in sentences and sub-phrases. An unusually 
strong or evocative element may prompt for the construction of an entire mental space 
(for example, so-called “loaded” terms such as terrorist or patriot); however, elements 
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usually do not foster the creation of mental spaces in and of themselves. Mental spaces 
usually require more than named “things.” They require some kind of structure, some 
kind of content, and at times, some kind of narrative agent/agency or relationships among 
the elements to rise to the level of cognitive event implied by the construction of a mental 
space. (Noun phrases are in fact a special case, described later in this chapter.) 
Prepositions, by implying more to follow, are usually considered to be space builders, 
words which are used to indicate an important speech element to follow: prepositions 
have their objects which themselves can be other single elements or even entire other 
phrases. Several other space builders are discussed below as a group. Slightly more 
complex is the notion of frames. 
The cognitive structure implied when we construct a mental space is called a 
frame, simply defined as a mental scene. Frames offer and prompt for much more 
information than elements. Frames are not necessarily equivalent to mental spaces, but 
they can be. Often, frames are entrenched mental spaces created via cultural practices or 
individual experience. From a conceptual integration view, memory and prior 
knowledge—which are assessed in this work’s pretest phases—are caches of accessible 
frames to be used as input spaces. An input space includes some kind of information 
which helps us frame the prompts and responses of our conversations reasonably and 
effectively. Different frames provide different types of information. If the frame provides 
a great many details, concepts, examples, or ideas, it is said to be a conceptual frame. On 
the other hand, a frame may provide less fine-grained detail but more generic context or 
background against which the other frame’s content is arrayed. Such a frame is said to be 
an organizing frame. A blend, as the product of a least two input spaces, may borrow its 
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organizing frame from one input and its conceptual frame/content from the other, for 
example, which is one reason frames are really not the same as mental spaces. Another 
reason is that frames may have lasting qualities through many people, cultures, and years, 
while mental spaces are private, ad hoc, and temporary.   
The content of mental spaces may range from the grand to the minute and from 
the vague to the specific. Often, as described above, a mental space will contain some 
kind of over-arching idea which shapes all of its internal elements and workings as a kind 
of frame, reference point, or scene. One participant uses the word heritage to mean some 
things which s/he re-describes in the phrases that follow the term. “[Heredity is our] 
heritage, the background of [sic] where we come from.” This person has been kind 
enough to overtly display the often hidden contents of a verbal element-turned-frame-
turned-concept in a mental space: in this case, Heritage. There is enough information 
provided about the participant’s understanding of the term heritage that we know what 
the person means, much more than if we were given only the single word by itself.  
The implication in the participant’s use of heritage as equivalent to heredity is that 
the particular mental space for the concept Heredity may be valid, technically speaking, 
but perhaps sparsely populated. Here heritage is simply followed by a list of terms which 
rename and define it: the background of where we come from. Conceptually, the sentence 
is really a simple pair of linked identity spaces--heredity and heritage--with the space 
heritage weakly linked to the NP--the background of where we come from. 
By contrast, in blends, some input spaces might be crowded with details or with 
robust, cognitively resonating frames such as when one participant in this research listed 
numerous relevant and interconnected examples of a novel metaphoric concept on the 
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final prompt: Genes are like a graduating class at college. The participant gave many 
examples on a number of levels, discussed at more length in following chapters.  
Other Space Builders  
 In addition to the prepositions-as-space-builders mentioned above, other types of 
words function as space builders. One group of relatively rare but cognitively evocative, 
robust words and phrases used as space builders are termed Counterfactuals: words like 
if, but, no/not, dis-prefixed words, other/another, etc. Counterfactuals imply and prompt 
for mirror opposites of the given, overt elements. When counterfactuals are in use in a 
blend, several vital relations, in conceptual integration terms, are at work: disanalogy—
and by implication—analogy, and often identity as well. Thus, in analyzing the cognitive 
implications of the open-response data, certain details are properly left out (as are articles 
described above) but certain other details (such as the prefix “dis-“) must be included 
because they play such crucial roles in determining the intent and the effect of the phrase.  
Even some otherwise lowly terms such as conjunctions--and, but, however, or, 
also, too--can be space builders as well, again by implying something to follow.” Another 
group of words usually treated as space builders in cognitive linguistics are what 
grammarians would call indicative/interrogative pronouns/adjectives (e.g., this, that, 
these, those, how, when, when, which, who, why). This type of use is often more along 
the lines of a conjunction where the word in question, such as “where” in this sentence, 
joins the space it has just prompted (“the word in question”) with a previously prompted 
space (“of a conjunction”). These are considered space builders because they usually 
indicate a substantial amount of information to follow, preparing the hearer/reader for 
lists, phrases, redefinitions, examples, etc.  
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These provide a classic case of how humans sometimes compress a lot of 
information into very small, conceptual packets. As is the case with all the words in the 
data, it is not their size, commonness, or location which determine their inclusion or 
exclusion for analysis; it their function in the given circumstances. One more 
consideration of prepositions serves to exemplify this critical point and then I move to 
other issues.   
Prepositional phrases (PrepP) not only include objects (which are a subclass of 
NPs) treated as elements but also imply/prompt for mental spaces as mentioned above. 
The preposition usually implies some kind of direction, movement, source, etc. in relation 
to its own object. Then, through the agency/existence and motion/action/change supplied 
by a verb or verb phrase (VP), the entire original phrase becomes potentially connected to 
other parts of the sentence with its implicit cognitive structure and content. And of 
course, an entire prepositional phrase itself may be collapsed grammatically to yet 
another form of noun phrase. Furthermore, as NPs, prepositional phrases may be nested 
as objects-within-objects of larger prepositional phrases. As a rule, then, prepositional 
phrases are treated in the coding process as more or less automatic and intact mental 
spaces.      
Structure and content of the mental space prompted for by a preposition provides 
important specific information which somehow relates to the structure and content of the 
other mental spaces which can make up a blend, if one is to be made. In short, the content 
and structure of mental spaces is what is put in to the inputs. I needed to determine the 
content and structure of all mental spaces—from prepositional phrases or not—implied 
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by a given blend in order to determine when and how each functioned as part of an 
integrated mental network, the blend.      
Other Constructions and Functions  
 Verbs and verb phrases (VPs) can, via gerundification, be turned into either 
subjects (“swimming is my favorite sport”) or objects (“he disliked having to repeat 
himself to his inattentive students”). Gerunds may be formed in many ways, but the “–
ing” form is most common. Yes, as subjects or objects, VPs can play roles as elements as 
can NPs and PrepPs.   
“To be” verbs are counted as lexicalized verbs when they are not used as auxiliary 
verbs. Thus, as a lexicalized verb, “to be” is allowed to play a major role in Simplex 
blends (“Genetics is the study of genes”) as well as the prototypical linking verb in 
identity statements, as we have seen above. And Mirror blends may include even 
auxiliary uses of “to be” in expressions of transferred energy, action, and motion (“Genes 
are passed along from parent to child”). 
An important feature of this treatment of the verb “to be” lies in its “stative” 
implications. Even in its most basic uses, this state/statement-of-existence verb is 
considered every bit as robust, active, and evocative as verbs which are usually 
considered to imply more activity: so-called transitive verbs like run, hit, ski, etc. Thus 
blends involving “to be” verbs are not only theoretically acceptable but commonplace.   
Based on the practices and premises articulated above, I used the following 
sequence of attention-points on successive readings of the textual data. That is, I first 
identified nouns and noun phrases as elements, frames, or entire mental spaces (all 
described in detail elsewhere). I then focused on frame-level words or phrases, including 
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prepositional phrases, marking them as potential mental spaces. I then looked for verbs 
and conjunctions to determine the sources and directions of both implied and overt 
activity and the relationships among the various mental spaces, building and analyzing 
many graphic models of specific grammatical constructions and their attendant cognitive 
implications.       
To summarize, blends contain or imply at least four mental spaces. Mental spaces 
contain or imply frames and other elements. Though most elements and frames serve as 
part of larger mental spaces, they may sometimes bring so much automatic emotional or 
cultural prompting as to be considered separate mental spaces of their own. The 
entrenched frames and spaces of memory and culture provide input information during 
speaking/writing/thinking, but so do situational variables such as context, intent, 
unfolding events, and any other types of prompts which may present themselves.     
The blend analysis I have described is the basis for distilling individual and group 
information from the pre-and-post instruction open-response statements into data which 
may be compared with the more traditional quanta garnered from the selected-response 
results. After all open-responses were analyzed from this core conceptual integration 
perspective, the rest of the coding processes and data developed more or less as a matter 
of course along well-established principles in the cognitive modeling of normal 
discourse/writing. I have used the above-mentioned terms—elements, frames, mental 
spaces, and blends, and all else—as specifically as possible throughout.             
 
Coding: Special Cases 
Identity Statements  
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 One of the most common statement types used by the participants turns out to be 
not quite a blend, per se. These are identity statements, pairs of linked identity spaces. A 
blend, remember, is a network of at least four separate mental spaces: a generic, topical 
space which serves as a starting point for a new blend; at least two inputs spaces, each of 
which provides unique information to the blend; and the fourth space, the blend itself, 
combining aspects of the other spaces. Therefore an identity statement such as 
“chromosomes go through mitosis” cannot be a blend because it only presents two 
elements linked in an identity/equivalency relationship based on process: that is, 
chromosomes are defined here by the process of going through mitosis. Linked identity 
spaces such as provided by the example fall short of being full networks because they do 
not provide enough detail, content, structure, and dynamic cognitive interrelations to 
provide the impact, richness, and content of blends.         
Identity statements usually involve only two mental spaces. Also, the two spaces 
are often sparsely developed and may be as simple as single elements such as “Genes are 
made up of chromosomes.” This phrase has but two elements, genes and chromosomes, 
connected with the verb phrase “are made up of,” which is equivalent to a definition 
(read, “something is something else”) using the verb “to be.” Thus the definition is based 
on naming the constitutive parts of the given term. “To be” works very much like an 
equal sign (=). “To be” often links subjects and predicate nominatives (“he is president”) 
or subjects and predicate adjectives (“she is great”). This linked identity statement form, 
which prompts for a good deal of important information in its own right, still falls short 
of inclusion as a blend by itself.   
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 Because they are frequent and foundational to establishing both mastery of 
domain knowledge, and to reflecting cognitive mechanisms related to conceptual 
blending, I have counted each instance of identity statement and included those counts as 
part of both the quantitative and qualitative analyses. This pattern is seen many times in 
many forms. Other identity statements work by naming a function (“This is what gives 
you eye color…”), a location (“Within genes there are 46 chromosomes…”), a process 
(“chromosomes go through mitosis”), another equivalent term (“heterozygous …means 
one dominant trait and one recessive trait”), a description, definition, or example 
(“heredity is a person’s heritage, their background”), etc. Still other identity statements 
can work via naming a product, a moment, a relation, a form, analogy and metaphor, 
constitutive elements, features and attributes, and even by counterexamples. The mental 
spaces of identity are usually linked by a form of the verb “to be,” but there are many 
other, equivalent forms, as seen above. But linked identity spaces are not blends in and of 
themselves, and are not counted as such in this analysis.  
Double Verb Causatives  
 Another, much knottier situation arose with the highly conversational language 
used by participants in their open responses. On the positive side, the language is very 
natural and unpolished, providing a very real sense of authenticity to the participants’ 
responses. But the analysis of such conversational-style writing forced me to deal with 
what grammarians call “double raising” or a “double verb causative.” It is a common 
enough linguistic phenomenon--one inner sentence (an independent clause) is couched 
inside another, often as part of a statement where the subject of what was originally the 
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inner sentence has been raised—or moved to the left—in relation to its former status as 
an object of the first or outer sentence.  
Thus, I had to untangle the domain-specific language I wanted to analyze from the 
highly inappropriate trappings of conversational phrases which provided no usable data 
as demonstrated in the example below. 
“I know that traits are passed from parents to children.” The outer, first subject, I, 
has its own verb, “know,” and the entire independent clause “that traits are passed from 
parents to children” is the object of this prototypical Subject-Verb-Object (S-V-O) 
construction. From the original independent clause, the word “that” is considered in 
cognitive linguistics a space builder by virtue of its role here as an indicative pronoun; 
the role of pronoun allows the word “that” to refer to (and subsume) the phrase which 
follows as a NP unit. This sets up the following core/kernel sentence--“[T]raits are passed 
from parents to children”--where the object of the first, outer sentence, “traits,” becomes 
the subject of the new sentence, allowing the most important part of the sentence—the 
domain-specific part— to be used as a mirror blend: S-V-O1-O2, or, “Traits are passed 
from parents to children.” 
The focus of the present analysis is much more targeted on the language the 
participants use when writing about the given topic, rather than the mere conversational 
declarations they make in off-topic language. This practice is evident in only some of the 
response sets; the inclusion of such off-topic responses undoubtedly would result in 
deeply skewed numeric comparisons of no real value and also to interpretive imbalances.  
Therefore, in most such cases, my rule has been to analyze only the core/kernel sentences 
expressed in such constructions. The exceptions are for double verb constructions which 
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are fully related to the topic. (Example: “The genes tell the chromosomes when to split 
apart.” This is a full mirror blend: S “genes”-V “tell”- O1 “chromosomes”- O2 “when to 
split apart” where the space builder “when” creates a mental space occupied by the 
gerund phrase-turned NP/element “to split apart.”)  
 Participants presented two further major areas of response-types: noun phrases 
(NPs) and conceptual metaphors. Both types of constructions are exhibited throughout 
the response sets; each instance required a separate, ad hoc analysis and decision as to 
whether or not to include that instance as germane to, or exclude it as peripheral to, the 
purposes at hand.  
Noun Phrases  
 By itself, without verbs or prepositions to impel, imply, or direct the NP or Pro in 
relation to something else, the NP/Pro/element may be part of a mental space but usually 
cannot prompt for an entire space because there is too little information. Readers will 
recall that elements which provide a great deal of relative specificity often reflect what 
cognitive linguists call values. More generic elements reflect what are called roles. When 
we say “James is the father of Claire” we have a role—Father—and two values in 
relation to that role--James and Claire. (The implied role of Daughter, though unspoken, 
but would be used in some cognitive modeling.) Some elements often play generic roles, 
providing information about kinship (as above), location, products/processes, results, 
means, activity, or instruments. 
There is a wide range of NP possibilities in construction, complexity, and 
salience. Many NPs are defined and delineated by space builders as described above. 
Readers will recall that a space builder prompts listeners/readers to construct a mental 
148 
 
space containing a certain amount of certain types of information. This mental space is 
occupied in part by NPs created by a space builder. This usage is extremely common, 
especially in unpolished conversation; its use by participants lends to the authenticity and 
credibility of the data.  
Another deceptively simple NP-type of construction is both quite common and 
quite complex, and requires a good deal of working-out in order to establish where a 
given instance should be included in analysis. Noun phrases may come in many forms 
including the three most common two-word nominative compounds: adjective-noun (blue 
house), noun-noun (eye color), and noun-adjective (duty free). Noun phrases can occur in 
much longer constructions as well (gerunds/gerund phrases) where a verb, verb phrase, or 
even an entire noun phrase or prepositional phrase or independent clause may be used as 
a subject or object of a larger sentence through the syntactical process of double raising 
described above. These latter, longer noun-phrases are generally much easier to 
categorize and analyze than the two-word variety, somewhat surprisingly, and thus are 
not really at issue here. But each two-word NP represents both a potentially deep level of 
blending and another type of judgment call explained below.  
Adjective-noun phrases give us a good chance to appreciate the automaticity, the 
ubiquity, and the complexity of language-based blending. When we name things and 
describe them, we have accomplished impressive mental feats. Categorization and 
memory allow us to name the world and its actions and inhabitants (Lakoff, 1987). 
Perception and sensation allow us to use context clues as inputs. Imagination and analogy 




For example, a seemingly unambiguous NP such as blue house might evoke very 
different scenes in the minds of different speakers/listeners. Of course, we must consider 
that the phrase refers to a house that is painted blue on the outside. Obviously, we would 
recognize such a place if we were standing right in front of it. But if it is a dark night and 
the house in question is next to a house of a similar very dark color, we wouldn’t be able 
to tell the difference. Is there a difference if we are unable to perceive it? Or if an interior 
decorator is working on several sites, perhaps blue house refers to a color scheme for the 
living room of a particular house which is not necessarily the same blue house as the 
hypothetical original. The same phrase could correctly refer to more than one house.  
Going a bit further, if all the houses on a block were the same non-blue color but 
only one had a blue door (and the others had doors of other colors), a delivery person 
would easily discern which house was the blue house regardless of the exterior wall color 
or interior carpet color. A family who formerly owned such a house might refer to it as 
the blue house long after it had been sold, repainted, or even demolished. Perhaps an 
artist’s “blue period” was spent at that house. Someone who associated the place with a 
depressing time or event in her/his life might refer to it as the blue house completely 
beyond any sense of the color spectrum; that house is blue—in this case—because of its 
emotional import. 
In this construction, the adjective potentially brings its own mapping, frame, 
content, and other influences to a blend. Considering all such constructions might be a 
technical possibility, but in some important cases, the issue is resolved before it can be 
raised, thus excluding a few instances for the following reasons. Any phrase can become 
so ubiquitous and automatically employed as to lose its novelty (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; 
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Linzey, 1997). Often, its elements are then compounded into new vocabulary, e.g., the 
word “blueprint” (Deutscher, 2005). The upshot here, as elsewhere, is this. If a phrase has 
become so lexicalized as to be conceptually fused into a single element in a mental space, 
that phrase is likely to be treated as a unit or an element rather than as an internally 
dynamic and viable space or blend.   
If we turn to noun-noun phrases, the situation is equally difficult.  The problem 
becomes obvious. Somewhere in the course of use, any phrase can be used to the point 
where the individual words and meanings have long since been blended into a lexicalized 
unit. The term “heart disease” is a good example. Two nouns, the first turned into a 
functional adjective, are much less evocative or specific when considered separately; but 
as a paired set, the words describe in specific and unequivocal medical terminology a 
single type or at least a single group of related diseases. This and several other highly 
lexicalized terms have been excluded from blend analysis primarily because of the 
cognitive and linguistic processes which allow us to use a pair of words to name or 
describe what we consider to be one thing, in this case a (single) disease. Of course, there 
are different sub-categories of heart disease which might be accessible to the participant’s 
content domain knowledge. Without further information (input) from the participant, no 
further prompting can take place; we simply cannot tell, from the information given, if 
the person knows more. But the difficulties don’t stop here. 
Another highly typical example from the data presents the noun-noun 
combination, “eye color.” Grammatically, this noun-noun phrase is constructed 
identically to the previous one, “heart disease.” But regardless of identical grammatical 
construction, the phrases, as simple and similar as they seem on the surface, actually 
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reflect different cognitive mechanics. Eye color prompts for a different blend than heart 
disease: the former is a single scope blend and the latter, at one time a double scope 
blend, is now lexicalized through medical terminology to a single noun/element. 
Fortunately, the data presented no noun-adjective NPs, which are equally problematic. I 
have already shown above how such two-word NPs can prompt for entire blends. Which 
is which and what could they mean to this study? (see Chapter V).     
Metaphors 
Key (Historic, Domain-Specific) and  
Overt Metaphors  
 Many of the minor details of the most automatic, mechanical aspects of the 
coding process are noted later in this chapter; however, an early focus during many 
perusals of the data was simple and straightforward and dealt with one of the central 
issues of this research, metaphor in its many forms. As expected from the pilot test, 
participants rarely used overt metaphoric constructions, so they were easy to find in the 
texts. In fact, the pretest texts produced a total of only two metaphors, of which one was 
indeed a key metaphor. Simple pre-post frequency counts reveal some potentially 
noteworthy information, reported in Chapter V.  
There is much more to consider here, however. First, because part of the 
assessment included direct references to domain-specific metaphors (key metaphors) 
used in the past (Marcus, 2004), I was particularly interested to find if any participants 
employed any of those specific metaphors. The other interest, one that turned out to be 
data-rich and thought-provoking, was in how much of Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) work 
on conceptual metaphor would be applicable with this kind of unpolished language data 
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to study. After all, the topic of metaphor and then conceptual metaphor led to this 
research in the first place. 
Conceptual/Implied Metaphors  
 Conceptual metaphors must also be addressed here for a number of other reasons. 
Readers will remember that the wellspring of the conceptual integration movement was 
the conceptual metaphor revolution. But it is not merely homage to Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980) to apply their theory here. It is applied not only because its explanatory power still 
holds in general; for current purposes, conceptual metaphor theory is specifically inherent 
to conceptual integration practice and the interpretation of metaphor use. It is also 
appropriate to address conceptual metaphor because it is so obviously at work in the 
open-response data. I use the term “implied metaphor” here because of the inherently 
covert, unconscious nature of the usages and constructions; the metaphoric implications 
are most often covert to both parties in a conversational exchange, not just one or the 
other. This was a surprising challenge in itself because of their ubiquitous occurrence 
throughout the data texts. And there was a much more challenging task in determining 
precisely what to include and exclude.  
The myriad examples of implied metaphors have a very real potential to muddy 
the data. Like the identity statements explained elsewhere, the conceptual metaphors used 
by the participants are used highly automatically with little or no evident awareness of 
their metaphoric etymology or cognitive implications. Because these types of statements 
are in varying degrees of fossilization/lexicalization, varying degrees of metaphoricity are 
at work, making some analysis rather arbitrary and difficult. But the approach I took was 
to account first for all the cases of these types of usages in the entire dataset relegated 
153 
 
either to an “active” or “fossilized” group primarily in accordance with Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980). Then, when given conceptual metaphors arose in particular texts, they 
were counted accordingly and otherwise analyzed according to conceptual metaphor 
theory. I present those findings in Chapter V.  
Metaphor Mimicry  
 Using simple frequency counts, I analyzed the open-response data for post-
instruction metaphor mimicry. Of the overt metaphors produced after instruction, how 
many would be copies of metaphors used in the video? Of the unprompted metaphors in 
either pre-or post instruction data, are any original/creative? Again, the very low counts 
or overt metaphor use made this all too easy to determine; although there were few 
surprises, there may be real value in using this data (see Chapter V) to refine our 
understanding of how educators can make the best use of this cognitive powerhouse (see 
Chapter VI).  
Metaphor Elaboration, Survey, and Creativity  
 Participants produced three final types of data specifically related to metaphor: 
metaphor elaboration, creation exercises, and a survey eliciting their opinions about the 
relative efficacy of the key metaphors. Results from this section of data (Chapter Five) 
have a real potential to provide valuable insights into some educational practices (Chapter 
Six).  
Blends 
In order to deal with the written, open-ended responses to the assessment prompts 
in a way consistent with the tenets of conceptual integration, I developed a procedure that 
became, in effect, a blend filter as my primary analytic instrument. In describing how I 
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developed the instrument and techniques as appropriately as possible regarding 
conceptual integration theory, I am now afforded the opportunity to offer the reader a 
final review of conceptual integration theory, especially in the context of the current 
research. 
 Readers will recall that a blend is a specific type mental construction—that is, a 
conceptual integration network— derived from various sources, called inputs. Both the 
blend and the inputs are examples of mental spaces—“[the] small conceptual packets 
constructed as we think and talk, for the purposes of local understanding and action” 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 102). The inputs contribute specific types of information 
to the blend in terms of content, context, memory, framing structure, etc. The four 
principle types of blends are identified and differentiated by the way the inputs contribute 
to, and work in, a given linguistic expression: Simplex, Mirror, Single Scope, and Double 
Scope networks (Fauconnier & Turner; see Table 2 and Figures 8, 9, 10, and 11) . 
 In analyzing either written or spoken language, one may unpack a true blend, 
deriving the relative contributions of inputs to the final blend. Any number of specific 
cognitive mechanisms—called “vital relations” by Fauconnier and Turner—may be at 
work in a given blend. The vital relations (analogy, category, cause-effect, change, 
disanalogy, identity, intentionality, part-whole, property, representation, role/value, 
similarity, space, time, and uniqueness) work both within and between mental spaces. 
Examples from the actual data sets to demonstrate each network type and the vital 
relations at work in each are provided in the coding section which follows. In conceptual 
integration terms, there are three constituting principles of conceptual integration 
networks: (a) there is partial cross-space mapping between inputs, (b) there is selective 
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projection to the blend, and (c) in the blend there will be some kind of emergent structure. 




Table 2  
 
Inputs and Resulting Blend Types  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Network Inputs Blend 
Simplex Only one input contains a 
frame 
Blend is structured by the 
frame 
 
Mirror Both inputs contain the 
same frame 
Blend is structured by the 
same frame as inputs 
 
Single Scope Both inputs contain distinct 
frames 
 
Blend is structured by only 
one of the inputs 
Double Scope Both inputs contain distinct 
frames 
Blend is structures by 
aspects of both input 
frames 
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Blend: Genetics is 
the study of genes. 
(X is the Y of Z) 
 
Figure 8. Blend and vital relations analysis of a simplex blend. This is an example of a 
Simplex blend with XYZ construction of an identity statement, where X is the Y of Z, or 
“Genetics is the study of genes.” Two related but distinct elements, “genetics” and 
“genes” (X and Y) are linked by their separate relationships to “the study of” in a 
Simplex blend. The relationship (here, as usual in ID statements) between X and Z is 
defined by the mental space created by the NP/Prepositional Phrase “of [genes].” 
“Genes” is the third of the three elements at work in this blend, put into cognitive 










(object phrase 1) 
        
            
…inside a cell’s 
nucleus. 







































Figure 9. Blend and vital relations analysis of a mirror blend. The agent “Chromosomes” 
acts, via the lexicalized verb “are,” on the object phrase “tightly wound material,” which 
in turn is strongly influential in its relationship to the secondary object phrase “inside a 
cell’s nucleus.” This features harmonious, balanced, and deeply shared contributions of 
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Figure 10. Blend and vital relations analysis for a single scope blend. Asymmetric 
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Figure11. Blend and vital relations analysis for a double scope blend. Double scope 
blends also feature asymmetric input contributions, but with the added dimension of 
disharmony among some components of the inputs. Here, the first noun “eye” serves as 
an adjective for the second “lashes,” but the second is almost devoid of content. The 
noun-turned-adjective “eye” is by far the more salient and detailed of the two. The terms 
clash on details (e.g., major vs. minor body parts, two vs. many) and on larger issues, 




Blends develop emergent structure or content or other types of information that 
are not available in either of the inputs alone. This emergent meaning or understanding is 
often unique to a situation; blends tend to be quite fleeting in nature due to the cognitive 
demands of keeping active too many inputs. The cognitive mechanisms of memory 
games such as trying to remember the names of all the people at a party, for example, 
would be considered a matter of holding as many thoughts as possible until the demands 
of memorizing more and more detail overwhelms our ability to store so much 
information. Blends often change into inputs for succeeding blends and so on. According 
to conceptual integration theory, this explains many of the basic dynamic processes of 
human cognition and language-based communication.  
I analyzed the sentences written by the participants according to what Fauconnier 
and Turner (2002) called the governing principles of conceptual integration, described in 
detail in Chapter II. In presenting and explaining the participant examples below, I use 
quotes for the first mention only. Small capital letters are used, per convention (Evans & 
Green 2006), to indicate a mental concept as distinct from a written or uttered word. 
Readers may also wish to refer to the previously developed sample blends in Chapter II.    
Example 1: Simplex, Figure 8:“Genetics is the study of genes.” The result is a 
prototypical XYZ statement, sometimes called a “Y-of” statement where X and Z 
(Genetics, genes) are values, Y (study) is a role; the mental space for the role Study 
intersects and interacts with the mental space naming the values Genetics and Genes. 
Example 2: Mirror (+ Mega), Figure 9: “Chromosomes are tightly wound genetic 
material inside a cell’s nucleus.” Here a subject/agent (NP “Chromosomes”) acts 
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(lexicalized VP “are”) upon Object1 (NP “tightly wound genetic material”), which in turn 
relates itself (O1) to Object 2 (NP “inside a cell’s nucleus”).  
Blending is not based on superficial patterns of structure but on deeper, often 
automatic and unconscious use of cognitive mechanisms. A perfect example is the 
imbedded single scope blend (NP/AN “genetic material”), the existence of which helps 
propel the basic mirror blend above into a “mega blend,” a combination of blends.  
Example 3: Single Scope, Figure 10: “…genetic material…” Looking more 
closely at this noun phrase in the adjective-noun combination reveals powerful cognitive 
mechanisms working automatically and effortlessly. Here the model has the generic 
mental space of the blend as the understood topic: Genes, Genetics, and Heredity. Each 
input space is inhabited by only one of the two self-named concepts, Genetic and 
Material.  
Consider the different qualities and amounts of information each word contributes 
to the meaning of the single scope blend. The first concept, genetic, obviously has to do 
with genes, etc. It is focused and specific in its referential ability. Furthermore, it has a 
vast potential of prompting for specific references and factoids relating to anything 
genetic. For example, one could probably name many conditions, traits, etc. somehow 
associated with genetics. In this case, the adjective part of the NP contributes the great 
majority of specific information prompted by the two word term; the noun simply 
provides a very general conceptual framework, meaning, loosely, “stuff,” or the 
“physical, tangible components of a thing,” as the cognitive background against which 
the more evocative adjective is contrasted.  
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 The two words/concepts/inputs play very different roles: in conceptual integration 
terms, they are said to be highly asymmetric in their relative contributions to the blend 
but there is nothing inherently “clashing” about what they imply (Figure 10). According 
to Fauconnier and Turner (2002), when the inputs of a blend do clash, and we still make 
sense of it, we have achieved a singularity of human cognition--the double scope 
integration network. 
Example 4: Double Scope, Figure 11: “…eye lashes…” This NP with noun-noun 
construction implies a massive amount of compression, the term used to describe how 
vital relations work. The generic space (the general topic “genes, genetics, and heredity”) 
relates and informs the basic content of the input spaces, providing the concepts Eye and 
Lashes. Each provides a measure of potential information; however, the concepts implied 
by the individual inputs are said to “clash” in the following ways. How many specific 
details or examples of “eyes” can one imagine? Compare this to the number or quality of 
specific details one can imagine regarding “lashes.” Asymmetry of contribution is a 
quality of both Single Scope and Double Scope Networks, so the difference between the 
two cannot lie in that factor. At this point, a considered analysis for each type of blend 
required a focus on something beyond asymmetry of contribution alone.   
The separate terms “clash” on a number of points: one term refers to a specific, 
obvious, major organ but the other term refers to a high number of small and individually 
insignificant hairs; “eye” is really used as an adjective here, telling us which lashes to 
consider. “Eye” creates an organizing frame with essential details,but “lashes” creates a 
conceptual frame with essential general information. Either term alone might warrant 
status as an element (see below); together, they rate as a full blend, though the power of 
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compression. Vital relations have compressed a great deal of information in this blend 
using category, change, identity, part-whole, space, and uniqueness. 
 Every time there is a blend, there are different vital relations at work. The final 
step in coding blends, after I found, graphically modeled, and categorized them by type, 
was to consider each in isolation, analyzing the language of the given blend for which of 
the 15 vital relations that must have been at work in the construction and compression of 
that blend. Therefore, in “unpacking”—that is, analyzing—each blend, I assigned a 
frequency data point for any of the vital relations at work in activating the blend. For 
example, in the double scope blend above, I found analogy, category, cause-effect, 
identity, part-whole, property, representation, role/value, space, time, and uniqueness. I 
did not find change, disanalogy, intentionality, or similarity at work in this blend. In the 
scoring matrix I created (Appendix D), the double scope blend category is marked with 
the numbers 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 15, respectively. I performed these 
analyses on all 340 blends provided by the participants. 
To summarize the coding processes described above, the qualitative data were 
derived from the concurrent application of standard practices and conventions in 
cognitive linguistics and the theories of conceptual integration. I applied the coding 
procedures as uniformly and meticulously as possible, trying to account for all responses 
in as academically principled as manner as possible. Results for all quantitative and 











Descriptive results (means and standard deviations) for the quantitative data in 
this study are presented in Table 3. Specifically, the selected-response results, the eight 
item pretest, the eight item posttest, the four novel item cluster, and the combined 12 item 
posttest serve respectively as dependent variables Y1, Y2, Y3, and Y4, providing the 
baseline against which the other numeric are compared. All individual selected-response 
scores are reported as number correct.  
As explained below, no significant group differences were found in either the 
selected-response results or the pre-post frequency data; however, the data may still hold 
some interest as discussed in Chapter VI. For now, I report the control group scores for 
the eight-item pretest, revealing a mean of 3.27 (SD = 1.79), and post test scores showing 
a mean of 4.18 (SD = 1.66). Experimental group pre- and post-scores, respectively, 
revealed means of 3.57 (SD = 1.40) and 5.71 (SD = 1.59).  The remaining sections of this 
and the concluding chapters are presented in relation to the research questions. 
Research Question 1: How is Learning Reflected 
in Changes of Conceptual Integration Patterns? 
Reliability Concerns  
 Reliability calculations revealed the Post 12/Y4 test to have the highest reliability 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .737) of the four sets of selected-response test scores (Pre 8/Y1 =  
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Table 3  
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.405; Post 8/Y2 = .597; Post 4/Y3 = .600). This allowed us to turn our focus to ways the 
quantitative selected-response results (specifically, Post 12 results because of the highest 
reliability of the four selected-response quizzes, having the most items, and having the 
novel items) may reflect the levels of change, if any, in the patterns of blend use 
demonstrated in the accompanying open-response texts. 
Significant correlations between the Post 12 results and pre-post blend patterns 
(Table 4) arose between the use of simplex blends before instruction and mirror blends 
after instruction (r = .536). Pretest mirror networks correlated with pretest single scope 
networks (r = .416) and with posttest simplex networks (r = .604). Finally, pretest use of 
single scope networks was found to be related to posttest use of simplex networks (r = 
.602). These results implied linguistic change in relation to learning, the basis of this 
inquiry. Also, T-tests revealed significant differences in the pre- and post-performance of 
participants on the use of simplex blends (t = 3.605, .001). Final comments about these 
important results are in Chapter VI. 
A different kind of reliability tentatively confirmed the interpretation of the blend 
data in the open-response sections of the assessment. I enlisted the help of a long time 
teaching colleague who took an hour of training from me in the basic coding processes I 
developed for this project. I trained him to find identity statements and blends. He then 
chose at random 10 different pages of the participants’ open responses, circling and 
marking given phrases as ID statements or blends.  
His choices for identity statements agreed/overlapped with 72% of mine and his 
choices for blends agreed/overlapped with 76% of mine. This high degree of inter-rater 
agreement was heartening because it demonstrated that other literate people would find 
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similar levels of evidence to analyze, lending to replicability of the study. Also, my 
colleague would have undoubtedly revised his numbers and notions with more in-depth 
understanding and re-readings as I did. Further, I know I subsumed some ID statements 
into simplex and mirror blends and my colleague had no way of making decisions of that 
subtlety without a good deal more training.    
 
Table 4  
 
Correlations Among Post 12, Pre-Post Blend Types 
 












PreSim          
PreMir .025         
PreSing -.175 .416*        
PreDble .387 .226 .318       
PostSim -.228 .604** .602** .286      
PostMir .536** .166 -.029 .079 .034     
PostSing -.060 -.099 .252 -.031 .186 -.097    
Post Dble -.125 .013 .074 -.091 -.067 -.207 -.162   
Post 12 .348 .500** .147 .027 .434** .356 .043 -.068  
  * Significant at alpha p <. 05, 2-tailed  




Conceptual Integration  
 On visual inspection, the frequencies of blends and vital relations seemed to differ 
considerably according to group and Pre-Post performances. In large part, this is 
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attributable to mimicry for the following reason. In copying and expressing metaphors 
from the lesson—unconsciously or not—the sheer number of metaphors, and therefore 
the number of blends, increased substantially. But there was some evidence, via 
regression calculations, even in this limited sample, that some phrase construction 
patterns, including blends, were subject to change as a result of learning. 
Observation revealed very little change in blend type frequency among control 
group participants: Simplex statements changed from four to six; Mirror statements went 
from 30 to 32; Single Scopes went from 32 to 24; Double Scopes went from two to zero. 
The experimental group seemed to reflect broader changes: from zero to 16 Simplex 
statements; from 24 to 8 for Mirror blends; from 4 to 16 Single Scopes; from four to zero 
Double Scopes. 
Much more tellingly, regression calculations compared Post 12 results against all 
metaphor data, blend data, and accuracy data. Posttest Accuracy ratios (R2 = .508) and 
pretest Identity statements (R2 = .631) accounted for nearly two-thirds of the total 
variability in test scores.  
Question 2: Does Metaphorically “Richer” Instructional  
Content Lead to Significant Group Differences Either  
in Selected-Response Scores or Any  
Open-Response Measures? 
 Whole group results of the correlations performed between selected-response 
results and other groups of related variables are presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7. Table 5 
displays correlations between all selected–response results as described above and the 
pair of independent variables referred to hereafter as Accuracy Data. This is the first of 
four subsets of qualitative pre-post data which completed the datasets described in Table 
3. Pretest data are labeled by the variable name in the left hand column; postest data for 
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that variable are in the right hand column. There are two pre-post accuracy measures. The 
Accuracy pre-score is a rating on a scale ranging from 0-3, conducted by a subject matter 
expert, describing the accuracy level for all open-response statements. Higher scores 
mean the subject matter expert judged the responses as "more accurate." In order to 
develop that raw score into a potentially more telling form, the initial numeric rating for 
accuracy was calculated in proportion to the number of sentences in the same response 
set, yielding an Accuracy Ratio.   
Table 5 shows that almost all of the selected-response and accuracy sores were 
highly intercorrelated. At the .01 significance level, Pre 8 and Post 8 related at r = .720. 
The pretest also related to Post 4 (r = .606) and Post 12 (r = .752). The eight-item posttest 
related to the novel four-item mini-cluster (Post 4) at r = .595 and to Post 12 at r = 941. 
The mini-cluster also highly related to the Post 12 results at r = .832. Post 8 results also 
highly related to Pre Accuracy (r = .588), Post Accuracy (r = .700), and the Post 
Accuracy Ratio (r = .783). Post 12 results strongly related to Pre and Post Accuracy at r = 
.612 and r = .652, respectively. Post 12 results also related strongly to the Post Accuracy 
Ratio at r = .713. Pre Accuracy statements related at a level of .816 with the Pre 
Accuracy Ratio and at r = .577 with the Post Accuracy Ratio. Post Accuracy ratings 
related with Post Accuracy Ratios at r = .781 and Pre Accuracy ratios related with Post 
Accuracy ratios at r = .615.  
At the .05 significance level, Pre 8 related to Post Accuracy at r = .499 and the 
Post Accuracy Ratio at r = .502.  The Post 8 score related to the pretest accuracy ratio at r 
= .466. The four item post-instruction mini-cluster, Post 4, related to all four accuracy 
scores as follows: Pre Accuracy statements--r = .500, Post Accuracy statement--r = .400, 
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Pre Accuracy Ratio--r = .405, and Post Accuracy Ratio--r = .410, respectively. Post 12 
results related to Pre Accuracy Ratio at r = .492. Finally, Pre Accuracy statements related 
to Post Accuracy statements at r = .440.  
 
Table 5  
 
Correlations Among Selected Response Data and Accuracy Data 
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.502* .783** .410* .713** .577** .781** .615*
* 
 
  * Significant at alpha p <.05, 2-tailed  
** Significant at alpha p <.01, 2-tailed 
 
 
Table 6 presents correlations between the selected-response and accuracy data, 
now grouped as a kind of domain-specific dataset, and metaphor production data, and 
showed few significant relationships. At the .05 level of significance, selected-response 
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Pre 8 scores were significantly associated with post-instruction use of “Overt” metaphor 
at r = .439. Greater use of implied metaphors in pre-instruction responses related to both 
the Post Accuracy statements (r = .421) and the Post Accuracy Ratio (r = .398). But these 
results are problematic (see Chapter VI). 
 
Table 6  
 
Correlations Among Selected Response/Accuracy Data, Metaphor Data 
 










Overt -.079 -.194 -.126 -.187 -.142 -.327 -.191 -.367 
(post) .439* .293 .236 .301 .265 .131 .235 .108 
Implied .122 .354 .359 .395 .338 .421* .164 .398* 
(post) .094 .239 .168 .236 -.004 .181 .021 .297 
Key -.055 -.135 .008 -.090 -.035 -.087 .117 -.001 
(post) .118 .141 .148 .160 .222 .099 .322 .171 
  * Significant at alpha p <. 05, 2-tailed  
** Significant at alpha p < .01, 2-tailed 
 
 
On the other hand, Table 7 shows several significant correlations between the 
selected-response and accuracy data, and the pre- and post data regarding Blends and 
Identity Statements. Because both the selected-response and open-response sections of 
the assessment overtly prompted for definitional information, it was only to be expected 
that there would be strong correlations between identity statements and the selected-
response and accuracy data. This was certainly the case across the board with the one 
exception of the selected-response pretest. All variables (except the Pre 8 scores) related 
strongly to the Pretest Identity statements: Post 8, r = .603; Post 4, r = .580; Post 12, r = 
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.660; Pre Accuracy, r = .695; Post Accuracy, r = .478; Pre Accuracy Ratio, r = .506; Post 
Accuracy Ratio, r = .500. One Post Identity association emerged in connection with Post 
Accuracy statements at r = .668. Of note though, among the correlations in this table, 
were the significant levels of association of both Pre and Post Blends and the mini-cluster 
of novel items (Post 4) at r = .470 for Pre Blends and r = .431 for posttest blends. 
Another correlation of note lay between posttest productivity in blends and accuracy 
statements at r = .492. Pre- and Post-Blends also related to the Post 12 results at r = .445 
and r = .428, respectively.  
 
 
Table 7  
 
Correlations Among Selected Response/Accuracy Data, Blend Data 
 










IDs .342 .603** .580** .660** .695** .478* .506** .500** 
(post) .277 .323 .225 .317 .024 .668** -.140 .217 
Blends .157 .358 .470* .445* .344 .322 .236 .343 
(post) .295 .357 .431* .428* .264 .492* .234 .217 
  * Significant at alpha p <.05, 2-tailed  
** Significant at alpha p <.01, 2-tailed 
 
 
The assumptions for MANOVA calculations seemed to be satisfied. Independent 
random sampling was at work in the participant pool. Independent variables (IVs) were 
categorical and the dependent variables (DVs), as selected-response results, were 
continuous variables. The DVs were moderately correlated, there were no missing data, 
and there were no extreme outliers in the observations, providing multivariate normality. 
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Visual inspection of means and standard deviations also indicated normality and 
homogeneity of variance. Box’s M = 12.703, p = .422, suggesting the covariance 
matrices were equivalent. Levene’s test of Equality of Error Variance, testing 
homogeneity of variance, revealed F values ranging from 2.72-.002 and p values ranging 
from .113-.965.      
Table 8 displays the pre- and posttest means and standard deviations of phrase 
construction frequencies by experimental condition. Five MANOVAs were performed to 
investigate differences between the control group and the experimental group across all 
groups of variables. First, when using selected response results as dependent variables, no 
significance was found by group: F (3, 21) = 1.25, p = .318. A second MANOVA, this 
time using the pretest scores as a covariate, also showed no significant difference 
between group performances: F (4, 19) = .776, p = .554. A third MANOVA was 
performed on group differences between pre-post word and sentence productivity scores; 
again, none was found for number of words or number of sentences: F(4, 20) = .519, p = 
.723. The fourth MANOVA, analyzing group differences in pre-post identity statements 
and blends, also revealed no significant differences: F(4, 20) = .954, p = .454. Finally, a 
fifth MANOVA compared group differences in metaphor data (numbers of overt, 
implied, or key metaphors) for group differences and, again, none was found: F(6, 18) = 
.497, p = .802. With no evidence of significant group differences on quiz performance, 
further analyses focused on pre- and post-differences rather than on experimental 





Table 8  
Means (and SDs) of Pre- and Post- Construction Frequencies by Group/Condition 
Dependent Variable   Control Experimental 
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 A good deal of other evidence (see Table 9) pointed to significant changes 
between the pre- and post-performances of the entire group on many variables. In order 
to investigate these differences, a series of paired t-tests was conducted on all the relevant 
variables and showed significant increases from pretest to posttest on all except the key 
metaphor data (p = .574). Because there were only two key metaphor observations in 347  
sentences (one pre-, one post-), this did not present enough data to warrant further 
inclusion. However, the pre-post effect sizes were significant for the other paired 
variables, shown as Cohen’s d values.   
 
Table 9 
Paired t-Tests and Cohen’s d Values on Pretest-Posttest Data 
Variable Pair/Name,  
Pre-Post 
  t df Sig. (2-tailed) Cohen’s d 
Words 4.049 24 .000 .708 
Sentences 3.761 24 .001 .612 
Overt Metaphors 2.914 24 .008 .835 
Implied Metaphors 2.302 24 .030 .564 
Key Metaphors .569 24 .574 N/A 
Identity Statements 3.198 24 .004 .768 
Blends 2.828 24 .009 .612 
Accuracy Statements 3.508 24 .002 .800 
Accuracy Ratio 2.311 24 .030 .407 
8 Item Selected-Response 6.943 24 .000 1.053 
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Phrase Construction Frequencies 
As far as numeric analysis, one of the first places to start—word and sentence 
counts–is classic, simple, and sometimes very informative, but not here. Words per 
sentence ratios are typically used as a tentative indicator of either intellectual ability or 
complexity of thought. This type of data is calculated as matter of course. In this study, 
the most interesting thing at first blush was the slightly lower word per sentence rate in 
posttest performance. Using fewer sentences to convey more information was fine, but of 
little further use here.  
Research Question 3: To What Extent Does Mimetic 
Learning Apply to the Use of Instructional 
Metaphors by Participants? 
 
Key Metaphors, Overt Metaphors,  
and Mimicry  
 As expected, overt metaphors were in very short supply, especially in the pretest 
responses (i.e., only two observations in 147 sentences). Of those, only one was a 
domain-specific key metaphor (code). The posttest response sets provided a fairly 
dramatic contrast in terms of sheer numbers, at least, providing a not-so-grand total of 
two key metaphors and a very respectable 16 metaphors overall. Potentially more 
interesting than anything the paltry key metaphor counts demonstrated was other data, 
which seemed to provide evidence pertaining to the more central question about change 
in any overt metaphor production, especially as a result of mimicry.  
I have to mention group differences at this point. Each group happened to present 
one (1) metaphor in their combined pre-instruction texts. But Group C, the participants 
who did not have the enriched instructional condition, only produced six metaphors in 
their posttest metaphor production, while the experimental group produced 10. When it 
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came to mimicry, 8 of the 10 posttest metaphors produced by the experimental group 
were blueprint, recipes, or twisted ladders, all in the video. But the apparent disparity in 
performance was not between groups, as shown in the MANOVAs, but only between 
pre-post performances.  
Conceptual/Implied Metaphors 
 Table 10 lists the following items, in order of high-to-low-frequency, as too 
fossilized/lexicalized to warrant further attention in this study. It was beyond the scope  
and focus of the present study to analyze the data for group differences on this type of ad 
hoc measure; however, the terms themselves and the frequencies of their use were 
instructive on face. Many of these terms clearly confirmed Lakoff and Johnson’s 
pioneering work (1980). Notice how many terms involved concepts of Traits Are 
Physical Things: Have/has/had, posses, include, get, give, transfer, linking, based on, 
connected. 
 
Table 10  
Conceptual Metaphors: Lexicalized/Fossilized and Excluded from Further Metaphoric  
 
Considerations 
Lexicalized/Fossilized Metaphors (and Frequencies)  
Have/has/had/posses  
Find, found/found out, include, get  
Give, transfer, linking, based on  
Wrapped, fields  








Of greater interest were the less-fossilized terms participants used in describing 
their domain knowledge. Participants used many other terms which may be understood as 
conceptual metaphors (Table 11) in high-to-low frequency. These terms were specifically 
included in the data as implied metaphors, included in the analyses of the data, and 
represented in a major portion of statements used to describe the content domain.  
 
 
Table 11  
 
Implied Metaphor Frequencies 
 
Implied/Conceptual Metaphors 
 (and frequencies) 
 
 
Pass along/down/on/through/to  
Make, make up, made (V)  
Contain  
Made up of (AdjPhrase)  
Make-up (NP)  
Show  
Carry, receive  
Decide, determine, go (through), tell  
Built (V/Adj), build-up (V), structure (V)  
Background (N), trace (N), control, hold, play(a role), 
run (through), says (all VPs) 
Breakthrough (N), code (N), cool things (NP/AN), 
around (Prep), over (Prep), through (Prep), advance, 
assign, dictate, flow,  (to) further, grow (up), look, put 
together, stay, store, survive (through), [take] the 




 9  
 9  
8  
 5 each  
 3 each  
 3 total 
 2 each 




However, regardless of their relatively higher degree of metaphoricity, treating even 
these less lexicalized terms as true metaphors rather than as conceptual metaphors would 
be theoretically unprincipled. They served their duty primarily as verbs in the blends they 
helped create. Whole group frequencies and parts of speech, when germane, are listed 
parenthetically. 
Identity Statements  
 Identity statements are an important subclass of expressions; they usually lack 
enough information to become blends in and of themselves. They are often simply a pair 
of linked elements (in X IS Y form, where object Y either renames the subject or 
adjective Y describes the subject). Identity statements are not necessarily accurate; nor 
are they necessarily a sign of improved domain-specific knowledge. It is only when they 
are played out against some other factors, such as the accuracy data, that one may 
determine their relative value. This is indeed addressed in the integration of data near the 
end of Chapter Six.   
Mega Blends  
 Data from this analysis, unlike the conceptual metaphor data, were more 
straightforward in their quantification. As with key metaphors, not enough data were 
available to make any other definitive claims about it. 
Research Question 4: Can Participants Develop  
Effective Novel Metaphors of Their Own? 
 The participant survey prompt provided a list of nine classic metaphors about the 
topic and asked participants to choose and defend their choices for the most effective 
metaphor. This prompt had selected-response and open-response elements, providing 
frequency data in direct connection with highly focused textual responses. As in the pilot 
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test, respondents selected blueprints, recipes, and codes over the other metaphoric 
offerings overwhelmingly. Participants provided few truly novel metaphors even when 
prompted; most suggestions--puzzle pieces, maps, building blocks, and yarn--were well-
worn. 
Some responses were truly novel and exhibited a sense of having been formed ad 
hoc. Novel metaphors ranged in levels of target and source specificity, and in overall 
salience from the vanishingly shallow (“Genes are like polar bears because they all look 
the same unless you look really close”) to the surprisingly effective (“Just how are genes 
like a class of graduating students?”). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
participant who offered this creative metaphor articulated many examples about groups 
working together--all individuals (“genes”) having roles to play depending on their 
category and group (“cells” and “organs”), a strict timing and sequence to everything, 
some individuals seem to be “in charge” while others wait or just “go through the 
motions,” etc.  
In Chapter VI, I discuss some of the specific and general implications of this 










The various kinds of data elicited in this research have been obtained in order to 
add to the growing body of literature about conceptual integration in both educational 
psychology and cognitive linguistics (Evans & Green, 2006; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; 
Levitin, 2002; Pinker, 2002). Because blends by definition have emergent structure, the 
mental act of blending goes beyond the given information of the separate contributing 
inputs. The practical implication for educational psychologists is clear: blending may be a 
powerful form of learning and imagination which is only beginning to be understood. 
One of the most obvious forms of blending in language is the use of metaphor, a classic 
topic in language studies. The logical and theoretical progression toward much of what is 
now the entire cognitive linguistics enterprise began as investigations into metaphor. 
Because metaphor and conceptual integration are so deeply linked, it is only logical that a 
study of either one would become, in part, a study of the other. Whether metaphors or 
blends, what ties them together for the current purpose is how they relate to teaching and 
learning. 
The core aim of this research project--from first learning about theory and 
developing questions to the final design, research, and data collection to interpretation-- 
had always been to find whether or not Fauconnier and Turner’s (2002) ideas about 
conceptual integration could be used to understand more about the way we think when 
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we learn. Therefore, the analysis of the focused-text open responses of the participants in 
accordance with Fauconnier and Turner’s theories became the primary focal point of this 
entire paper. The fact that the participants were expressing their ideas about a common 
topic allowed for a level of qualitative standardization that could not be achieved if the 
participants were engaged in unfocused verbal exchanges. This fact was crucially 
important because only by using a common topic to unify the conversational domain 
could the participants’ written statements be justifiably compared in many of the most 
probative ways. 
In this chapter, I integrate and discuss the findings (Chapter V) with regard to the 
original research questions. With those elements in place, I continue this chapter with a 
summary of the work, after which I re-address some of the constraints and limitations of 
the study in light of the emergent data. I close with a consideration some of the 
implications of this study for educators, psychologists, and researchers. 
Research Question 1: How is Learning Reflected  
in Changes of Conceptual Integration Patterns? 
It is appropriate at this time to discuss issues of reliability and validity, addressed 
here as fundamental to the proper interpretation of any results relating to the question. 
First, readers will remember the pilot test that was used to test the feasibility and 
refine many aspects of this study as early evidence of my efforts to enhance the reliability 
of the instruments and processes.  
Results of the eight-item pre- and posttests and the novel four-item post test (as 
well as the combined Post 12) scores were related at relatively high levels (see Table 4), 
as should be expected. Those within-set correlations lent some confidence as to the 
selected- response instruments’ reliability, leading to further confidence in the possibility 
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of more valid interpretations about the study’s overall implications. There were also data 
about instrument validity. 
Table 5 showed that almost all the selected-response variables and the accuracy 
data were highly related. More gratifying than surprising, the results lent credence to the 
assessment’s external and internal validity. The premise of the current work rested on the 
theoretical assumption that language changes as a result of learning. High correlations 
between the traditional quantitative results and the qualitative results which dealt the 
most with the same aspect of content domain mastery were a validation that these 
instruments measured some of the participants’ same generalized and commonly 
accepted cognitive understanding of the domain of genes, genetics, and heredity. This 
was highly suggestive of positive cognitive links between participants’ quantitative 
selected-response performance and a qualitative open-response performance, suggesting 
indeed that learning and language change might be reflective of one another in specific 
and measureable ways.  
External validity was implied here, too; the subject matter expert’s ratings 
(Accuracy Data) correlated with each of the most objective measures in the study, the 
selected-response scores, virtually across the board. This meant that the data from each of 
these two crucially important variable sets were the least susceptible of all data obtained 
in this research to whatever subjective rater biases I would bring into the mix. Readers 
will remember too that I developed still another third-party source of checking for 
reliability with my own rater-training activity, described elsewhere.  
I contend that the combined effects of using the pilot test, many drafts of the 
instruments, separate third-party accuracy checks of two critical elements of  the content 
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validity of the data, and the process of analyzing the data (as described previously) lent 
credibility to the entire study. 
Table 6 showed a number of high correlations between identity statement and 
blend production and the accuracy scores, but the language itself probably prompted for 
identity statements by asking for definitions. Also the video instruction contained many 
overt definitions. It was possible that a fluke of language seemed to make this set of 
correlations with ID statements so strong. Identity statements are certainly part of 
cognitive linguistic research and conceptual integration as well and are often blends in 
the making with cognitive implications of their own. But this research was about blends 
all along and some of the associations that emerged here between the production of 
identity statements, blend production, accuracy, and posttest scores suggested that 
learning and blending might be significantly related. Their inclusion here reflected their 
value in conceptual integration analysis and also helped answer the first research 
question. This was confirmatory of blending theory in general and the premise of the 
primary research question for this study: how is learning reflected in changes in blend 
patterns?  
Conceptual integration theory suggests that certain, though as yet unspecified, 
types of linguistic change must be associated with learning, of which blending may be a 
large and important part. A final set of numeric data reflected some of the linguistic 
changes participants exhibited in their whole-group pre-post writing performances. 
Included in this data was a subset of numeric information about participants’ use of 
metaphors, overt and implied, in their open-response answers. Not only were these data 
worth noting in their own right but they provided a direct tie-in to the more obviously 
185 
 
qualitative data described elsewhere. Basic word and sentence counts revealed highly 
uniform sentence length, averaging 14 words per sentence in the pretest and 13.4 words 
per sentence for the posttest. Participants wrote 147 sentences before instruction and 200 
after. They used two pretest metaphors and 16 posttest metaphors. This was not 
surprising, given that participants knew from the sign-up process and the consent form 
that the research was about metaphor use in learning and teaching and more than half of 
them saw two slightly elaborated metaphors in the lesson. Basically, there was nothing in 
the data to suggest anything beyond simple mimicry in this case: they came, they saw, 
they copied. This was not to say that mimicry is necessarily bad; it was derivative rather 
than original, perhaps. However, it could provide a Vygotskyan type of initial cognitive 
scaffold for future behavior and comparisons.   
Pre-post implied (i.e., conceptual) metaphors rose from a total of 76 instances to 
99. ID statements rose from 179 to 236, but the definitional nature of the exercise 
probably accounted for most of that apparent gain. The total number of blends, however, 
also increased substantially from 145 to 195. Did familiarity, confidence, learning, or 
some other factor make blending more likely simply as a result of any given instruction? 
It is logically possible, but beyond the scope of this study, leaving another tantalizing 
question. Also unanswered was this implied question: is more blending a sign of more 
learning? The theory of conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) is a now a 
critical sub-component and access point to conceptual integration theory. As seen with 
overt metaphor and blending, implied (conceptual) metaphor is also deeply tied to 




 With three out of the four correlations shown in Table 4 (Chapter V) involving 
simplex and mirror networks, evidence started to suggest these kinds of simplex and 
mirror blends might be connected to the expression of knowledge about these particular 
domains. Both the correlations and the t-tests pointed to simplex blends as the type of 
blend participants were most likely to use—and change their use patterns of— when 
describing their understanding of the topics. 
Fauconnier and Turner (2002) claimed that simplex blends prototypically 
involved statements about human cultural and biological history (X is the Y of Z; e.g., 
James is the father of Claire). The results might be viewed as tentatively confirmatory of 
the Fauconnier and Turner claim. Perhaps also the types of questions which led to these 
types of statements limited the kind of blending required to answer the question. This 
also fit with the notion that definitional questions lent themselves to simplex type of 
answers, in part because of their close similarity in form and function to identity 
statements.     
Finally, it should be noted that there was some evidence about changes in the use 
of some of the different vital relations in the blends expressed by the participants. 
Identity, the vital relation most associated with naming things, was used much more often 
in the statements participants made after instruction than before instruction. The two vital 
relations that were used much less often in post-instruction responses, property and 
uniqueness, might well be explained by the nature of the prompts: perhaps descriptive 
adjectives—or even creative metaphors—were somehow cognitively inhibited by the 
prompts or at least by the participants’ inner re-constructions of the prompts.   
187 
 
There was more to the issue than specific changes in blending per se; blending is 
a vitally important subset of speech behaviors in general, here counted as phrase 
construction frequencies. The first research question was about changes in conceptual 
integration patterns due to learning. The effects of instruction on phrase construction 
frequencies as shown in Table 9 (Chapter V) seemed to be significant, regardless of 
group, confirming not only what the MANOVAs were indicating about the lack of group 
differences (discussed below) but also confirming significant whole group change after 
instruction. 
Research Question 2: Does Metaphorically Richer  
Instructional Content Lead to Significant Group  
Differences Either in Selected-Response Scores  
or Any Open-Response Measures? 
 
 First, I address the results from the traditional quantitative data-- the 
matching/selected response exercise. No significant differences were found between the 
experimental and control groups. This was not surprising since the content of the two 
videos substantially overlapped. Also, other factors such as instructional or assessment 
clarity might account for the lack of difference between the two groups’ performances.  
However, considerable and significant differences in whole group means between pre-
and-posttest performances suggested two possibilities: (a) the instructional videos had 
some effect and (b) robust practice or priming effects might be also expected. By the time 
participants had read and responded in writing to several highly-focused prompts and also 
watched an overtly instructional video about the same topics, they had been exposed to 
the material a number of times within mere minutes of the first “cold” assessments. This 
was simply a limitation of the study I had to accept in light of the overwhelming 
difficulties of a two-session approach.  
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The practice effect having been acknowledged, however, it could be accounted 
for/factored out to some extent. Given the nature of the participants in this study as 
undergraduate introductory psychology students, their expertise with traditional, 
classroom-like assessments such as this could be assumed. The first possibility—that the 
instruction contributed to the participants’ subsequent changes in linguistic 
performance—remained intact.   
 The relatively robust correlations discussed above allowed me to continue the 
investigation of data at deeper levels. If remaining quantitative differences were to be 
found, they would logically be derived from experimental condition, which is where the 
effects, if any, of the instructional differences would lie. However, MANOVAs showed 
no significant differences by experimental/instructional condition. Thus, experimental 
condition is no longer a viable topic in this part of the discussion. 
Although the MANOVA operations indicated no significant difference by group 
condition, it is worthy of note that the changes in the different groups’ performances were 
at least in the expected direction, hinting at some as yet untraced effect. The issue of 
using different metaphors cannot be counted as “settled”—especially as being settled 
against enriched metaphor conditions. It is not impossible that significant differences 
might appear in different research over longer times or with more polished instruments, 
etc.  
Research Question 3: To What Extent Does Mimetic 
Learning Apply to the Use of Instructional 
Metaphors by Participants? 
 
Mimicry, though perhaps superficial, may be a first step in constructing 
understanding. Though as revealed in Chapter V, the result—lots of copying, conscious 
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or otherwise—was completely unsurprising, mimicry should not be dismissed too quickly 
as an effective teaching and learning factor. It is clearly a factor in learning many 
linguistic skills, uses, and behaviors. A Vygotskyan educator would say that mimicry is 
an early level or stage of internalization which can lead to important learning of skills, 
ranges of acceptable behaviors in social situations, and, among other things, self-
developed and creative uses of what was at first merely mimicked. 
The implications of Table 6, showing only a few significant relations between 
metaphor production data and the selected response and accuracy data, were not of 
practical use. Logically, change in metaphor use would reflect improved understanding as 
measured by the selected-response and accuracy data. However, higher selected-response 
Pre 8 scores were significantly associated with post-instruction use of overt metaphor at r 
= .439. One possible interpretation here is that prior knowledge, reflected in Pre 8 scores, 
could lead to higher confidence or comfort in producing or even “merely” mimicking 
related metaphors. This was the only significant association in the quantitative analyses 
between any pre-post aspect of overt metaphor production and any selected-response 
variable. Given the high number of significant correlations among other variables as well 
as low metaphor productivity, these results may not be usefully interpretable.    
But overt metaphor production was not the only aspect of performance under 
consideration. Greater use of implied (i.e., “conceptual”) metaphors in pre-instruction 
responses related to both the post accuracy statements (r = .421) and the post accuracy 
ratio (r = .398). One implication here could be that frequency and fluency of conceptual 
metaphor use could provide a mechanism for linguistic or perhaps domain-specific 
understanding, mastery, or clarity.  
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Research Question 4: Can Participants Develop 
Effective Novel Metaphors of Their Own? 
 
The metaphor preference survey provided no new information. No doubt, most 
participants had heard both of the overt instructional metaphors, perhaps many times. It is 
likely here that familiarity brought comfort and the “genes as blueprints and recipes” 
metaphors live on, probably because old habits die hard. The survey counted for little for 
now. Part of the point was to provide a hidden mini-lesson on metaphors in the activity in 
order for participants to be primed for the more creative activity to follow.   
The creative element of the Post-5 prompt displayed an entirely different aspect of 
the study’s participants as discussed below. The participants’ choices in developing novel 
metaphors ranged from mundane to clever. Three chose “puzzles” for a metaphoric 
source; two each chose “building blocks,” “maps,” “shoes,” and “yarn.” These first 11 
choices were mostly tried and true, except “shoes.” Both respondents made comments 
about “a good fit” in obvious reference to the great specificity genes must exhibit in their 
processes. One said she chose “shoes” simply because she liked them. This was not 
necessarily a flippant answer. If the metaphor fit, if it worked to help a person understand 
something, it had some kind of personal salience which could not be “canned” and 
applied without further thought. 
For a possibly flippant, but more creative choice, one participant chose 
“gobstoppers” as a metaphor. Here the sheer silliness might make for a good mnemonic 
device; a person might have a valuable mental picture of variety, complexity, and yet a 
kind of harmonious outcome. Complexity, details, and exactitude were elicited by 
another source: “sheet music.” Participants here explained their choices, giving a pretty 
accurate notion of their levels of understanding by the number and novelty of aspects 
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they could name or describe. This confirmed evidence of differential metaphor abilities 
measured by elaboration (Johnson, 1991). My favorite? The “graduating class” metaphor 
was nicely argued with many parallel roles between the various participants in a 
graduation ceremony and the genetic participants in the biological processes explained in 
detailed ways, clearly showing that the metaphor was robustly salient, at least for that 
participant.   
Limitations 
Many of the most serious limitations of this study were related to time and 
logistical factors. Developing and applying the analysis and coding techniques were very 
time consuming. The administration and organization details were created for this study 
and had a real chance of overwhelming this single researcher. The “gift” of a larger 
sample size would create the need for a much more cumbersome organizational effort, 
including training raters, dealing logistically with large groups of participants, integrating 
and unifying bureaucratic and data entry protocols, etc.  
The untried analysis of open-responses via conceptual integration network types 
and vital relations represents a new approach to understanding teaching and learning. 
There are and will continue to be difficulties in making accurate inferences about prior 
knowledge and bias regarding any particular metaphor because of the inevitable 
differences in learners’ demographic factors (such as poverty levels, linguistic abilities, 
experiential differences, and in this case, possibly the university majors of the student 
participants) which could dilute the viability of conclusions that could be derived from 
the relatively small sample.  
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Also, the focus of one lesson in one subject area with only a few given metaphors 
may be difficult to transfer to other teaching and learning situations. Even with some 
progress in the current endeavor, this concept is still only in its infancy.   
Significance 
This research implies that teachers may want to rethink their approach to their 
instructional use of metaphor: just as meaning is not considered by cognitive linguists to 
be “contained” in a word, neither is meaning contained in a metaphor. The results, 
therefore, underscored constructivist theories. Our impact as teachers is less a factor of 
the information we “give” to our students than the factor of student engagement in the 
cognitive activities they apply to that information. If students construct meaning through 
hearing a metaphor, conceptual integration theory holds that the students have been 
prompted to do so through the small packet of information supplied by the metaphor and 
their own immense neural network designed to make sense through the “vital relations,” 
which construct and compress the information into blends, the way we think. 
No quantitative changes were attributable to either of the different conditions of 
instructional metaphors. The implication of the conceptual integration model is that 
improved quantitative scores will be reflected in changed qualitative output. This has 
been born out.  
The idea that more metaphors lead automatically to improved learning is on very 
shaky ground. This work is no death knell for conceptual integration theory. Metaphors 
are only part of the picture and their use, too, may be improved with an improved 
understanding of conceptual integration. With further work, limitations of design and 
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analytical applicability may be overcome to the point where more definitive results will 
emerge.  
Summary 
 In developing research to reflect and test the techniques and supporting theories 
which define cognitive integration, I used a traditional pre-post/selected-response 
assessment to provide a quantitative data set against which the rest of the qualitative data 
was compared. I performed this research to investigate how changes in learning are 
reflected in changes in language. The following statements summarize and mark a final 
interpretation of the findings, 
1. Language patterns do seem to change in identifiable ways which reflect 
learning. 
2. Enrichment by mere number of instructional metaphors cannot be as valuable 
as enrichment by quality and depth of engagement with the metaphors to develop what 
they can really teach us. 
3. Copying will always be with us; perhaps we can use that fact to our 
advantage. 
4. Creativity is not merely related to ability to learn, but can be a rich source of 
learning in itself. 
Implications and Conclusion 
 Two implications of a conceptual integration approach to education become 
immediately apparent: (a) conceptual integration could potentially provide measures of 
content-domain mastery and conceptualization; and (b) conceptual integration could lead 
to enhanced teacher effectiveness through the more deliberate use and application of 
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instructional metaphors (as well as other linguistic and cognitive means) and increased 
sensitivity to specifics of student understanding.  
For teachers, the diagnostic possibilities are tantalizing. For example, can 
conceptual integration teach us to write more effective assessment prompts for the 
facilitation of more complex, dynamic, deeper, thinking and learning implied by the 
conceptual integration model and measurable as blends and vital relations? Or perhaps by 
analyzing student comments from the conceptual integration perspective, a teacher might 
become aware of information or processes that could be helpful in remediating some 
learning obstacles.      
The reader will remember an example provided in Chapter IV where a participant 
presented the identity statement, “[h]eredity is your heritage, your background.” The 
writer used geographic/locative terms--“background,” “where,” “come,” and “from”--for 
a word, heritage, connotative of cultural heredity. Remember the lack of direct 
connection to biological processes and products, a common aspect of many simplex 
blends. This participant’s identity statement did not provide enough information even for 
a simplex blend.  
In a classroom, this type of distinction could provide a teacher with more effective 
and subtle powers of diagnosis and instructional remediation. In this case, for example, a 
Vygotskyan/constructivist teacher could at first build on the cultural metaphor the 
participant already has as a frame of reference for this content domain by demonstrating 
ways the metaphor source (e.g., “background”) is accurate (BACKGROUND = “something 
in historical past”). The teacher would nudge the student to consider “people”—such as 
grandparents—as part of “something in the historical past,” providing a conceptual bridge 
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from history to biology and from biology to genes, genetics, and heredity. Then over 
time, the teacher would introduce (“instruct”) and help the student develop (“construct”) 
other, more salient, and personally relevant and accurate metaphors.    
Further research in conceptual integration will not be limited to education, of 
course. Here are a few other fields of interest for non-education researchers in conceptual 
integration: communication, business and advertising, psychology, developmental 
psychology, forensics, problem-solving, psychopathology, and psychotherapy.  
Responsible, responsive teachers, as lifelong learners, will always work on ways 
to improve their understanding of and practice in the judicious and effective use of any 
teaching tools, especially those with such powerful potential, such as metaphor. My own 
teaching will change as a result of this study. I will not expect meaning to be in my 
metaphors any more than it is in my words. I will take the time to analyze instructional 
metaphors with students in order to help them realize multiple, even contradictory aspects 
of topics. Because the meaning students attain is not a matter of what I give them but of 
what they can mentally construct in the learning environment I try to create for them. I 
will also regularly ask for and attempt novel metaphors; who knows what I and my 
students might learn? With the right approach, we can learn much. 
Through more accurate diagnosis and more accurate and subtle application of 
what this could teach educators about their own language use in the classroom, new 
techniques from conceptual integration theory for measuring changes in an individual’s 
understanding of a concept, psychologists will have another analytical tool at their 
disposal. The techniques developed in this study could eventually assist test makers in 
creating more effective, valid, and reliable assessments. Many stakeholders, from 
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students to educators, to politicians and publishers, could benefit. Additionally, and most 
importantly, from the perspective of day to day schooling, the same stakeholders will 
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(An asterisk (*) denotes graphic picture/text support from Power Point presentation of 
key concepts/ vocabulary provided throughout script. With the exception of the title, 
capitalized words in the text are to be shown on-screen (as a subtitle or as part of the 
graphic screen’s text) when they are mentioned and are specific answers to selected 
response (matching) questions in the pre-and post-assessments. Camera and “stage” 
directions, as per convention, are in italics.)  
 
1. (Dissolve from title, *1 Review of Genes, Genetics, and Heredity to close-up) 
Hello. My name is Robert Johnson. Thank you for participating in this research 
about the psychology of teaching and learning. Today I will be presenting a brief 
lesson about several closely- related, vitally important, and fascinating topics: 
Genes, Genetics, and Heredity. As mentioned in the informed consent form you 
signed just before the pretest phase of this research, this study is designed to test 
how teacher language is reflected in student language and learning. The different 
groups to which you have been assigned will be viewing and hearing slightly 
different versions of an otherwise identical lesson. At no time in the lesson is 
there any purposeful deception, so you won’t need to focus on exact details of 
accuracy about the topics. The only differences between the lessons will be in the 
types of metaphors used to describe various aspects of the topics. And remember, 
in psychology, as distinct from literature, the term “metaphor” refers to any figure 
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of speech, not only the traditional metaphoric construction of a literature-based 
metaphor, such as, “Life is a journey.”   
 
2. To preview our lesson, I will be discussing a bit about the history of the science of 
genetics and heredity, what genes are, and where they are found. Then I will 
explain some of the structures, functions, processes, and products of genes. That 
is, I will discuss what they look like, how they work, what they do, and what they 
make. But I will first explain some of the reasons genetics is considered by so 
many people to be one of the most important fields of science. 
 
3. (Medium shot, include screen behind presenter) By learning about how genes 
work, agricultural scientists having been working to improve crops and livestock. 
(*2; two farm scenes) Thus in both agricultural science and animal husbandry, 
genetics holds the promise of providing more food for more people all across the 
world. But botany and zoology are only two of the major areas of scientific 
concern dealing with genes, genetics and heredity.  
 
4. A third field with interest in genes, genetics, and heredity is medicine. (*3; 
medical research) Many medical researchers are finding genetic links to various 
types of illness and disease. There is a rapid pace of discovery in genetic 
approaches to birth defects, many types of cancer, many viruses, and diseases 
such as diabetes, Parkinson’s disease, and Alzheimer’s disease. By understanding 
the genetic links to these and other ailments, scientists hope to alleviate the 




5. A fourth field of interest and promise lies in the search for genetic engineering 
applications to environmental issues such as waste management (*4; landfill/ 
biofuel plant) and fuel production.  
 
6. Even archeologists and historians are using genetic evidence to trace the 
movements of ancient peoples across the earth in prehistoric times. (*5; world 
map) With these important possibilities ahead of us, it is no wonder that so much 
scientific attention is being paid to genes, genetics, and heredity. 
 
7. Today, I will discuss various elements of our topic, but I would like you to listen 
especially for how genes are defined, what they look like, where they are located, 
what they do, and what they produce. In short, I will review some of the 
information about the structures, functions, processes, and products of genes. 
Over the years, scientists have used many different metaphoric descriptions of 
genes and genetic processes.  
 
 
(Group C-control goes to Paragraph #8 now. Group E-experimental gets both the 
Blueprint and Recipe metaphors.)  
 
(Presenter does quarter turn—cut— to new camera angle for both of the metaphors. 
At end of recipe metaphor, a quarter turn –cut— back to original camera angle. 




Group E (Blueprint): 
Some people metaphorically describe genes do as a kind of * blueprint.  
(* 6; blueprint and house) 
That is, just as a blueprint provides information on the building design and structure to 
a builder with precise graphic descriptions of what needs to be done, with what 
materials, in what order, and with particular types of uses in mind, genes somehow 
provide information (in the form of templates, guidelines, or instructions) that 
determines the structures and functions of the cells of an organism. The information 
directs what the cells do, using particular molecules, working in a particular sequence, 
assembling particular chemicals and cellular tissues with one or more particular useful 
functions/products as a result.                     (Continue) Group E (Recipe): 
Some people metaphorically describe the work the genes do as a kind of * recipe. 
(* 7; recipe, cake) 
That is, just as a recipe provides a chef with precise descriptions and directions of 
what needs to be done, with what ingredients, in what order, and with particular uses 
in mind, genes determine what the structures of cells will consist of and look like, and 
what functions the cells of an organism will perform. Genes determine what cells are 
supposed to do, using molecular ingredients, working in a particular sequence, and 
with a particular useful function/product as a result.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Group C (No overt metaphoric description; skip directly from paragraph 7 to 
paragraph 8): 
(Both groups re-enter the lesson’s text from here forward.) 
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8. (Return to close-up after presenter’s quarter turn; graphics on bottom of screen 
as mentioned-add and retain all till end of paragraph) But any metaphoric 
description, no matter how well it communicates some aspects of what is being 
described, still falls short of being entirely accurate. With this in mind, let us take 
a brief look at how our understanding of genes, genetics, and heredity has 
developed. 
 
For thousands of years, people have wondered about how all living things grow, 
survive, change, and pass certain characteristics to succeeding generations. As 
scientific techniques and tools became more precise, many of these ancient 
questions have begun to be resolved. Over the course of the last 150 years, 
scientists have discovered that growth, survival, change, and reproduction in all 
known life are functions of tiny segments of DNA molecules called “genes” (from 
the Greek word for “birth”). Thus, the study of genes is called “genetics,” and the 
process of how characteristics are passed from one generation to the next is called 
“HEREDITY.” Unlocking the secrets of how these molecules work has been one 
of the great scientific achievements of all time. And new discoveries in this field 
are still being made. There is even a new field emerging, called epigenetics, 
which concerns how multiple generations of an organism respond to changing 
environmental pressures. 
 
9. (Return to medium shot, with screen; include graphics at bottom, changing as 
mentioned) Now, let’s move to just what genes are, and where they are found. As 
microscopes were improved over the years, it was discovered that all living things 
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were made up of one or more cells, (*8; single cell) and that these cells could 
divide to create more cells. (*9; cell division) Careful observations of cells during 
division revealed that within the cells were even smaller structures which seemed 
to control their workings. (*10; cell nuclei) These structures, the “nuclei,” had 
even tinier molecules inside them which came to be called “CHROMOSOMES.” 
(*11; chromosomes) Every species has a particular number of chromosomes; 
humans, for example have forty six. The chromosomes were found to be very 
long and very tightly wrapped chains of amino-acid molecules known as DNA.  
 
Genes are specific sets or combinations of molecules along the chains of DNA 
(*12; DNA), made of four basic chemicals represented by the letters A, T, C, and 
G. These chains of DNA molecules were found to form a structure now famously 
known as a double helix, which looks like a very long, tightly coiled or twisted 
ladder. The basic unit of genetic code is called a “CODON” (*13; codon chart), 
the smallest functional working part of a string of genetic information –only some 
combination of three of these molecules, in fact.  
 
10. (Return to close-up; continue graphics at bottom on mention) Every living thing 
has a particular set of genes and DNA unique to its species. Humans, for example, 
are thought to have about thirty thousand different genes scattered along their 
forty-six chromosomes. While some of these genes may work independently, 
many of their functions are the result of partnerships among them. Also, many 
genes and gene partnerships may have multiple functions. All of this occurs on a 
very small scale; there are nearly three billion locations for the molecules which 
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make up gene sets on human chromosomes. Further complicating matters is the 
fact that many of these specific sets of genes may be hundreds or even thousands 
of molecules long. Interestingly, particular genes may occur in many different 
species.  
 
11. (Medium plus screen, plus graphics) Having seen what genes are and where they 
are located, we can now consider some of the processes genes control. Amino 
acids such as DNA are part of a very large family of complex organic chemicals 
known as “PROTEINS” (*14; proteins), from the Greek term for “I come first”. 
The origin of this term implies that proteins are the most important chemicals in 
living things. Indeed, some of the most important products of gene expression are 
another type of protein known as “ENZYMES,” (*15; enzyme) which seem to 
initiate and regulate a great many gene activities, such as molecular assembly and 
disassembly, reproduction, growth, and change in an organism.  In short, most of 
the work genes do is primarily involved in producing or constructing proteins of 
one kind or another, and most of these proteins are enzymes. 
 
12. Basically, the expression of genes controls or regulates two main functions: 1) 
regulation of growth (through typical cell division-mitosis) and 2) regulation of 
reproduction (through sexual recombination-meiosis). Thus, every cell in every 
living organism contains a chemical copy of the set of genes which allow the 
organism to grow and reproduce. So, regardless of whether an organism is a cow, 
a cauliflower, an amoeba, a person, or a snail, (*16; composite) that organism 
contains a genetic code in its DNA which promotes the survival of its species 
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through growth and reproduction. A closely related sub-category of DNA, RNA, 
is a special gene sequence involved in much of a cell’s internal growth, structure, 
and function.  
 
13. Because RNA is so important, it warrants a brief explanation here. Two forms of 
RNA are necessary for the DNA to make copies of itself, which ability is the 
basic reason DNA is considered the essential chemical basis of life. (*17; RNA 
and DNA) One form, messenger RNA or mRNA, is responsible for preparing a 
nucleus and the rest of its cell to be copied by signaling the readiness to do so to 
the various bits and pieces of potential new cellular material floating in the 
cytoplasm of the cell outside the nucleus. The second form of RNA is transfer 
RNA, or tRNA. These tiny components of the nucleus actually travel through the 
porous nucleus wall and attach to—or collect— the specific bits of material called 
for by the mRNA from the cytoplasm and return them to interior of the nucleus to 
start building new DNA. The new DNA is produced by a lengthwise split of the 
DNA’s ladder-like molecules, which provides exact templates to which the new 
molecules, with help of the tRNA, attach. This process of synthesizing matched 
copies of original DNA strands is called “REPLICATION.”     
 
14. Broadly speaking, the particular DNA sequence, or genetic information for a 
given species is called its “GENOTYPE.” All of the individuals in a species have 
this genotype as a baseline of traits or characteristics such as basic size, shape, 
gender, body parts, etc. Depending on the exact application of a given sub-field of 
genetics, the term “genotype” may refer to an instinctive behavioral trait, a 
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physical characteristic, or to an entire species. (*18; composite of different 
humans) With this genotype as a starting point, environment, experience, and 
nurturing shape the individual organism during its life, giving each individual a 
both species-typical body and a unique form, called a “PHENOTYPE.”  
 
The genotype may be understood as the particular chemical formula or starting 
point for the development of traits and characteristics for a given species, but the 
phenotype may be understood as the resulting physical or behavioral 
manifestations of the actual physical bodies of individual members of that species. 
Technically, even the manifest results of genetically induced behavior— beyond 
or outside of – a species’ physical bodies are sometimes considered phenotypes. 
For example, cities may be considered a phenotype of the human genes which 
evolved to favor social and cultural cooperation. (*19; city and beaver pond) 
Another example would be the lakes created by beavers’ genetically induced 
gnawing behavior. The entire typical set of a species’ total genetic information is 
called its “GENOME.” In an amazing world-wide effort, scientists have recently 
“mapped out” the entire three billion gene positions of the human genome.  
 
15. As individuals reproduce and continue the species, certain characteristics or traits 
are expressed, and certain others are not expressed. These characteristics are 
called, respectively, dominant and recessive. The genes responsible for passing of 
these characteristics to given individuals, such as eye color, or blood type, are 
called “ALLELES.” (*20; eyes) Basically, alleles are different forms of the same 
gene. They will be found in the same location on the same chromosome with the 
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same length of chemical instructions; however, there will be very slight 
differences within the chemical sections, accounting for the differences in 
dominant or recessive characteristics. 
 
16. There is still much to be learned about genes. They seem to be at the center of our 
ongoing search for how cells copy each other for growth and even for creating 
new individuals from older ones. Before cells divide for growth through 
“mitosis,” their genes usually control a process where DNA strands duplicate and 
split apart. When this synthesis of creating new parts is accomplished, the new 
cells are practically exact copies of the previous “parent” cell, and this process is 
called cell reproduction.  
 
17. In sexual reproduction, though, the process of “meiosis” provides a different kind 
of duplication and matching. Here, instead of one donor cell dividing into two 
daughter cells, there are two donor cells, combining separate contributions of the 
cells of the parents. Occasionally, the halves of the chromosomes do not find and 
bind to exact matches, and change occurs. This change process is called 
“MUTATION,” an abrupt heritable change in a single allele, gene or region of a 
chromosome. Mutation is very typical in any species. Usually, a mutation is not 
copied any further, and there is no further change in the individual or the species. 
However, sometimes, the change can be beneficial, and the mutation stays with 
the organism and the species more or less permanently, as a positive mechanism 




18. Recently, researchers have begun to use cells to copy entire organisms in 
laboratories without involving typically necessary sexual reproductive processes. 
This process, called “cloning,” has moved from single-cell organisms to plants 
and animals. Thus a “CLONE” (*21; Dolly) is an organism genetically identical 
to a single ancestor, produced by asexual reproduction. There is an on-going 
debate about whether cloning humans is possible or ethically acceptable.  
 
19. This brief lesson about genes, genetics, and heredity has probably been a mere 
review for most of you, but it is likely that your performance on the upcoming 
assessment will be much improved over the pretest you took before. I hope you 
have been able to benefit from this lesson, and that you will use it for accurate and 
thoughtful responses to the questions in the next part of this research. We will 
now convene for a posttest similar to the one you took a short while ago. Then we 
will ask for some final responses about your opinions regarding the content of this 
lesson. Of course, for the posttest, we hope you will be thorough, thoughtful, and 
even creative when it comes to the last sections on developing your own 
metaphoric descriptions regarding the structure, functions, products, and 
























































(ID: please write your initials and the last three numbers of your Bear Number- _____ + 
___) 
(Demographic information: Gender______; Age______; Major______) 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please complete and turn in each page in order. Do NOT look or work 
ahead. 
 
1. Please describe in the spaces provided below everything you know about GENES, 
GENETICS, HEREDITY and their functions and processes, linking the words or 






























Please match the definition below with its term on the right. Mark your choice by writing 
the letter of the term in the space at the beginning of its correct definition. No term will 
be used more than once. 
 
Definitions        Terms 
 a- chromosomes 
 
 b- allele 
 
1 ___ : one or more possible forms of a gene, 
affecting whether a trait is dominant or recessive.  
c- genotype 
2 ___ : basic unit of genetic code 
 
      d- diploid 
3 ___ : genetic information about a species 
 
      e- protein 
4 ___ : special protein type, which fuels 
assembly, 
reproduction, and change in an organism 
 
      f- centromere 
5 ___ is the study of how traits of an organism are 
passed from one generation to the next 
 
      g- heredity 
6 ___ : the primary product of genes 
 
      h- codon 
7 ___ the specific physical form an individual  
attains through genes plus experience 
 
      i- chromatid 
8 ___  Long molecular chains of chemically-
coded genetic “instructions” for growth and 
regulation of cellular functions/activities, 
structures, and replication, specific and unique to 
each species 
      j- enzyme 
       k- autosome 










(ID: please write your initials and the last three numbers of your Bear Number- _____ + 
_____) 
 
1. Now please summarize below what you recall of anything you ever knew about  
GENES, GENETICS, HEREDITY, especially as a result of the recent video 






























(ID: please write your initials and the last three numbers of your Bear Number- _____ + 
_____) 
 
Please match the definition below with its term on the right. Mark your choice by writing 
the letter of the term in the space at the beginning of its definition. No term will be used 
more than once. 
 
 
Definitions        Terms 
 
1 ___  : one or more possible forms of a gene, 
affecting whether a trait is dominant or recessive.  
a- chromosomes 
2 ___ : basic unit of genetic code b- allele 
3 ___ : genetic information about a species c- genotype 
4 ___ : special protein type, which fuels assembly, 
reproduction, and change in an organism 
d- phenotype 
5 ___ : is the study of how traits of an organism 
are passed from one generation to the next 
e- proteins 
6 ___ : the primary product of genes f- enzyme 
7 ___ : the specific physical form an individual 
attains through genetic coding 
g- heredity 
8 ___  Long molecular chains of chemically-coded 
genetic “instructions” for growth and regulation of 
cellular functions/activities, structures, and 
replication, specific and unique to each species 
h- codon 
9___ : change in a gene i- replication 
10__ : an organism identical to a single ancestor, 
produced by asexual reproduction 
j- genome 
11___ : the synthesis of DNA k- clone 
12 ___ : the total genes in the basic set of 
















(ID: please write your initials and the last three numbers of your Bear Number- _____ + 
_____) 
 
Of the following alphabetical list of possible metaphorical descriptors of 





• instruction manuals 
• interchangeable parts 























Are there any other metaphorical descriptions you can think of which might help you or 
other students understand the concepts (especially the functions and processes) related to 





Please turn in this sheet before we close this session with a debriefing page, time for 












CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION MATRIX:  

















Conceptual Integration Matrix: Blends and Vital Relations 
Blend Type → Simplex Mirror Single Scope Double Scope 
Vital Relations ↓     
1 Analogy     
2 Category     
3 Cause-Effect     
4 Change     
5 Disanalogy     
6 Identity     
7 Intentionality     
8 Part-Whole     
9 Property     
10 Representation     
11 Role     
12 Similarity     
13 Space     
14 Time     


































Project Title: A CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION ANALYSIS OF INSTRUCTIONAL 
METAPHORS IN SCIENCE 
Researchers: Dr. Kathryn Cochran and Robert Johnson 
Contact Information: 970-351-1681; Kathryn.cochran@unco.edu 
             970-227-3758; robertbjohnson@go.com 
 
This study is designed to test how well certain instructional metaphors help 
teachers educate students. Teachers use many metaphors in the course of instruction, in 
order to provide students with relevant examples of different aspects of a given topic.  
In psychology, as distinct from literature, the term “metaphor” is used as a general 
reference to any figure of speech. Thus, metaphors per se, and also similes, irony, 
proverbs, etc. are lumped together as examples of metaphoric descriptions, unless there is 
a specific need to distinguish one kind from another. My work is designed to help 
teachers provide more effective metaphors in order to help students learn more 
information more accurately.  
The study will consist of a pretest asking for some full-sentence responses and a 
brief matching quiz to establish a baseline of information about your current knowledge 
of genes, genetics, and heredity. Then you will be assigned at random to a smaller group 
to view an instructional video on the topic. After this brief video, you will be given a 
posttest involving the same basic information asked for in the pretest plus a few more 
questions about what you may have learned or recalled about the topic after seeing the 
video lesson.  
Near the end of the posttest, you will be provided with a list of several descriptive 
metaphors used by science in the past for some of the structures, functions, and processes 
associated with the study of genes, genetics, and heredity. You will be asked determine 
and explain your reasoning of the three “best” descriptors. A final question is completely 
open-ended, asking you to name and explain—if possible—a different descriptor of your 
own which could help explain the topic. 
We appreciate your help with this study. Should you decide to help us, we will 
proceed in this room right away. Your participation should be no more taxing or 
strenuous that taking a quiz. We are unaware of any risk of performing these tasks. 
However, should you choose to participate and find that any part is too distressing, you 
may quit at any time, for any reason, without penalty. We anticipate that this study will 
take no more than two hours to complete.  
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There is no deception in this study, and the test items are not tricks to see if you 
can find minor inaccuracies in terminology. The terms may, however, be somewhat 
different in detail than what you may know or recall from your own experience in 
previous class work. This is simply because we have taken the terminology from several 
sources; different specialists may have slightly different definitions for given terms, 
based on the specific uses in their respective fields.  
We will also ask some basic questions about yourself (e.g., gender, age, major) to 
help our understanding of the demographics of your group and to allow us to organize the 
data effectively. We will make all of your individual data completely anonymous. Other 
than the researchers, no one will be granted access to your individual data. We will not 
release any information about you to your professors, other students, etc., and maintain a 
high standard of protecting your privacy.  
 After the initial pretest and subsequent grouping, at no time will any individually 
identifying information be used or disseminated. All reasonable measures and cautions 
will be taken to provide confidentiality. The proposed research involves no more than 
minimal risk to any participants. 
At no time will you be exposed to any harmful environment or inaccurate 
information. Results will be reported only on the relative effects of the instructional 
metaphors on group performance. Upon completion of the study, I will share the results 
with any professors and students who so desire. Other than a possible improvement in 
understanding the topic, it is unlikely that your participation will result in any direct 
benefits to you as an individual. You will already have already received a credit slip for 
your class by keeping your appointment with us. 
By signing below, you are acknowledging that:  
1) You understand that participation in this study is only one way to satisfy the 
research experience for your PSY 120 class and that you may select an alternative 
assignment to being a research participant. 
2) Participation is voluntary. You may decide not to participate in this study and if 
you begin participation, you may still decide to stop and withdraw at any time. 
Your decision will be respected and will not result in loss of benefits to which 
you are otherwise entitled. Having read the above and having had the opportunity 
to ask any questions, please sign below if you would like to participate in this 
research. A copy of this form will be given to you to retain for future reference. If 
you have any concerns about your selection or treatment as a research participant, 
please contact the  Sponsored Programs and Academic Research Center, Kepner 
Hall, University of Northern Colorado, Greeley, CO 80639; 970-351-1907. 
 
Participant Signature: ________________________________ Date: ______________ 





INSTRUCTIONAL METAPHORS IN SCIENCE 
WHAT THIS STUDY IS ABOUT: 
 
This study is designed to test how certain types of teacher language in a lecture 
format affect student learning. To that end, the two groups of participants have been 
presented with nearly identical instructional videos containing small but very specific 
differences in the metaphoric language used by the instructor. The common current and 
most widely used metaphors about the topics—genes, genetics, and heredity—have been 
presented. 
We have provided a format including both quantitative assessment, in the form of 
a matching quiz, and qualitative assessment in the form of short-answer written 
responses. We will compare the quantitative results of the different groups to determine if 
either of the two primary metaphors in question, that is, “blueprints” or “recipes,” have 
any inherent relative strengths or weaknesses.  The written answers will be analyzed for 
more subtle differences in use or understanding. 
First we will determine if either group’s changes in qualitative scores match 
observable changes in frequency or elaboration of the metaphors participants use in their 
written responses. Then we will try to determine how much of any changes in language 
may be attributable to mimicry of different metaphors used in different lectures. Finally, 
using a technique specifically designed for this research, we will test whether improved 
selected-response scores in the posttest reflect improved understanding through the use of 
a specific, given, metaphor, or if the act of elaborative thinking involved in using 
metaphors more deeply in itself develops the understanding of the concepts being taught. 
In short, we will use the information gathered in this research to help teachers do 
a better job of explaining sometimes hard-to-understand topics such as genes, genetics, 
and heredity. Please ask any question you like now or via email: Robert Johnson 
(Principle Investigator) john5602@bears.unco.edu or Dr. Kathryn Cochran (Faculty 
Sponsor) Kathryn.cochran@unco.edu. 
 
